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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines backsourcing of corporate IS activities, and why IS
outsourcing clients decide to backsource. Information Systems (IS) backsourcing is a
business practice in which a company takes back in-house assets, activities, and skills
that are part of its IS operations and were previously outsourced to one or more outside
information service suppliers. Focusing on economic, strategic and relationship motives,
a number of theoretical backsourcing factors is derived from transaction cost theory,
agency theory, core competency perspective, IOR theory and marketing channels
literature. The economic lens considers asset specificity of outsourcing activities, and
cost benefits and switching costs of backsourcing. The strategic lens examines the change
in the role of IS, loss of control over IS direction, and internal and external structural
changes in the organization. The relationship lens examines goal conflict between the
client and the provider, service quality and client satisfaction with an outsourcing
arrangement, the client’s trust in the provider and voice behavior of the client.
To identify factors salient in IS backsourcing and to examine the process of
backsourcing this dissertation employs exploratory case study methodology. Six
outsourcing contracts within three client companies are analyzed. The evidence is
collected using semi-structured interviews, archival records and company documents.
Results of individual cases are reported and then triangulated to single out the primary
backsourcing antecedents. Qualitative comparative analysis is employed to augment the
findings.
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The findings indicate that power of decision makers and other organizations,
change in the role of IS, cost benefit of backsourcing, service quality of the outsourcing
arrangement, loss of control over the outsourcing arrangement and changes in the
management impact backsourcing decisions. While service quality and cost
considerations are important deliverables in the outsourcing contract, these factors by
itself do not justify the decision to backsource. Strategic considerations, a change in the
role of IS and a loss of control, dominate the backsourcing decision even if costs or
service quality suggest otherwise. The dissertation also highlights the role of authority of
company executives in the backsourcing decision. The executives exert power through
their structural position within an organization and have a major impact on decisions.
Executives’ beliefs, prior experience and values impact their perception of backsourcing
and play a role in backsourcing decisions. Additionally, the dissertation uncovers the
importance of power of other organizations involved in the interorganizational
relationships with the client company. These organizations use political maneuvering to
impose their goals on the client organization. Understanding the underlying reasons for
backsourcing provides managers with better decision tools when reviewing the
outsourcing contract as termination nears or as major environmental changes occur.
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION

Backsourcing Phenomenon
Information systems backsourcing is a business practice in which a company
takes back in-house assets, activities, and skills that are part of its information systems
operations and were previously outsourced to one or more outside information services
providers. Backsourcing does not have to be an all-or-nothing proposition (Buxbaum
2002), and depending on the circumstances companies undergo partial or complete
reversal of an outsourcing contract.
Backsourcing, as the term implies, follows the initial outsourcing arrangement,
and can be a result of an expired, renegotiated or terminated outsourcing contract. The
global outsourcing market has been growing steadily from revenues of U.S.$9 billion in
1990 (Lacity and Willcocks 2000), to U.S.$120 billion in the year 2002, and was
estimated to reach U.S.$150 billion by 2004 (Lacity and Willcocks 2001). Yankee Group
predicts that this growth will continue at 10% to 12% annually through 2006 (Kaplan
2003). Companies of all sizes pursue outsourcing arrangements, and many multimillion
dollar deals have been widely publicized.
Outsourcing is viewed as wholly satisfactory by 55% of the companies involved
in this arrangement, and as partially satisfactory by 39% (Lackow 2001). Even though
information systems (IS) outsourcing contracts exhibit rather high success rates, some
problems still arise in this customer-supplier relationship. Outsourcing frequently has
been found to be poorly controlled, high in cost, and a drain on quality and service
1

performance (King and Malhotra 2000).

Outsourcing disadvantages include loss of

expertise and control of IS direction (Benko 1992; Quinn and Hilmer 1994), increased
costs (Doig, Ritter, Speckhals et al. 2001), lack of flexibility in addressing change in the
business (Quinn 1999), and dissatisfied customers. All of these problems diminish the
business value of the outsourced processes and make the current arrangement
unprofitable. Furthermore, outsourcing contracts often do not specify outsourced services
in detail. This is usually more detrimental to the customer than the outsourcing provider
because it places the customer at a disadvantage in terms of pricing services. Because of
this, conflicts may arise in the relationship between the client and the provider.
Consequently, some IS outsourcing deals get renegotiated or even canceled before their
expiration.
Once the decision to terminate the contract has been made, or the contract is about
to expire, the company faces a choice of either staying with the current provider, hiring
another provider to manage the IS functions, or taking activities and assets back in-house.
Lacity and Willcocks found that almost one-third of the canceled contracts were
eventually brought back in-house, or backsourced (2001).

Examples of IS Backsourcing
While there is an abundance of theoretical frameworks, qualitative and
quantitative studies on IS outsourcing, IS backsourcing issues are rarely discussed in the
literature. There are, however, more and more real life examples of both total and
selective backsourcing found in both practitioner and academic literature. Various
companies seem to have chosen to backsource for different reasons. All of this existing
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anecdotal evidence can be grouped into several general trends in the backsourcing
scenarios (Table 1.1). Whereas the most commonly cited motive for outsourcing is costs
savings, backsourcing also can be prompted by other factors that can be grouped into
strategic, economic and relationship reasons.
Table 1.1. Motives for Backsourcing
Examples
MLC, Australia
Oxford Health Plans
Sears in U.K.
East Midlands Electricity
Bank One
Suncorp Group, Australia
Halifax Bank of Scotland
J.P. Morgan
LSI Logic Corp, USA
Farmers Group
Bank One
Xerox
Washington Mutual
Continental Airlines

Key Motives
· Need to gain control over IS

Category
Strategic

· Change in the importance of IS

· Structural changes in organization

· Cost Savings

Economic

· Questionable performance of the provider

Relationship

· Tension between parties over contract

There is a number of possible strategic reasons to reverse the outsourcing contract
which include the need to regain control over the IS functions, redefinition of the
importance of the IS function for the organization and internal or external structural
changes. One of the most frequent reasons for the termination of outsourcing contracts
and taking the function back in-house is the loss of control over the direction of IS. For
example, Australian-based financial services giant MLC brought back in-house
management of its application development and maintenance after renegotiating its
outsourcing agreement with IBM Global Services (Australia). MLC felt they needed to
have control over the IS enabled business solutions (Lacity et al. 2001). When Oxford
Health Plus ended its relationship with CSC in 2002, it aimed to integrate IS functions,
3

which could help to deploy technology solutions in a more flexible and timely manner to
meet its business goals (Bushell 2003). As the business needs of Oxford were changing,
its IS needs were changing as well; backsourcing was the only way to regain control over
the entire IS function and to use technology effectively.
Another motive for backsourcing involves redefinition of the importance of IS
and change in the IS requirements and the context. For instance, Sears’ U.K-based
operations canceled a £344 million 10 year outsourcing contract with Andersen
Consulting after just 17 months. It took back 500 employees and chose the selective
outsourcing route. In the new arrangement, the internal staff focused on new application
development, whereas the provider managed more mundane functions (Lacity et al. 2000;
Lacity et al. 2001). In another case, East Midlands Electricity cancelled its 12-year
contract with Perot Systems five years early. The management of the company had
redefined the importance of IS to its business and decided to rebuild the in-house skills
(Kern and Willcocks 2001).
Some organizations may decide to bring IS back in-house in response to structural
business changes such as acquisitions, divestitures and mergers. The previously existing
arrangements within the old companies may not meet the needs of the new organization.
When Suncorp Group, Australia acquired GIO, the decision was made to transfer GIO’s
IS functions in-house as the best way to maintain a competitive advantage and achieve
the benefits of platform synergies (Bushell 2003). In a similar context, Halifax Bank of
Scotland (HBOS) canceled its outsourcing contract with IBM and Xansa, when Bank of
Scotland and Halifax Building Society merged. The requirements of the business changed
and HBOS took the outsourced processes back in-house (Bushell 2003). Most recently
4

J.P. Morgan pulled the plug on their seven-year U.S. $5 billion deal with IBM less than
two years into the contract after it merged with Bank One. J.P. Morgan decided that
managing their own technology infrastructure was best for their long-term growth and
success (Morgenson, 2004).
Economic reasons and cost savings remain salient for backsourcing consideration
as well. For some outsourcing arrangements, cost savings never materialize. For instance,
Farmers Group insurance company terminated a 10-year U.S. $150 million outsourcing
contract with Integrated Systems Solutions (division of IBM) eight years into the deal
due to escalating costs. Even with U.S.$4 million in cancellation fees Farmers Groups
was saving U.S.$6 million a year within the first year of backsourcing (Overby 2003a).
In the case of long term outsourcing contracts, as the costs of technology decrease over
time, the client company may be unwilling to pay fees specified in the service level
agreement that are above the market rates. On the other hand, companies often realize
that they can implement the same effective strategies internally. For example, US-based
chipmaker LSI Logic Corp terminated its outsourcing contract with IBM Global Services,
and was able to save 33% in costs as a result (Lacity et al. 2001).
In addition to the above mentioned strategic and economic issues, the client may
also backsource because of the unsatisfactory relationship with the provider. The
problem of the questionable performance on the part of the provider arises in 25% of
outsourcing relationships and may lead to backsourcing (Lackow 2001). Xerox contract
with EDS can be an example of such difficulties. Xerox had undergone selective
backsourcing in 1998 by adjusting its exposure to its main provider, EDS. While the deal
with EDS was often considered strategically successful, at the operational level service
5

performance remained far below expectations in many areas such as telecommunications
and laptop services. Because of the low service performance, Xerox decided to withdraw
the services and support for laptops from EDS (Kern et al. 2001). In another case,
Washington Mutual took back help desk, network management, architecture and strategy
work while restructuring the contract with IBM Global Services (IGS). Calls to the help
desk weren’t being answered in a timely manner, which was giving IT a bad reputation;
IT service levels were low under the management of IGS. Backsourcing was done to
improve service levels and offer additional value to the customers, not for cost reasons
(Overby 2003b).
In many cases, companies undergo backsourcing for a combination of reasons
including economic, strategic and relationship. For example, Continental Airlines was in
financial distress when it outsourced nearly all of its IS to EDS with the cost savings as
the primary motivation. Over time, tensions have developed between some of Continental
and EDS’ staff regarding expectations of what services should be provided according to
the agreement. At the same time, Continental recognized the potential value that IS can
bring to its business and was trying to improve its operations using the new technologies
such as online ticketing. Unfortunately, EDS did not have the capabilities and skills to
support the new needs of the airline. As a result, four years after the signing of the
contract Continental Airlines reconsidered EDS’ particular competencies, strategic
implications of each IS and business function as well as relationship conflicts.
Continental Airlines brought much of its IS back in-house, arriving at a 50-50
outsourced-insourced equilibrium (Buxbaum 2002; Christensen and Pearlson 1996). This
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decision was driven by strategic and relationship considerations which included tension
over the contract with the provider and changes in the importance and role of IS.
Bank One also decided to backsource for a combination of reasons, including
strategic and economic. It cancelled its outsourcing arrangements with IBM and AT&T
Solutions to cut operating costs, improve customer service and be able to quickly
implement new products and services. There was no dissatisfaction with either
outsourcing provider, but a change in the philosophy of how they wanted to do business
and change in the positioning of IS in its business. As a result of backsourcing, the bank
expected to cut U.S. $200,000 in annual operating costs. A company of this size can
achieve the same cost efficiencies as outsourcing providers by purchasing hardware,
software and IS services directly from the manufacturers (Hoffman 2003).
While a multitude of reasons can affect the decision to reverse the outsourcing
arrangement, one of the factors either strategic, economic or relationship seems to
dominate this decision. Even though there are multiple reports of backsourcing activity,
taking outsourced functions back in-house can be a time consuming and expensive
proposition (Christensen et al. 1996). Issues of intellectual property ownership, changes
to the IT structure (Doig et al. 2001), recruitment of skillful and knowledgeable IS
personnel and large switching costs (Kern and Willcocks 2002) can complicate the
transition. Thus, it is crucial that the companies undergo a thorough evaluation of the
existing outsourcing contract before pursuing backsourcing.

7

Problem Statement
Backsourcing is a significant emerging trend, and a number of companies have
returned outsourced functions back in-house. While there are some explanations of
backsourcing phenomenon in both academic and popular press, most of it is conjectures
and anecdotal evidence. There has been no theoretically grounded study of this
phenomenon. However, Lacity and Willcocks recognized its importance when they called
for the investigation of the factors that lead to backsourcing (2000). This research is the
first attempt to examine theoretical underpinning of IS backsourcing.
Backsourcing is preceded by the contract with an IS outsourcing provider.
Relationship with the provider is a dynamic process that is affected by various factors
throughout its development. Reported instances of backsourcing demonstrate that
performance issues, conflicts between the parties and lack of expertise on the part of the
provider may sour the relationship (Kern et al. 2001; Lacity et al. 2001). Unsuccessful
outsourcing relationships can lead to premature cancellation of the contract or
nonrenewal at expiration. At the same time, clients undergo business changes and
continuously reevaluate the existing IS outsourcing arrangements. Regardless of the
problems that may arise in the outsourcing relationship, some clients may backsource due
to changes in business strategy or to streamline their operations.
Why would organizations take back in-house assets, activities, and skills
previously outsourced? Backsourcing seems to be motivated by a change in
circumstances, redefinition of the character of outsourced service, or discovery of flaws
in the initial assessment that led to outsourcing (Lacity & Willcocks, 2000). The
examples given in the previous section demonstrate that backsourcing reasons seem to be
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different from the foremost outsourcing reason of reducing costs. There is a combination
of factors that seem to be salient in the backsourcing considerations, yet it is not clear
which ones are more important and represent the key drivers of backsourcing.
The organizational situation has to be analyzed thoroughly and all the possible
factors should be taken into consideration before the change. Success of the changeover
from outsourcing into backsourcing may depend not only on the availability of resources
and strategic considerations, but also on a good relationship and support from the
provider. Better understanding of backsourcing and its theoretical underpinnings will lead
to better backsourcing strategies and business outcomes for organizations that return their
previously outsourced IS functions back in-house.

Research Questions
This dissertation aims to investigate the reasons for backsourcing after the
outsourcing arrangement, considerations involved in the formation of backsourcing
intentions on the part of the IS outsourcing client, as well as the transition to
backsourcing and issues associated with it. In particular, it targets the following research
question:
⋅ Why do IS outsourcing clients decide to backsource?
To answer the above research question, multiple theories are examined to uncover
theoretical underpinnings of the possible economic, strategic and relationship motives of
the backsourcing decision. These theories previously have been applied to explorations
about sourcing considerations and include transaction cost theory (Ang and Straub 1998;
Grover, Cheon and Teng 1996; Poppo and Zenger 1998; Wang 2002), agency theory (Ho,
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Ang and Straub 2003; Logan 2000), core competency perspective (Quinn 1999),
interorganizational relationships theory (Kern et al. 2001) and marketing channels theory.
This theory has been widely used in marketing literature to analyze the exchange
relationships (Alajoutsijarvi, Moller and Tahtinen 2000; Bolton 1998; Dwyer, Schurr and
Oh 1987; Ping 1995). Using these theories, a number of factors that could play a role in
backsourcing considerations is developed and the possible influence of various factors is
explained.
The exploratory case study approach is utilized to examine the nature of IS
backsourcing and to investigate the drivers for this arrangement. Using the evidence from
six case studies, the possible theoretically suggested and emergent reasons for
backsourcing are analyzed. Triangulation across cases identifies the primary factors that
lead outsourcouring clients to backsource.

Importance of Research
The theoretical contribution of this research is the framework of factors involved
in backsourcing considerations which is constructed through exploratory case studies.
While backsourcing may seem to be similar to outsourcing decision, backsourcing
decision involves factors different from those used for the original outsourcing decision.
They include not only cost factors but also a variety of strategic factors, as well as prior
experience and performance in outsourcing relationships. Interplay of these factors seems
to be present in many backsourcing scenarios discussed in the earlier section. The
assumptions and predictions of the theoretically derived factors used in the backsourcing
framework are evaluated using the case study evidence collected in the course of this
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dissertation research. Emergent themes are examined across cases and are introduced to
the framework.
Understanding the underlying reasons for taking the IS function partially or
completely back in-house can provide managers with better decision tools when
reviewing the outsourcing contract as termination nears or as major environmental
changes occur. Not all outsourced functions may be suitable for in-house operations.
Looking at the reasons underlying the backsourcing decision helps identify a potential
framework for future assessments, and distinguish factors most relevant for the
backsourcing decision. The analysis of the circumstances and decisions that lead to
backsourcing should be beneficial for both academics and practitioners.
To address the needs of practitioners, this dissertation aims to provide managers
of the client company with better tools for reevaluating an outsourcing contract, and
specify factors that should be considered during partial or complete transfer of outsourced
services and processes back in-house. It does so by analyzing the possible antecedents of
IS backsourcing in strategic, economic, and relationship areas, observing the transition
process to backsourcing and gaining insights into successful and unsuccessful practices.

Scope of Research
This dissertation examines the backsourcing phenomenon as a change in sourcing
process after the initial outsourcing contract. It focuses on the factors that lead to the
formation of the backsourcing decision. Staying with the current provider, partial
backsourcing or outsourcing to another provider are also options for the client after the
end of the initial outsourcing relationship. This dissertation evaluates cases that involve
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backsourcing, partial backsourcing and continuation of outsourcing in order to single out
the factors that would lead to backsourcing.

Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation is comprised of eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the IS
backsourcing phenomenon together with examples from practice providing basis for
research problem statement, research questions and the importance of research. Chapter 2
compares IS backsourcing with IS outsourcing and then provides a review of literature on
agency theory, transaction cost theory, core competency perspective, interorganizational
relationships theory and marketing channels literature that are used to further examine the
reasons for the backsourcing decision. Chapter 3 presents possible antecedents of
backsourcing along with their theoretical underpinning and explanation of their influence
on the backsourcing decision. Case study research methodology and the details of the
case sites selection, data collection procedures and data analysis are presented in Chapter
4. Chapter 5 provides the descriptions of each of the case sites, IS outsourcing and
backsourcing situation in each contract. Chapter 6 presents detailed results of the case
studies and discusses the role of each of the proposed antecedents in backsourcing
considerations. The results of all case studies are synthesized in Chapter 7, and the
primary factors that affect the backsourcing decision are identified. In the final chapter,
Chapter 8, implications and limitations of findings are discussed, and future research
directions are suggested.
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CHAPTER TWO. LITERATURE REVIEW

IS Backsourcing vs. IS Outsourcing
Make or buy assessments and decisions are continuously made in business
organizations, and in terms of information technology entail outsourcing vs. insourcing of
IS functions and activities. Insourcing deploys and manages information systems
internally within the organization. Outsourcing involves business arrangements to
manage IS activities outside the original organization. Once the decision to outsource is
made, the company contracts a provider to perform the necessary activities. When the
contract expiration date approaches, or the partners decide to terminate the contract
prematurely, the issue of sourcing arises again. At that time, the client is facing a choice
of either staying with the current provider (continuing outsourcing relationship), hiring
another provider to manage the IS functions (finding a new outsourcing arrangement), or
taking the activities and assets back in-house (backsourcing). IS backsourcing is the
partial or complete reversal of the outsourcing contract and returning previously
outsourced IS back in-house. Both IS outsourcing and IS backsourcing address the
organization’s buy or make decision. However, the decision to outsource is made early
in the sourcing cycle at the time of initial insource or outsource considerations. The IS
backsourcing decision represents a change in sourcing and is made towards the end of the
sourcing cycle. It is made after the evaluation of the initial outsourcing contract taking
into consideration the experience with the outsourcing as well as company technology
requirements and needs (Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1. Sourcing Process
The outsourcing contract is based on an interorganizational relationship between a
client and a provider. Ring and Van De Ven view the development and evolution of
interorganizational relations as a repetitive sequence of negotiation, commitment and
execution stages, each of which is assessed in terms of efficiency and equity (1994).
During the negotiation stage involved parties assess uncertainty associated with the
contract, each other’s trustworthiness, rights and obligation in the transaction, and
possible usefulness of the transaction. This is the stage when the original buy or make
decision is made. In the commitment stage, parties reach an agreement and establish the
terms of contract. The execution stage involves actual administration of the contract
details. Usually in this stage, as the parties continue to become more familiar with each
other’s performance, uncertainty is reduced, which makes interactions more predictable.
During the commitment and execution stages the actual outsourcing relationship develops
and the parties engage in the activities specified in the contract. Every stage can be
followed by an assessment where the progress is assessed in terms of efficiency and
equity.
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As the contract progresses, conflicts, misunderstandings and changing
expectations are inevitable. In the end of the IOR development process, in the final
assessment period, all of these factors lead to reconsideration of the terms of the
relationship. The relationship can be terminated once the parties have completed the deal
or as a consequence of some condition such as breach of contract, mutual rescission or a
new contract (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). In terms of the termination of the relationship
and intention to backsource, the assessment represents the most interest. At this point,
parties face two options: they can continue with the relationship or terminate the contract.
If they decide to remain partners, they can carry on their relationship under existing terms
or modify the terms of the outsourcing agreement. If the contract is terminated, the client
can seek another provider or take the previously outsourced functions back in-house.
Lacity and Willcocks (2000) examined stakeholder relationships in IS outsourcing
and identified six phases of outsourcing activities: scoping, evaluation, negotiation,
transition, middle and mature phases. The scoping phase involves identifying potential IS
activities for outsourcing. During the evaluation phase, the company searches for the best
arrangement to manage its IS functions. When the future provider is found, terms of
contract are detailed during the negotiation phase. Transition activities may last for up to
two years and during that time the provider sets up the outsourced activities, and
completely takes over managing those IS activities for the client. In the middle phase, as
the outsourcing relationship progresses, realignment of the agreement and involvement of
the provider in value adding activities may be necessary. In the mature stage, the parties
are faced with planning for the future of the current sourcing arrangement and assessing
the available options.
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Lacity and Willcocks’ six relationship stages can be mapped into the more general
Ring and Van de Ven model of interorganizational relationships (Table 2.1). These
stages help highlight the sourcing cycle and the alternating emphasis on sourcing and
resourcing. Ring and Van de Ven’s framework is a general framework for analyzing
exchange relationships, while Lacity and Willcocks focus specifically on the outsourcing
relationship. Backsourcing of information systems is always preceded by the outsourcing
contract.

The decision to backsource is likely to be based on the evaluations and

projections done in Ring and Van de Ven’s assessment process or Lacity and Willcocks’
mature phase. Since backsourcing requires a previous outsourcing relationship, it is
especially useful to also consider the success and implications of prior outsourcing
experience on the decision to backsource.

16

Table 2.1. Stages and Activities in Information Systems Sourcing
General Interorganizational Relationship
Ring & Van Negotiation
Commitment
de Ven
(1994)
Stages
Parties reach
Ring & Van Parties develop
an agreement
de Ven
joint expectations
on the
Activities
about motivations,
obligations and
possible
rules for future
investments, and
action in the
perceived
relationship.
uncertainties of a
business deal that
they are exploring
to undertake jointly
Terms and
Ring & Van Assess uncertainty
governance
de Ven
associated with the
structure of the
Objectives
deal, the nature of
relationship are
each other’s role,
established and
the other’s
codified in
trustworthiness,
formal
their rights and
contract.
duties in the
transaction, and
possible efficiency
and equity of the
transaction.
Outsourcing Interorganizational Relationships
Equivalent
Scoping
Transition
Lacity &
Evaluation
Willcocks
Negotiation
(2000)
Stages
Contract is
Lacity &
Client identifies
Willcocks
core IS capabilities, distributed,
Activities
and IS activities for post contract
management is
potential
established and
outsourcing
parties validate
Measure baseline
costs and
costs and services
responsibilities
Lacity &
Identify IS activities Sign contract
and establish
Willcocks
for potential
operational
Objectives
outsourcing; select
performance
the best and final
offer
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Execution

Commitments and
rules of action are
carried into effect;
parties give orders
to subordinates,
buy materials, pay
amounts agreed
upon, and
administer the
agreement.
Parties execute
commitments that
make the
interactions
among parties
more predictable.

Assessment
(iterative process
during and after
each stage
Evaluation of the
progress and
relationship.
Misunderstandings,
conflicts, and
changing
expectations can
provide cause for
rethinking the terms
of the relationship.
If the contract
commitments are
not executed in
efficient and
equitable manner,
the parties will
initiate corrective
measures by either
renegotiating or
reducing their
commitment.

Middle

Mature

Parties benchmark
performance and
realign contract to
reflect changes in
technology

Determine if
relationship will be
terminated or
extended

Achieve valueadded above
operational
performance

No lapses in
operational
performance during
final transition

At the time of assessment some of the activities similar to the activities of Ring
and Van de Ven’s negotiation or Lacity and Willcocks’ scoping and evaluations phases
take place. Analogous to the earlier initial sourcing evaluation, full investigation of IS
sourcing options, benchmarking of costs, reconsideration of the role and importance of IS
for the organization, assessment of uncertainty and each other’s trustworthiness take
place. At the same time, all the prior experience with outsourcing is reviewed, the current
outsourcing relationship is evaluated, its successes and failures are analyzed, and
competencies of the provider and needs of the client are reassessed. During this stage
some of the companies may decide to discontinue the current outsourcing arrangement
and pursue backsourcing.
While some of the considerations of backsourcing are similar to the initial
outsourcing decision, outsourcing and backsourcing have different motivations and goals
underlying them (Table 2.2). The motivation behind IS outsourcing decisions is very
often the opportunity to save significant amounts of time and money by modifying the
management of IS functions (McKeen, Smith, Joglekar et al. 2002). Outsourcing is also
used to fill gaps in the firm’s IS resources and capabilities, such as access to information,
equipment, IS personnel and skills (Grover, Teng and Cheon 1998). Approaching
outsourcing considerations strategically, companies base the choice of outsourced
functions on their core competencies, and outsource only non-critical functions (Quinn et
al. 1994).
Goals of the provider and the client in the initial outsourcing situation are usually
complementary. Clients are interested in receiving the quality services that meet their
business and technology requirements at a reasonable price, and providers are ready to
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offer those services at sensible costs to the client and at a profit for themselves. When the
deal is signed, both sides are usually happy. However, as the contract gets under way, the
client often feels like it is paying too much for the services (Scardino 2002a). Costs are
usually squeezed out to a minimum in the first couple of years (Scardino 2003), and
eventually the client starts looking for additional business value in its IS activities. At this
time the goals of the client and provider may differ, especially if the client is requiring
additional services from the provider that are asset and skill specific. The provider is
interested in economies of scale and can only offer low costs on commodity services, but
customization of services can turn out to be exorbitantly expensive and time-consuming.
Table 2.2. Outsourcing Vs. Backsourcing
Characteristic
Definition

Outsourcing
Business arrangement where thirdparty providers manage information
system activities or develop
information systems.

Motivation

•

Strategic
o Focus on core
competencies

•

Economic
o Cost savings
o Access to resources
o Deals with volume
uncertainty

Goals of the
parties

Provider’s goals complement or are
congruent to outsourcing
organization’s goals (reduce the costs
of services)
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Backsourcing
Business practice in which a company takes
back in-house assets, activities, and skills
that are part of its information systems
operations and were previously outsourced to
one or more outside information service
providers. Always occurs after outsourcing
• Strategic
o Change in circumstances/core
competencies
o Redefinition of importance of
outsourced service
o Structural changes/mergers
• Economic
o Costs savings
• Relationship
o Inability of provider to provide
service
o Misalignment of provider
performance and outsourcing
organization’s needs
o Discovery of flaws in initial
assessment about outsourcing
Provider’s goals (reduce costs) are
incongruent with outsourcing organization’s
goals (lower costs and additional business
value)

Cost considerations are important, but often the client is seeking additional
business value in the utilization of its technology. A frequent reason for taking the
function back in-house is the need to regain control over the direction of IS. Redefinition
of the importance of IS (Kern et al. 2001) in response to structural business changes such
as acquisitions, divestitures and mergers (Bushell 2003), or questionable performance on
the part of the provider (Lackow 2001), often play a role in backsourcing decisions. The
outsourcing arrangement experience and the relationship between the outsourcing client
and the provider also are important in understanding the backsourcing decision, since
backsourcing is always preceded by the termination of the outsourcing relationship.
In the case of backsourcing, there is often an interaction of economic, strategic
and relationship considerations that motivate ending of the relationship and transferring
previously outsourced services back in-house. During outsourcing assessment, the
organization focuses on economic performance of the outsourcing contract, value
generated by the utilization of IS, strategic role of IS, future IS needs, current service
quality of the outsourced IS services, etc. When multiple factors are involved in the
evaluation of the outsourcing arrangement and the backsourcing decision, some of those
factors may have a stronger influence on the determination of IS governance in the
organization. For example, poor service quality, delays in responses to service requests
and unsatisfactory performance on the part of the outsourcing provider, or conflicts and
tension between the client and the provider over the contract can compel the client to
consider termination of the outsourcing agreement. Yet the client may decide to continue
with outsourcing services for cost reasons or because the IS is not one of its core
competencies. On the other hand, a client who is satisfied with the current level of IS
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services received from the outsourcing provider may decide to backsource in order to
regain control over their IS functions even at the expense of higher costs of managing IS
internally. The following section examines possible theory-based precursors of
backsourcing decision.

Backsourcing Antecedents: Theoretical Background
Various theoretically-based perspectives have been applied to the explorations of
IS sourcing antecedents. Because the costs saving is the primary factor in the make-orbuy decision, the most commonly used perspectives were economic theories that
emphasized organizational concerns with the economic efficiency of the arrangement.
The two most frequent contributors to the cost-based perspective on sourcing are
transaction cost theory (Ang et al. 1998; Grover et al. 1996; Poppo et al. 1998; Wang
2002) and agency theory (Ho et al. 2003; Logan 2000). In addition to economic theories,
sourcing can be considered through a strategic lens. One of the frequent criterions for
make-or-buy decision is the strategic role of the IS activities (King et al. 2000; McFarlan
and Nolan 1995). Core competency perspective has been used to examine outsourcing
decisions in terms of the contribution that a particular activity brings to the business
(Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny 1996; Quinn 1999).
Backsourcing takes place after the initial outsourcing contract. Thus, relationship
factors also play a role in the assessment considerations. In addition to the above
mentioned frameworks, interorganizational relationships theory and marketing channels
theory are utilized in this research to understand the motives involved in the relationship
between the outsourcing client and the provider. Interorganizational relationships theory
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has been recently applied to better understand the relationship advantage in IS
outsourcing (Kern et al. 2001; Kern et al. 2002), while marketing channels literature
considers the factors involved in the termination of the channels relationship (Ping 1993;
Ping 1995; Ping 1999; Tahtinen and Halinen 2002).

Transaction Cost Theory
Transaction cost theory (Williamson 1981) provides guidelines for the make-orbuy decision. Its basic premise is that firms organize their exchange relationships to
minimize the total costs incurred in the exchange of goods and services. This theory
maintains that the organization of economic activity depends on balancing production
economies of scale against the cost of transacting (Grover et al. 1998).
For optimized performance and minimized costs there must be a good fit between
characteristics of the transaction exchange and the governance structure.

Based on this

premise, transaction cost theory suggests that the higher the cost of transacting in the
market, the greater will be the comparative advantage for organizing resources within the
firm using a hierarchy governance structure (Alchian and Demsetz 1972), i.e. having an
internal department in charge of those resources and functions.
Transaction cost theory focuses on three dimensions when describing
transactions: asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of the transaction (Williamson
1981). Asset specificity describes “the degree to which durable, transaction specific
investments are required” for a particular transaction (Williamson 1981). Uncertainty
deals with the difficulty in assessing choices in the decision. Transaction cost theory
relies on the assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality
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implies that all economic actors are intentionally and limitedly rational (Williamson
1985). Bounded rationality assumes complexity of the contractual relationships and, thus,
uncertainty. Opportunism is concerned with economic actors’ self-interest seeking
tendency and trustworthiness (Williamson 1981). An opportunistic party would exercise
distorted disclosure of information, especially designed to mislead, disguise or otherwise
confuse (Williamson 1985). Opportunism is a source of uncertainty in economic
transactions (Williamson 1985).
Transaction cost theory has been widely applied to examine buy-or-make
decisions, including IS outsourcing vs. insourcing (Ang et al. 1998; Grover et al. 1996;
Poppo et al. 1998; Wang 2002). In outsourcing arrangement, production costs are
expected to decrease, while transaction costs are expected to rise. According to
transaction costs theory, outsourcing is not recommended for a company (or client) if its
uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency of contracting are high, number of suppliers
is small and it has insufficient knowledge of the IS market (Lee, Huynh, Kwok et al.
2001).
Both internal and external sourcing initiatives are driven by a need to reduce costs
(Scardino 2002b). Focus on cost savings underlies many outsourcing arrangements, and
costs often play a significant role during reevaluation of the agreement and the turn to
backsourcing. Companies focus on the current state of their business environment, ways
to introduce efficiencies, improve operations and reduce costs. However, there are large
switching costs involved in changing IS sourcing decisions (Willcocks, Fitzgerald and
Lacity 1996), and backsourcing can prove to be an expensive alternative. Thus, high
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external production and transaction costs can be the reason for the reversal of the
outsourcing arrangement, while switching costs can impede backsourcing.

Agency Theory
Agency theory is directed at the agency relationship in which one party delegates
work to another who performs that work (Eisenhardt 1989). Its focus is on developing the
most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship, assuming that
organizations are self-interested (Logan 2000). According to this theory, goal conflicts
that arise between the agent (provider) and the principal (client) are “resolved through the
coalignment of incentives – the price mechanism of economics” (Eisenhardt 1989).
This theory is most applicable to the situations that have inherent goal conflict
between the parties and sufficient outcome uncertainty.

Uncertainty coupled with

differences in willingness to accept risk should influence contracts between principle and
agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Small ventures usually face higher outcome uncertainty in
terms of their future business opportunities and cash flows. High outcome uncertainty
results in high risk for any business transaction and, thus, managers tend to be more risk
averse when it comes to additional investments or business decisions. Agency theory
suggests that in this situation managers are likely to transfer the risk to the supplier.
Organizations facing less outcome uncertainty and taking a risk neutral outlook tend to
choose the “make” option. Contracts that govern the relationship are in place to limit the
risk undertaken by the involved parties through specifying either a fixed payoff or an
incentive payoff tied to specific measures of performance (Fama and Jensen 1983).
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Difference in interests of client and provider can result in problems and additional
expenses for the client or agency costs (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991).
Agency theory is another economic theory that has been extensively used for the
explorations of sourcing decisions (Ho et al. 2003; Logan 2000; Yao, Watson, Chen et al.
2003). According to agency theory, outsourcing is not recommended when outcome
measurability is low, outcome uncertainty is high, risk aversion is high, programmability
is low, and length of relationship is long (Lee et al. 2001). Since both client and provider
pursue their own interests, and there is goal incongruence, the client may have to exert
extra effort to monitor the behavior of the provider, which results in additional costs for
the client, i.e. agency costs. Escalating agency costs and changes in the business situation
as a result of business uncertainty can lead to the reevaluation of the outsourcing contract
and the return of the outsourced functions back in-house.

Core Competence Perspective
Core competencies include skills that currently underpin the firm’s success and
represent the firm’s most valuable resources (Hamel and Prahalad 1994). Core
competence perspective maintains that a company can create uniquely high value for its
customers through its core competencies (Quinn 1999). Core competencies empower
individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities and provide potential
access to a wide variety of markets. For a function to be considered a core competency, it
should make a significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end
product and should be difficult for competitors to imitate (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) .
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Focusing on core competencies enables companies to concentrate their limited
resources on relatively few competencies where they can develop superior capabilities. It
also helps them to leverage their internal innovation capabilities to ensure that their
performance stays ahead of competitors. Through core competencies, companies can
eliminate inflexibilities in overhead to deal with changing competitor pressures and
opportunities. Additionally, companies can expand their own knowledge and physical
investment capabilities by exploiting the facilities of outside sources (Quinn 1999).
According to the core competency perspective, companies should perform the activities
that represent their core competencies in-house, while outsourcing all the non-critical
commodity operations.
Core competency argument has been frequently applied to outsourcing
considerations (Lacity et al. 1996; Quinn 1999). Some IS functions happen to be critical
contributors to business operations, while other activities only make incremental
contributions to the bottom line. Therefore, each company must analyze its IS activities
in its own business context, rather than accept generalities (Lacity et al. 1996).
Outsourcing can be used as a process for focusing on an organization’s core
competencies and to push for operational efficiency (Allen, Kern and Mattison 2002).
When business value of a particular technology is low, then that activity is a good
candidate for outsourcing. However, if cost savings are the most critical driver in the
outsourcing decision, it is likely that the company will sacrifice crucial competencies and
capabilities in the initial outsourcing decision (Earl 1996). Firms that outsource the
majority of their IS functions lose valuable IS expertise, and thus, companies should not
outsource anything but commodity elements (Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny 1995).
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Over time, changes in the company business processes, changes of the
environment and reconsiderations of the role of IS in the organization may lead to shifts
in the positioning of IS within the organization. Changes in the perception of the
importance of the activity can lead to reevaluation of the outsourcing benefits and may
result in backsourcing. Control over outsourced services can also become an issue in the
client-provider relationship and lead the client to the decision to backsource. Strategic
issues are even more important during the assessment of the outsourcing arrangements, as
most likely cost savings have already been realized, and now other considerations
become important.
From the provider perspective, core competency focus also plays an important
role. To offer its customers the best possible service and products at competitive prices,
the outsourcing provider has to not only achieve economies of scale performing those
activities, but it must also have superior skills and resources to ensure the maximum
contribution to the business operations of its clients. Efficiently providing quality IS
services and products should be the core competence of any IS outsourcing provider.
Only providers that can respond to changing client needs are able to create an additional
value for the client, therefore, when selecting an outsourcing provider clients should
focus on the provider’s core competencies (Levina and Ross 2003).
Goles suggested that the provider must possess the following competencies to be
able to satisfy the client’s outsourcing needs: understanding of the customer's business, a
minimum level of technical capabilities in order to provide outsourcing services, and
some relationship management capabilities (2001). Levina and Ross found that an
outsourcing provider can deliver value to its clients by developing a set of core
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competencies

by

addressing

client

needs

and

market

conditions,

exhibiting

complementarities that result in service delivery, and by having a large number of
projects from multiple clients (2003). The provider’s focus on core competencies and
development of the necessary competencies for the outsourcing business ensures the
success of the outsourcing relationships with the clients.

Interorganizational Relationships Theory
Interorganizational relationships (IOR) theory discusses why organizations enter
into relationships and how the relationships develop over time. This theory examines
structural, behavioral and interaction dimensions of the relationship (Kern et al. 2001)
and provides understanding and analysis of the causes and conditions for the emergence,
growth, and dissolution of IORs (Ring et al. 1994). Backsourcing is preceded by a
relationship between the outsourcing client and provider, and a termination of such a
relationship. IOR theory can be useful in understanding the development and termination
of the outsourcing relationship.
Relationship building is a dynamic process that develops through interaction of
the involved parties. The ways in which the parties negotiate, execute, and modify the
terms of the interorganizational relationship strongly influence the beliefs about the
efficiency of the relationship (Ring et al. 1994). Two types of uncertainty are inherent in
cooperative IORs: uncertainty about the future of the business and uncertainty of the
relationship (i.e. whether the parties are able to trust one another) (Ring et al. 1994).
Usually a legal contract is used to safeguard against uncertainties and opportunism of the
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other party. However, trust can be another form of control based on predictability of
relationship and shared sense of fairness between parties (Davis 1996).
Trust refers to one agent’s assessment of

a particular level of subjective

probability that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both
before the agent can monitor such action and in a context in which it affects the agent’s
own action. When an agent trusts someone, or believes that someone is trustworthy, they
implicitly assume that the probability that the other agent will perform an action that is
beneficial or at least not detrimental to the trusting agent is high enough to consider
engaging in some form of cooperation with the other agent (Gambetta 1988).
Interorganizational trust entails the collectively held trust of organizational members
toward the partnering company (Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone 1998).
Trust is important in maintaining long term cooperative relationships. Exchange
relationships that feature personal trust will survive greater stress and display greater
adaptability (Williamson 1985). Where the relationship between two parties is subject to
great uncertainty, trust should not be allowed to deteriorate (Davis 1996). Investments
that economic partners make to build trust often create economic value in the exchange
relationship (Dyer and Chu 2003).
The outsourcing relationship recently has received increased attention (Goles
2001; Kern et al. 2001; Kern et al. 2002; Lacity et al. 2000; Lee and Kim 1999). The
outsourcing relationship often has a mission critical status, as it provides support services
for the organization’s processes and operations (Kern et al. 2002). Conflicts and
misunderstandings between the client and provider can undermine an otherwise
successful relationship and result in cancellation of the contract. If the client is not
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satisfied with the existing relationship, alternatives for the management of the IS function
are considered. Indeed, a KPMG Consulting study revealed that more than 70% of clients
were not planning to renew their current contracts due to their dissatisfaction with the
client-provider relationship (Goles 2001). The relationship between the outsourcing
provider and the client is important in the evaluation of backsourcing. IOR theory
provides a lens to examine the interaction in the relationship between the outsourcing
client and provider, and the behavioral and structural factors that may lead to termination
of such relationship and backsourcing.

Marketing Channels Relationship
Marketing channels research originated from microeconomics and behavioral
research (Stern and Reve 1980), however, relationship management has since become its
central research paradigm (Heide 1994). In particular, marketing channels literature
examines exchange relationships and their development from the beginning of the
interaction to the relationship dissolution. The relationship development process includes
phases of awareness, exploration, expansion, commitment and dissolution (Dwyer et al.
1987).
The relationship dissolution phase in the marketing channels literature helps
analyze the termination of client-provider relationships (Ping 1993; Ping 1995; Ping
1999; Tahtinen et al. 2002) and can be useful in the evaluation of outsourcing
relationships and backsourcing. Dissolution begins when one of the parties evaluates its
dissatisfaction with the other party; it is followed by negotiation and public
announcement of relationship termination, and then recovery from the breakup (Dwyer et
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al. 1987). Research indicates that many of the reasons for relationship termination are
related to the relationship itself, tendencies created within the relationship and potential
weaknesses in interaction (Tahtinen et al. 2002).
Interorganizational relationships can be terminated for various reasons.
Satisfaction with the relationship, attractiveness of the alternatives, switching costs,
service quality, trust and commitment are some of the factors that have been suggested to
play a role in the ending of exchange relationships (Bolton 1998; Garbarino and Johnson
1999; Halinen and Tahtinen 2002; Ping 1993). Client and provider are likely to have
different reasons for ending the relationship and may have limited knowledge of the other
party’s reasons (Tahtinen et al. 2002). The majority of the reports on ending of the IS
outsourcing relationships cite client organization as the initializer of the contract
termination (Bushell 2003; Buxbaum 2002). On the part of the provider, it is important to
be able to recognize the signals of potential contract cancellation and take action to
preserve the relationship (Alajoutsijarvi et al. 2000).
Before terminating the relationship, a client can voice its concerns to the provider
in an attempt to have the issues resolved. Voice option can be an effective method that
can either prevent termination of the relationship or complement the exit strategy
(Hirschman 1970). In interorganizational relationships, voice can be used to bring the
other party’s attention to the problems with the product or service, as well as negotiate a
desired change in the contract or relationship.

When performance of the provider

declines, voice on the part of the discontented client can be very useful in getting the
provider to alter the state of affairs and improve the situation to the client’s content. It can
also be used to constructively work out the relationship problems without offending the
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partner (Ping 1999). However, extensive use of voice may also hinder the efforts of the
provider and lead to negative returns (Hirschman 1970). While managing outsourcing
relationships, it is important to establish a protocol for effective communication which
specifies the points of contact and schedule of the meetings (Langfield-Smith 2000).

Theoretical Framework
The above theories addressing transaction costs, agency costs, core competencies,
interorganizational relations and marketing channels are useful in examining the
interorganizational relationship between the outsourcing client and provider and the
factors that affect the backsourcing decision. As have been previously discussed, there
are various economic, strategic and relationship reasons that have an impact on intent to
backsource, and many different theories can be applied to the backsourcing phenomenon
and investigation of its antecedents. However, to properly evaluate the client’s
backsourcing decision, all of the various factors should be taken into consideration
(Figure 2.2). While individually economic, strategic and relationship theories explain
backsourcing, the combination of these theories helps to develop a more integrated and
internally consistent theoretical lens. By articulating its analytical paradigm, each of the
theories can be applied to the backsourcing phenomenon to produce a thorough
theoretical explanation and help in reconciling the differences (Allison 1969).
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Figure 2.2. Backsourcing Framework
Transaction costs economics and agency theory help identify various costs and
related economic factors that play a role in the evaluation of backsourcing. Like any
sourcing decision, backsourcing is based on comparison of the cost of performing
services internally and the cost of performing the same services externally. Applying only
economic theories to the backsourcing considerations would provide insights very similar
to the outsourcing situation. However, even though economic theories have been widely
applied to sourcing considerations, when used individually they fail to consider other
important environment, structure, and strategy factors that may affect organizational
decisions (Lee, Huynh, Chi-wai et al. 2000).
Core competency perspective brings in strategic considerations, and allows
considering additional factors that have been reported to play a role in sourcing decisions.
Indeed, over time the role of IS can increase in importance, or the management may
realize that initial assessment of the IS contribution to the bottom line of the business was
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flawed (Kern et al. 2001). Reviewing the outsourcing contract through a strategic lens
could produce recommendations somewhat different from the purely cost focused
perspectives.
Both the economic perspective and the strategic perspective also ignore the
importance of prior relationships that may have tremendous influence on future sourcing
decisions (Lee et al. 2001). Thus, examining the relationship between the client and
provider by applying interorganizational theory and marketing channels literature
completes this multifaceted framework and provides important insight into the role of
relationship success in backsourcing.
The proposed framework triangulates multiple approaches through inspection of
the existing evidence, articulation of the conceptual models employed in different
theories, formulation of the possible explanations of the phenomenon based on the
underlying logic of the various intellectual perspectives, and reflection on the questions
being asked (Allison 1969). Various models that are applied to explain backsourcing
intent are not exclusive alternatives. Each of the theories provides a partial explanation of
the framework, what it emphasizes and what it leaves out (Allison 1969).
Combining multiple theoretical perspectives provides opportunities for synergy,
and improves the efficiency of research. It is especially appropriate in situations where
the area of research is relatively unexplored (Kern & Willcocks, 2001). IS backsourcing
is a new phenomenon in IS research, and there are no theoretical frameworks that have
been applied to examine this issue. A review of backsourcing cases published in
practitioners and academic literature revealed various underlying factors that can be
grouped into economic, strategic and relationship motives. All three perspectives are
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fundamental to the sourcing relationships, and all three need to be integrated into a
comprehensive framework, as each of the perspectives has a unique emphasis that
contributes to the understanding of the sourcing relationship in its entirety (Kern et al.
2001).
By integrating these different views to explain the backsourcing decision,
weaknesses of one view can be compensated by the strengths of another (Lee et al. 2001).
Additional perspectives can help capture the greater complexity of the phenomenon
(Eisenhardt 1989), and designing a comprehensive framework can provide guidance in
studying the various aspects of backsourcing in a consistent manner.
When combining multiple perspectives to explain a phenomenon, it is important
that the employed perspectives are compatible or can be developed to be compatible
(Willcocks

and

Lacity

1998).

Transaction

cost

theory,

agency

theory

and

interorganizational relationships theory all assume that the companies are functioning
under uncertainty, incorporating uncertainty into the analysis. The information systems
field is advancing very rapidly and is full of business uncertainty. Assessment of the
sourcing options may lead to different conclusions as the business situation advances.
Another important consideration when applying multiple theories to a new
research phenomenon is their applicability to the issue under consideration. Transaction
cost theory, agency theory, core competency perspective and interorganizational
relationships theory have been previously applied in the IS outsourcing research.
Marketing channels theory has been extensively used in marketing to examine exchange
relationships and is introduced in this research to examine the ending of the outsourcing
relationship. Costs, importance of the activities considered for sourcing and relationship
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issues all play a significant role in the assessment of sourcing options. This dissertation
focuses on the evaluation of the outsourcing arrangement and the decision to backsource.
A review of backsourcing cases published in both practitioner and academic
literature revealed that a majority of backsourcing activity was driven by various strategic
factors. The decision to backsource IS services is a complex process, and the transition
of IS functions back in-house is challenging. There should be significant benefits to the
company before backsourcing can be implemented. Strategic interests and goals
dominate activities of any organization, and ineffective IS strategy is likely to require
attention and change. While the effect of economic and relationship factors can not be
discounted, they can serve as additional reasons to bring the previously outsourced IS
function(s) back in-house.
The following chapter will discuss in detail the possible antecedents of IS
backsourcing developed using transaction cost theory, agency theory, core competency
perspective,

interorganizational relationships theory and marketing channels theory.

There is a certain interaction between the constructs in those theories: their approaches
are intertwined. Integrating the concepts will allow to better address the backsourcing
phenomenon by using the strengths of each theory and minimizing overlap (Kern et al.
2001).
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CHAPTER THREE. THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS OF
BACKSOURCING

Based on the analysis of various backsourcing cases in Chapter 1, several key
factors have been identified that appear to affect the reversal of the outsourcing
arrangement. Those factors include: cost savings, redefinition of IS role, structural
changes in the organization, questionable performance of the provider, and tension
between provider and client over the contract. All those factors map into three general
categories: economic, strategic, and relationship. This chapter develops theoretical
support for the influence of these and other various factors on a backsourcing decision.
Taking into consideration economic, strategic and relationship motives involved
in the backsourcing process, the conceptual factors underlying the intent to backsource
integrate transaction cost theory, agency theory, core competency perspective,
interorganizational relationships theory and marketing channels literature. The main
focus is how these factors are involved in the evaluation of the current sourcing
arrangement and information systems backsourcing. Various costs, the strategic role of
IS, structural changes in the organization, and relationship factors are proposed to play a
role in the evaluation of backsourcing.

Research Framework
The make-or-buy decision that all firms face compares the costs of in-house
production with market prices. According to economic theory, firms acquire goods and
services in the marketplace when internal production of those goods presents comparative
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cost disadvantages. On the other hand, when they have a comparative cost advantage they
provide to markets goods and services. However, there are also costs involved in carrying
out the market transactions. For a client, four major types of costs are salient in the
evaluation of the backsourcing decision: production, transaction, agency, and switching
costs.
Another popular criterion for the IS sourcing decision is the role or strategic
contribution of the IS function to the company’s end product or service. Certain activities
are considered core for the company, and according to the core competency perspective
those activities should be performed in-house, while less crucial activities that represent
commodity type functions should be outsourced if possible. At the same time, IS
products and services providers can maintain a niche by performing certain commodity
services or producing IS products for a large number of clients.

Such specialized

providers can focus on optimizing investments in their core business (IS services)
(Levina et al. 2003), and thus offer clients lower cost solutions, while maintaining high
quality service.
While achieving cost savings by outsourcing IS to an outside provider, the client
companies also may feel that they are losing control over the direction of IS in their
organization (Lacity et al. 2001). The outsourcing provider is in charge of keeping the
technology up-to-date and applying it effectively to the needs of the client. When the
requirements of the clients’ company or industry change, they are not too flexible in
responding to those changes quickly as it is the provider who is in control of how IS is
managed. In addition to changes in the role of IS and loss of control over IS, some
companies may decide to bring IS back in-house in response to structural organizational
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changes such as acquisitions, divestitures and mergers, or internal changes in
management.
Finally, a multitude of relationship issues arise during the years of the outsourcing
contract. Tension may develop between parties over the contract, there could be instances
of questionable performance on the part of the provider, or the provider may be unable to
support the changing requirements of the client organization. Additionally, the provider
may also experience dissatisfaction with the client, and feel that the efforts they are
extending are not gratified by the terms of the contract and the payments that they
receive. Both parties’ satisfaction with the outsourcing relationship plays an important
role in the continuation of the relationship or its termination.
The next sections discuss the role of various economic, strategic and relationship
factors and their interplay in the backsourcing considerations. The list of factors
considered in this analysis is presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Factors Involved in Backsourcing Decision
Economic
Asset Specificity
Backsourcing Cost Benefit
• Production costs
• Transaction costs
• Agency costs
Switching Costs

Strategic
Change in the Role of IS
Loss of Control over IS
Internal Structural Changes
External Structural Changes
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Relationship
Outsourcing Service
Quality
Satisfaction with
Outsourcing
Trust in the Provider
Voice Behavior
Goal Conflict

Economic Considerations
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement
Asset specificity is “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative
uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” (Williamson 1989).
Considering IS sourcing from the client’s perspective, asset specificity refers to the
uniqueness of the service or product being outsourced. Customized products and services
are considered to be highly asset specific and are not easily transferable to a provider
(Grover et al. 1996). Only when asset specificity is low, the provider can offer a client a
production cost advantage, because the provider is able to achieve smoother production
schedules and greater economies of scale performing the same activities for multiple
clients (Walker and Weber 1984).
A major benefit of outsourcing is reduction in costs, which is not easily achieved
by outsourcing highly asset-specific products and services, as customization usually
requires more effort and expense by the provider. Further, a company may find it more
efficient (and less costly) to perform customized services in-house than to locate a
provider that can accommodate its unique needs. The expense to coordinate asset specific
activities is higher when the provider lacks the expertise or the skills necessary for
completing the particular task. Since the activities require customization, the client is
likely to spend more time detailing its requirements and needs. Any increase in asset
specificity usually increases transaction costs (Walker et al. 1984; Williamson 1985),
thus making outsourcing less beneficial.
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When a client needs to find a suitable outsourcing provider to meet its specific
needs, it may also mean increased costs for monitoring that particular deal. The more
idiosyncratic the providing firm’s investment is, the more likely the provider is to take
advantage of the client by exercising distorted disclosure of information or not
performing activities and services appropriately. If the client fears lack of effort on the
part of the provider, the relationship between the two is likely to suffer and the client may
incur additional costs for monitoring and restructuring the existing outsourcing contract.
With highly asset-specific services and products, the production costs, transaction
costs and also agency costs will be higher if compared to non asset-specific services and
products. As a result the client’s perceived cost benefit will be lower when customization
is required for their outsourced products and services. Consequently, highly asset-specific
services are better to be managed in-house, and thus are likely to be backsourced if they
were initially outsourced.

The client company can assess the uniqueness of the

outsourced services and the capabilities of the IS outsourcing provider in performing
those services, and decide to undertake the transition of those IS services in-house.

Cost Benefit of Backsourcing
Various costs are associated with the outsourcing arrangement. Their overall
impact represents the cost advantage that is associated with the make-or-buy decision.
Production costs include the cost of manufacturing a product or the cost of operations.
Transaction costs refer to the effort, time, and costs incurred in coordination of external
market activities. These costs result from processing transactions in the market
(Gurbaxani et al. 1991). Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and
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bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests (Fama et al. 1983).
These costs are incurred as a result of discrepancies between the goals of the client and
the provider (Gurbaxani et al. 1991; Logan 2000). Cost benefit gained by outsourcing is
the combination of internal and external costs associated with the outsourcing
arrangement. It can be presented as the overall cost advantage achieved by getting the
production costs benefits minus the costs associated with carrying out and enforcing the
business deal (i.e. transaction and agency costs).
Production cost advantage has been reported to lead to a greater degree of IS
outsourcing (Ang & Straub, 1998). Outsourcing providers may be able to achieve cost
savings for their clients for several reasons. Because of economies of scale, outsourcing
providers may be more effective at negotiating bulk purchase, leasing arrangements and
software licenses than independent clients could hope to be. They may be more
aggressive in their use of low-cost labor pools, more realistic and creative in the
structuring of leases, and better at enforcing tighter overhead cost control than their
clients. They also may be more capable of managing excess hardware capacity, since the
capacity can be used across a number of clients. A cost advantage influences the decision
to outsource, and it also plays a role in the decision to terminate the outsourcing contract
and follow the backsourcing route. Even though a company may desire to terminate the
outsourcing contract for a variety of reasons, the higher alternative production costs
compared to the costs currently offered by the outsourcing provider may be an
impediment.
Outsourcing entails unique transaction costs – searching, contracting, controlling,
and re-contracting – that at times may exceed the transaction costs of having the activity
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directly under management’s in-house control (Quinn et al. 1994). That can lead to loss
of comparative advantage of the outsourcing arrangement and motivate the termination of
the outsourcing contract. Transaction costs are important, but often underestimated, when
the outsourcing contract is initiated. In addition, agency costs are often not adequately
considered at the time of outsourcing.

Yet, mechanisms need to be built into the

outsourcing company’s structure, operations, and information systems to ensure that the
contract is being executed appropriately. Each of these mechanisms carries associated
costs.
Substantial transaction and agency costs diminish the effect of the cost savings
generated by decrease in production costs due to IS outsourcing, thus decreasing the
overall cost benefit from outsourcing. Costly maintenance of the contract provisions has a
negative impact on the success of the outsourcing and tends to play a role in the
termination of the outsourcing. Unsuccessful outsourcing contracts are likely to be
scrutinized and renegotiated or canceled upon reconsideration. Unsatisfactory experience
and costly maintenance of the IS outsourcing contract can compel the client to consider
other alternatives including backsourcing.

Switching Costs of Backsourcing
Another type of cost involved in the process of change in sourcing is switching
costs. Switching costs refer to the effort, time, and investments incurred in undergoing
change in sourcing. Outsourcing can be forever. The time and expense necessary to
actually migrate away from the outsourcer is substantial, changing the IS structure could
be an incredible undertaking (Christensen et al. 1996). Even if lessons and strategies
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learned from the outsourcing experience can be implemented in-house at lower costs,
switching costs can be prohibitive. Thus, even though performing IS functions within the
organization can be more effective in terms of the overall cost benefit, moving the
outsourced processes back in-house can require significant efforts and resources. There
are large switching costs associated with IS sourcing decisions (Lacity et al. 1996), which
can be an impediment to the return of previously outsourced functions back in-house
after the termination of the outsourcing arrangement.
Exorbitant costs associated with the IS outsourcing arrangement or lower
expected costs of internal IS management are important considerations in the evaluation
of outsourcing and the possibility of backsourcing. Cost considerations are the primary
motive for an outsourcing make-or-buy decision and they play a significant role in
justification of backsourcing. However, the governance of IS is an important decision
and there are other considerations involved in it.

Strategic Considerations
Strategic reasons can also play a role in the backsourcing evaluation. Similar to
the insourcing vs. outsourcing decision, strategic contribution of IS function to the overall
business of the organization has to be considered. Furthermore, structural changes in the
organization, both internal and external, can prompt backsourcing.

Redefinition of the Role of IS
Role of the IS in the organization describes the mission of the IS function and its
actual contribution to the company’s business operations (Premkumar and King 1992).
Indeed, for some organizations IS activities are an area of strategic importance and
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deliver unique value, and for others IS activities only play a supportive role. Processes
and skills that are most critical for the business success represent the core competencies
of the organization (Hamel et al. 1994). By focusing on core competencies, businesses
are able to concentrate their resources on the activities that contribute the most to their
operations. Some of the activities that are necessary for the organization’s operations
play a secondary role and can be considered a commodity. These types of activities play
a supportive role to the core business of the organization.
Outsourcing can be used to achieve operational efficiency by focusing on the core
competencies (Allen et al. 2002). Activities that support the main functions of the
organization are generally good candidates for outsourcing. However, strategically vital
functions should be kept within the company as they are important to the company’s
competitiveness and probably represent its core differentiating skills.

By outsourcing,

organizations relieve themselves of performing an outsourced activity in-house, but also
run the risk of losing the expertise in that area. Core competency perspective suggests
that only commodity elements should be outsourced (Lacity et al. 1995).
Changes in the positioning of IS can occur within the company over time. If the
currently outsourced IS activity becomes critical to the client’s business and presents
opportunities for a competitive advantage, management may need to reconsider its
positioning within the company and bring it back in-house. Leaving it outsourced gives
an opportunity to the competitors to learn about the unique utilization of IS and
implement it within their organization. Consequently, the role of IS and its actual
contribution to the company’s business operations is an important consideration at the
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assessment stage in the outsourcing relationship and is a critical factor in the evaluation
of the backsourcing decision.

Internal and External Structural Changes
External changes of corporate structure involve changes to the overall
organization such as acquisitions, divestitures and mergers. When such major changes
occur in a company, the overall business strategy is likely to be reconsidered and aligned.
IS managers are interested in keeping the IS structure aligned with the corporate structure
(Davis 1996), and thus, changes to the IS department are likely to take place when the
organization is restructured.

The previously existing arrangements within the old

companies may not meet the needs of the new organization. In such cases the new entity
formed as a result of the structural changes may reassess its strategy and decide to
terminate the outsourcing contract and move the previously outsourced functions into the
company’s internal IS unit (Bushell 2003). Once the requirements of the business change,
which can often be the case when the size, product mix or strategy of the company
changes, termination of the outsourcing and subsequent backsourcing may be the best
solution for the organization.
An organization can also undergo changes of the internal structure or power shifts
within the organization, that can result in a new approach to the management of IS. New
management in charge of IS or a new CEO can have a completely different perspective
on the outsourcing of IS products and services. As a result, internal structural changes in
the client company may lead to the reassessment of the outsourcing arrangement, its
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termination, and subsequent return of the previously outsourced IS services and products
back in-house.

Loss of Control over IS
One of the major problems that clients face with the outsourcing arrangement is
the loss of control over IS direction (Bushell 2003; Lacity et al. 2001). Loss of control is
characterized by the client’s reduction in ability to take action when things are going
wrong (Huxham and Macdonald 1992). In the context of outsourcing contracts the client
acts as a principal delegating certain IS activities to its agent, the outsourcing provider.
Such delegation of IS activities results in loss of control for the principal (Aghion and
Tirole 1997). To prevent significant loss of control, the client can chose to outsource only
unimportant functions and activities (Aghion et al. 1997). Yet in many cases, IS activities
are outsourced to gain access to the scarce IT human resources and latest technology, and
not necessarily represent commodity services. By seeking outside expertise and
competency, the client runs the risk of losing control over IS.
As the business and environmental requirements change, organizational
technology requirements are modified and need immediate attention. However, the
provider may not always be able to meet the individual requests of the client in a flexible
and timely manner, especially if they involve major changes. As a result, the client can
not adjust quickly to satisfy its technology needs, cope with the technology advancement,
or take action when necessary. Such loss of control over the outsourced activities and IS
direction may hinder the client organization’s competitiveness (Lacity et al. 2001).
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Since outsourcing IS functions can hamper the client company’s ability to
respond to competitive and environmental challenges in a timely manner, the contract
has to include clauses about current and future technology requirements of the client
organization (Behara and Gundersen 1995). If the contract does not account for
technological changes, and once the client organization does not have control over the
deployment of technology solutions, its business vitality is at stake. Consequently, the
client organization may decide to terminate the outsourcing arrangement and undergo
backsourcing to manage IS internally when there is a need for technology innovation and
its cross-functional implementation (Behara et al. 1995).
Strategic considerations, such as change in the role of IS, loss of control over the
direction of IS, or structural changes within the organization, present the client
organization with a choice to continue with outsourcing or return the outsourced services
back in-house. All of these reasons represent significant changes in the organization and
in the management of IS, thus, they require a change in the way IS is managed in the
organization and are likely to result in backsourcing.

Relationship Considerations
Managing a relationship between the client and provider is one of the greatest
difficulties. The companies are faced with a variety of challenges that include: achieving
a consistent level of service, measuring responsiveness, improving service levels,
resolving differences, tracking changes, and keeping down costs and prices (Violino and
Caldwell 1998). A good client-provider relationship is critical for long-term success of an
outsourcing arrangement (Grover et al. 1996; McFarlan et al. 1995; Willcocks et al.
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1998), and it is one of the important reasons for continuation of the contractual activities.
The length of the contract does not make the relationship long-term or short-term. What
is important is the way parties operate and it can make or break the relationship (Greaver
II 1999). Termination of the relationship is one of the responses to problems within the
exchange relationship (Hirschman 1970). When the outsourcing relationship is not
satisfactory and results in termination, the client company may decide to bring the
outsourced services back in-house. One third of all terminated contracts end up being
backsourced (Lacity et al. 2001).
Success of the outsourcing arrangement is dependent on the atmosphere that
permeates the relationship between the provider and the client. Such atmosphere can be
characterized by commitment and trust, cooperation and conflict, satisfaction and
expectations, and power and dependency (Kern 1997). Research on customer retention
suggests that service quality, satisfaction (Bolton 1998; Ping 1995), and trust (Garbarino
et al. 1999) help maintain customer-supplier relationship and influence future intentions
to remain with or leave the provider. Other factors also play a role in the termination of
an outsourcing relationship. They can be as follows: goal conflict as perceived by the
client, provider’s service quality as perceived by the client, client’s satisfaction with
outsourcing, client’s trust in the provider and voice behavior of the client, all play a role
in the evaluation of the decision to backsource.

Goal Conflict
Goal conflict, or the extent to which the goals of the outsourcing company and its
provider differ, plays an important role in the development of the relationship between
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the client and the provider (Anderson and Weitz 1989). The provider is contracted to
execute the agreed-upon tasks at the performance levels specified in the contract. The
client enters the IS outsourcing relationship in order to receive IS products and services
cost effectively. At the same time the client is expecting IS products and services to be
value adding to their company. The provider is striving to deliver the required products
and services, utilizing economies of scale by servicing multiple clients. Sometimes, the
provider is not ready to adjust to the needs of an individual client, and is only interested
in delivering commodity services. At such time the goals of the client and provider may
disagree. When goals do not coincide and dissatisfaction of either one or both parties
develops, the relationship may come to an end with the client withdrawing and taking
outsourced activity back in-house.
If the client and provider’s goals coincide then there is less conflict in the
relationship and a better working atmosphere (Stern and El-Ansary 1982). Misalignment
of goals is likely to cause tension between the parties and as a result, affects the
atmosphere in the relationship and the client’s satisfaction with the outsourcing contract.
The provider’s actions in the interest of the client are motivated by the economic
incentives that are part of the outsourcing contract. If the provider is exhibiting
opportunistic behavior, the client is likely to be unhappy with the relationship and exhibit
low satisfaction with the outsourcing arrangement. Whenever there is tension over the
contract details, the overall client’s satisfaction is likely to decrease and lead to
reconsideration of the outsourcing arrangement.
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Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement
Service quality involves the conformance of the service delivered by the provider
to the requirements of the client (Whitten 2003). Clients assess service quality by
benchmarking the received level of service against the expected level of service. The
smaller gap between the desired service and the perceived service results in the higher
assessment of the service quality of the provider (Zeithaml, Berry and Parasuraman
1993). Service quality involves five dimensions: tangibles, or the appearance of physical
facilities, equipment, personnel , and communication materials; reliability, or the ability
to perform a promised service dependably and accurately; responsiveness, or the
willingness to help customers and to provide prompt service; assurance, or the
knowledge and courtesy of employees and their ability to convey trust and confidence;
and empathy, or the caring attitude which provides individualized attention to customers
(Kettinger and Lee 1997).
The quality of the service offered by the provider is important in the outsourcing
contract. Service level agreements, as part of the outsourcing contract, specify the
expected levels of the service. The quality and promptness of the provided outsourcing
services is likely to have an impact on client’s overall satisfaction with outsourcing, as
satisfaction reflects client’s feelings about the interaction with the provider (Susarla,
Barua and Whinston 2003). When the client believes that it is receiving good quality
service, it is likely to be more satisfied with the overall outsourcing relationship.
An IS outsourcing client enters an outsourcing relationship to obtain IS products
and services required for the successful functioning of their business. However,
questionable service of the provider is a concern in 25% of the outsourcing relationships
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(Lackow 2001). Continuous service performance below client’s expectations puts a
negative strain on the relationship between the client and the provider. When the quality
declines the client may consider exiting the relationship (Hirschman 1970). Low service
performance leads not only to poor client satisfaction with the outsourcing relationship,
but also can be a precursor to the termination of the outsourcing relationship and then
backsourcing.

Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship
Client satisfaction with IS outsourcing reflects a positive affective state based on
the outcomes obtained from the relationship with the IS services provider (Ganesan 1994)
and plays an important role in the outsourcing relationship. Satisfaction with outsourcing
is based on the satisfaction with various details of the outsourcing arrangement:
timeliness and quality of the delivered services, provider behavior and performance on
the contract, costs of services, and overall competitive advantage gained by contracting
with the provider (Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2000).
The client’s satisfaction is built over the course of the relationship with the
provider and is reflective of all the various events and service encounters that took place
during the interaction. Overall satisfaction includes both the satisfaction with the working
relationship with the provider, as well as the satisfaction with the provided service (Bitner
and Hubbert 1994; Susarla et al. 2003). When the client is overall satisfied with the
services, the outsourcing contract with the provider is perceived as more valuable (Ping
1995). The satisfied client is likely to enjoy the benefits of the relationship and continue
doing business with the provider.
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Trust in the Provider
Interorganizational trust refers to the willingness of one company to be
vulnerable to the actions of another company based on the expectation that the other
company will perform a particular action important to the first company, irrespective of
the first company’s ability to monitor or control that other company (Mayer, Davis and
Schoorman 1995). Interorganizational trusts promotes information sharing and openness
between the partners (Zaheer et al. 1998), and as a result parties communicate better and
their expectations of one another are more predictable, and there is less room for
misunderstanding and conflict.
Relational trust is specific to a particular exchange partner and is based on
experience. In terms of interorganizational relationships, relational trust does not imply
trusting all the partners, but only trusting a specific counterpart (Zaheer et al. 1998). This
research is concerned with the client’s trust in the provider of the IS outsourcing services
and products, and thus, relational trust is of interest.
Competitive ability, benevolence and integrity are the three characteristics of the
trustee that traditionally appear to be important in the development of trust. Competitive
ability refers to a group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that allow an
organization to have influence within some specific domain. Benevolence describes the
extent of goodness and positive orientation of the trustee towards the trustor aside from
the profit motive. Integrity is comprised of the consistency of the trustee’s past actions,
opinions about the trustee from other parties, sense of justice and the extent to which
trustee’s actions are consistent with its words (Mayer et al. 1995). Trust in the partner is
built based on the evaluations of ability, benevolence and integrity of that partner.
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Interorganizational trust is built over time as the organizations engage in various
activities. Satisfaction with the outsourcing deliverables and the overall relationship leads
to the development of trust. Overtime, as the provider demonstrates greater reliability,
consistent performance contributes to trust building (Hart and Saunders 1998). A satisfied
client is likely to view the provider as trustworthy (Ganesan 1994; Garbarino et al. 1999),
and thus, satisfaction with all factors of the outsourcing arrangement results in higher
levels of trust on the part of the client.
When outsourcing IS activities to the provider, the client assumes that the
provider would make an effort to behave in accordance with the terms of the contract,
adjust the contract as needed if market circumstances change, and would not take
excessive advantage of the client even if such an opportunity presents itself (Dyer et al.
2003). If a client company believes that the provider is trustworthy, they expect the
provider to act on their behalf to the best of the provider’s ability. Overtime, as the
provider demonstrates greater reliability, consistent performance contributes to trust
building (Hart et al. 1998). Trust reduces the uncertainty associated with taking
advantage of otherwise risky new opportunities (Hart et al. 1998), reinforces the prospect
of continuity in a relationship (Hart and Saunders 1997), and has been reported to be the
most important factor in selecting an outsourcing provider as reported by the IT managers
(Violino et al. 1998).
Trust encourages cooperation between the client and the provider in the
outsourcing relationship (Gambetta 1988; Mayer et al. 1995) and helps develop
synergistic relationships (Jones and George 1998). Greater trust between the client and
the provider is likely to build a stronger relationship and lead to its continuation. A client
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organization that has high trust in the provider is likely to stay in the relationship
(Anderson et al. 1989). Therefore, as the outsourcing contract progresses, termination of
the relationship is unlikely where a client’s organization has high trust in the provider.
But if the trust in the provider is low and the satisfaction with the outsourcing
relationship is below expectations, the client may consider backsourcing to overcome
these issues.

Client’s Voice Behavior
Dissolution of the relationship begins when one of the parties evaluates their
dissatisfaction with the other party (Dwyer et al. 1987). When problems arise in the
relationship, clients may respond differently to those issues. Some customers voice their
concerns immediately to remedy the situation and avoid termination of the relationship,
and some remain silent, hoping things will get better. Voice behavior corresponds to any
attempt to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, either by
appealing to the management directly in charge or to higher authority. An organization
can resort to voice behavior instead of terminating the relationship in an attempt to
change the practices, policies and output of the partner firm (Hirschman 1970).
In an unsatisfactory relationship voice can be used to improve the conditions of
the relationship (Ping 1999). In order to improve the relationship, voice behavior should
be constructive and aim at alerting the partner to the problem and working on resolving
the issue, but at the same time maintaining the relationship (Ping 1999). The provider in
this situation can decide to work with the client on improving the unsatisfactory
characteristics of the products or services and resolve the relationship problems. In this
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case, the client’s choice to voice their concerns helps promote the relationship and
prevent termination.
Clients use voice to attract attention and to warn the provider about the decline in
performance or any other relationship issues. It is used as an alternative to an immediate
termination of the relationship in hopes that the relationship can be salvaged. For the
provider, it is an opportunity to respond to the client’s concerns, improve if necessary,
and prevent the relationship from termination. For the client, voice is a chance to get
better products or services, or even leverage their position.

The client is likely to resort

to voice if there is a lack of alternatives to the current outsourcing arrangement and the
termination of the relationship is undesirable (Hirschman 1970). In certain situations,
voice behavior of the client can signal to the provider the intent to terminate the
relationship. The client company may decide to backsource the IS services for reasons
other than relationship factors, but use voice in an attempt to end the relationship with the
provider.
Voice effectiveness usually increases with its volume, but only up to a certain
point (Hirschman 1970). Naturally, frequent expression of concerns and dissatisfaction,
as well as requests and appeals for changes, lead to increased attention from the provider
and improvements in products or services. For a while, increased voice serves to improve
the relationship and helps to reduce the client’s intent to terminate the relationship.
However, if discontented clients become too harassing, frequent complaints may
discourage the provider and hinder the efforts to remedy the situation (Hirschman 1970).
If the provider is not willing to make changes, termination of the relationship is inevitable
and the client needs to seek other alternatives. Effectiveness of voice reaches a limit at a
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certain point, and any additional increase in voice only increases the client’s intent to
terminate the outsourcing relationship with the provider.
Even though the client’s satisfaction with the provider’s performance leads to a
continuation of the relationship and long-term orientation (Ganesan 1994), voice
behavior can be detrimental to the relationship (Hirschman 1970). Voice can be used by
clients not only to improve the situation but also to negotiate additional benefits or
modify the contract. Clients engaging in voice behavior may be bargaining so much, that
their protests at some point only further deteriorate the relationship, and the provider will
not be interested in making any efforts to salvage or maintain such a relationship. Inflated
use of voice is also costly for the client as it requires time and effort for negotiation and
complaints, thus, making the outsourcing arrangement less efficient. In this situation,
frequent criticisms and bargaining over the details of the contract would lead to
destabilization of the relationship and its termination.
Once the outsourcing relationship is to be terminated because of the problems in
the client-provider relationship, the client company is likely to use its experience with
this outsourcing relationship in assessing other alternatives. Backsourcing is the most
likely solution in this case, especially if there are also cost benefits or strategic
advantages associated with the decision.

Triangulation of Factors
Assessment of the outsourcing contract takes into consideration multiple business
factors. The decision to backsource IS services is a complex one and the process of
transitioning IS functions back in-house is not easy. Theoretical development above
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argues for a multitude of factors that can have an effect on backsourcing, and some of
them are bound to be more critical than the others. How do all of those factors interplay
and which ones drive the backsourcing process?
Change over from outsourcing to backsourcing is not an easy transition and it
requires numerous resources (Christensen et al. 1996). As such, the outsourcing client
company should have substantial reasons for this decision. Backsourcing is a strategic
decision for the organization, a decision that is big, high-risk and breaks new ground
(Hall 1999). As such, strategic decisions are made to accomplish determined objectives
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992). Proper evaluation of the existing outsourcing situation
and the potential backsourcing benefits and impediments is necessary before committing
to backsourcing. Several major factors combined should justify the backsourcing
decision. No factor alone can by itself substantiate a significant strategic decision like
this. This dissertation analyzes the factors that played a role in several backsourcing
decisions, and through exploratory study, identifies the factors that are most critical for
backsourcing.

58

CHAPTER FOUR. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the procedures that were used to collect the data and
analyze the factors involved in the backsourcing decision. First, it focuses on the case
study research methodology that was used to investigate the backsourcing phenomenon,
the evidence sources that were accessed and provides details of the organizations that
participated in the study. Then it details the data collection procedures, and explains the
interview guide development process and pretests. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the techniques used for data analysis, and a triangulation of the results and
methods used to ensure the quality of the research methodology.

Case Study Approach
To investigate the factors salient in the decision to backsource and to examine the
process of backsourcing, this research employed case study methodology. A case study
research approach is popular in IS research, specifically, 15% of articles in major IS
journals utilize case study methodology (Dube and Pare 2003). A structured program of
multiple case studies is especially suitable for exploration of the relationship between
information technology and corporate strategy (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead 1987).
Since this research focuses on the examination of the factors leading to backsourcing, and
in particular, investigates economic, strategic and relationship reasons involved in the
backsourcing decision from the client and the provider’s perspectives, a case study
approach provides an opportunity to explore the relationship between the organizational
factors and the decision to backsource IS activities. Qualitative procedures help to
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understand the social reality at a greater richness and depth, and record such reality
through a more complex, and subtle set of interpretive categories (Feagin, Orum and
Sjoberg 1991).
There are several reasons why a case study approach was deemed appropriate for
this research. First of all, a case study is a preferred strategy when the researcher has little
control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some
real life context (Yin 2003). The study of the backsourcing decision is embedded in the
multitude of organizational decisions. The researcher has no control over the course of
events, however, has an opportunity to observe the organizational processes and changes
in the way information systems are managed. Backsourcing is a relatively new
phenomenon and the case study approach allows examining it in its real life setting as the
organizations undergo the evaluation of the current outsourcing arrangement and change
over to in-house management of IS.
Secondly, a case study allows an investigation to retain the holistic and
meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Yin 2003). The main interests of this study
are the organizational and managerial processes involved in the evaluation of the
outsourcing contract and possible backsourcing, as well as the relationship between the
provider and the client. The case study approach provides an opportunity to closely
examine the interaction between the client and the provider in the outsourcing context
and focus on the relationship between these two parties. It also permits the researcher to
gather the first hand opinions and experiences of the outsourcing clients and providers
and further analyze those in the overall real-life backsourcing context.
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Finally, case studies can be used to explain the causal links in real-life
interventions that are complex, or describe a real-life context in which an intervention has
occurred (Yin 2003). Backsourcing considerations are complex, and backsourcing
decisions are likely to be based on a large number of factors. Different criteria used in the
evaluation of the outsourcing contract may not corroborate with one another, making the
final decision even more difficult. Undergoing the reversal of the outsourcing contract is
not an easy process (Christensen et al. 1996), and the case study approach is posed to
provide interesting insights into the process and also allow for an investigation of the
reasons for backsourcing and any impediments to that decision.
Case studies are often critiqued for their lack of generalizability since they only
focus on a few cases. However, it should be noted that case studies are not supposed to
generalize to populations (Yin 2003). Examining backsourcing considerations within a
small number of client companies enables the researcher to generalize the findings to the
theoretical underpinnings. The cases in this research approach do not represent a
“sample”, and the researcher’s goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization) (Yin 2003).

Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis for this study is the IS outsourcing contract between the
outsourcing client and the provider. The contract refers to all of the contractual events
and any interaction between the outsourcing client and the provider, regarding the
outsourcing services, products or contract details, throughout the course of the
outsourcing arrangement, from its very inception to the end. A client can be involved in
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several unique agreements with different providers. As such, each outsourcing contract
signifies a separate relationship that exists between the client and the provider.

Selection of Cases
An exploratory multiple case study approach was selected for the analysis of
backsourcing. Multiple cases make the gathered evidence more compelling, analytic
conclusions more powerful, and strengthen the validity and stability of the findings
(Miles and Huberman 1984; Yin 2003). The selected cases need to be appropriate and
demonstrate a fit to both the purpose of the research and the phenomenon of interest
(Kuzel 1999). Because case studies rely on analytical, rather than statistical
generalization, use of case studies helps to expand and generalize theories through
replication (Yin 2003). The selection of the case study sites for this dissertation followed
literal replication logic, which suggests selection of cases with different settings that are
expected to achieve similar results.
To isolate the factors that are critical for backsourcing, this research focused on
companies that ended the outsourcing relationship to backsource the previously
outsourced IS operations. This approach provided an opportunity to compare the different
decision processes and settings for the backsourcing situations. Specifically, multiple
cases were needed to answer the main question of this study: “Why do IS outsourcing
clients decide to backsource?” and to compare the backsourcing decision and transition
to backsourcing across different organizations that have experienced outsourcing.
There are different purposeful sampling strategies available for case site selection.
Theory based strategies seemed most appropriate for this dissertation. Theory determined
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cases use either criterion, theoretical or confirming-disconfirming strategies (Shakir
2002). Criterion based sampling strategy suggests selection of cases based on some
predetermined criterion. Theoretical sampling strategy represents cases that manifest a
particular theoretical construct and are used to examine it in detail, and confirming or
disconfirming strategy seeks cases that elaborate on initial analysis and test variations
(Patton 1990). Criterion based sampling strategy is used for this research to select
companies that have experienced the reversal of the outsourcing arrangement, and
subsequent backsourcing.
Continuing with the criterion based sampling strategy, the researcher sought out
companies that were differentiated on the role of IS and structural changes in the
company. The first criterion was selected because core competency perspective suggests
that functions and activities that make significant contribution to an organization success
should be kept in-house. The choice of companies for the study was, thus, driven by the
role that IS plays in their organization. Companies where IS was expected to play a
supporting role, as well as companies where IS was perceived to be a critical component
of company’s business, were selected for the study.
The second criterion that was used focused on the internal structural changes in
the company. Power shifts within organizations can have an impact on the backsourcing
decision. Consequently, the companies also were selected to be different in terms of the
internal structural changes. Some of the companies had changes in the top management
around the time of the reversal of the outsourcing contract and some of them continued
on with the same management.
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Yin (2003) suggests that a satisfactory number of cases for a literal replication
study is two or three. In particular for this study, three companies that have recently
undergone backsourcing were selected (Table 4.1). One of the companies had four
separate IS outsourcing contracts; three of those contracts were terminated and brought
back in-house. Since the unit of analysis for this research is an IS outsourcing contract,
the total number of individual contract cases is six. Patton (1990) points out that the most
interest is in any common pattern that emerges from great variations. To address the issue
of maximum variation of the case studies, selected companies were of different size,
represent different industries, and have different profit orientations. The final criterion
that was used for the case study selection calls for the selection of companies that have
made the backsourcing decision within the past three years. This time frame ensured that
the interviewees have better recall of the details of the outsourcing experience and
subsequent backsourcing.
The following subsections present the description of three companies. These cases
represent companies that decided to bring the previously outsourced functions back inhouse. Additionally, the cases differ in terms of the role of IS and internal structural
changes. These cases are especially selected to make the findings more representative and
to gain a better understanding of a broad range of backsourcing processes.

Company One - Alpha
An international company that employs 7,500 people and has undergone recent
reversal of outsourcing was selected as the first case study site. This company provides
support and services that enhance supply chain management for their clients. The
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company has over 400 service centers in almost 40 countries with more than 100,000
customers worldwide. The company strives to differentiate itself from its competitors
through quality of service delivery, the application of technology, innovative products,
and the ability to offer a lower cost solution to customers. The company had almost U.S.
$2.5 billion in sales in the fiscal year that ended on June 30, 2003.
The company currently has 350 IS professionals on its staff. Originally,
subsidiaries in different countries managed their IS operations individually.

United

States, continental Europe, United Kingdom and Australia all had separate service
agreements with various IS outsourcing providers that handled the organizational IS
needs. However, recently the company worked its way out of all the outsourcing
contracts globally and now runs its IS operations from its headquarters in the United
States.

Company Two - Beta
The second company that was selected for the case study is a non-profit
broadcasting station. The station serves the 13th largest market in the US and has been on
air since 1958. The station’s revenues for 2004 were almost U.S. $10 million, and it
currently has 48 employees. The station exists through direct financial support of the
community with over half of the revenues generated through its member contributions.
Approximately 39,000 members from 16 different counties support the station. The
station employs two IS professionals to support its business operations.
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Company Three - Gamma
The third case study company was a non-profit organization in the broadcasting
industry. With revenues of U.S. $6.2 million for the fiscal year 2003, its main source of
revenue is donations from the members. The station employs 52 full-time staff, and
currently has almost 30,000 members that support the station through donations. One
full-time individual supports the IS needs of the station.
Table 4.1. Case Study Sites Key Information
Company
Details a
Industry
Revenues
(U.S.$ millions)
Employees
IS Employees
Action after
Outsourcing
Outsourced
Services
a.

Company One:
Alpha
Supply Chain
2,500

Company Two: Beta

Company Three:
Gamma
Broadcasting
9.6

7,500
350
Backsourcing
Continuation of
outsourcing
Data Processing
Network
Infrastructure

48
2
Backsourcing

52
1
Backsourcing
Some re-outsourcing

Data Processing

Data Processing

Broadcasting
10

Company information is based on Hoover’s Online Business Directory

Data Sources
The case study can rely on several sources of evidence: primary documents,
archival records, interviews, physical artifacts, direct observation and participant
observation. When doing a case study, it is beneficial to utilize multiple sources of
evidence converging on the same set of facts (Yin 2003). This section focuses on the data
sources that were used for the case studies, since a clear description of the data sources
and the way they contribute to the findings of the research, ensure the reliability and
validity of the results in the case research (Benbasat et al. 1987).
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To examine the factors that may lead to backsourcing, several sources of evidence
seemed appropriate; in particular: primary documents, archival records and interviews.
The opportunity to collect data from many different sources is a major strength of case
studies (Yin 2003). First of all, the use of multiple sources of evidence allows addressing
a broader range of issues. Additionally, when the data is really triangulated, the facts or
findings of the case study are supported by more than one source of evidence. This way,
the potential problem of construct validity is addressed through data triangulation since
multiple sources of evidence provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Yin
2003).
Interviews were the main source of evidence in all conducted case studies (Table
4.2). Various documents and archival data were used to augment and corroborate the
evidence collected through the interviews (Yin 2003). Archival records included publicly
available financial statements, annual reports and organizational charts. Documents
included communication between the client company and their IS outsourcing providers,
such as complaint letters and contract agreements, internal documents detailing the
organizational mission and documents pertaining to the backsourcing transition.
Initial research on the case study companies and their respective industries was
done using publicly available materials. Company websites were utilized to obtain
mission statements, annual reports, financial statements, staff listings and learn about the
company’s business. Hoover’s Online Directory of Business was searched for company
fact sheets and basic information. Additionally, other available online materials were
perused to gain industry insights. Organizational charts and news announcements,
pertaining to management changes, were used to examine changes in both external and
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internal organizational structure and to capture the structural changes in the organization
as one of the possible motives for backsourcing.
The informants were requested to share any documents that they had at their
disposal, related to either the outsourcing experience or the backsourcing transition.
When available, the researcher perused the documents at the company’s office. No
copying of the documents was allowed in any of the case companies. The documents
were helpful in verifying the dates of the IS outsourcing contracts, names of the
individuals involved in the outsourcing and backsourcing activities, and gathering overall
corporate information. In some cases, the researcher was able to obtain the
communication between the client and provider. It was informative in highlighting the
disagreements and issues that arose during the outsourcing contracts. Service records and
communication with the provider, related to the prior IS outsourcing arrangements,
provided data to ascertain service quality of the IS outsourcing and also satisfaction with
IS outsourcing. Complaint letters were used as a measure of voice behavior on the part of
the client and were analyzed for presence of any indication of the loss of control over the
IS.
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Table 4.2 Data Collection Sources
Constructs of Interest
Cost Advantage
Asset Specificity
Switching Costs
Change in the Role of IS
Structural Changes
Loss of control
Goal Conflict
Trust
Service Quality
Satisfaction
Voice
Other information

Archival Records

Data Sources
Interview
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

Company
Documents

X
X
X
X
X

Interviews
Interviews were the essential source of the case study evidence since this
particular research and case studies focused on the organizational affairs and
interorganizational relations (Yin 2003). Before data collection, an approval to collect
data through interviews was received from the university’s Institutional Review Board
(Appendix A). Interviews were conducted with the various executives of the company, as
well as other senior and junior personnel involved with outsourcing and subsequent
backsourcing, using a semi-structured interview guide (Appendix B). The interviews
focused on the experience of the individuals with the IS outsourcing, and were intended
to explore the issues associated with the termination of the outsourcing relationship and
with backsourcing. Since individuals within the company may have different accounts
reflecting their own experience, motives and involvements with the IS outsourcing
provider (Ping and Dwyer 1992), multiple responses from various individuals involved in
69

the process were solicited. The initial interviews with the main informant were used to
generate a list of people who were involved in the backsourcing decision and also in the
transition process from outsourcing to backsourcing.
Most interviews were conducted in person and lasted between 30 minutes to two
hours. Before each interview, informants were asked to complete written consent forms
which were kept by the researcher. A permission to record the interview was received
from each interviewee, and all interviews were tape recorded to ensure the complete
capture of the interviewee’s response and to assist the researcher in concentrating on the
direction of the discussion (Rosenthal et al. 1991). While tape recording an interview
makes some subjects more apprehensive, and may interrupt the interview (Taylor and
Bogdan 1998), it allows the researcher to capture the subject’s responses for future
thorough analysis.
Every effort was made to keep meticulous record of all the data in the case
research, as it helps enhance the validity and reliability of the study (Benbasat et al.
1987). After the meeting, each interview was transcribed by the researcher or a research
assistant. During the transcription, every effort was made to reflect the interview as fully
as possible by being verbatim (Seidman 1998). Once transcribed, the interview was
reviewed by the researcher for any inconsistencies. In the case of questionable sentences,
the researcher went back to the tape to verify the text. Afterwards, transcriptions of the
interviews were forwarded to the interviewees for review.
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Development of the Interview Protocol
Important characteristics of a qualitative interview design are that it is flexible,
iterative, and continuous (Rubin and Rubin 1995). Open ended questions were used in the
semi-structured interview guide to allow respondents an opportunity to expand on their
answers (Rosenthal and Rosnow 1991). Questions dwelled on the issues identified in the
theoretical development, and in particular, addressed the change in the role of IS in: the
organization, structural changes, loss of control over IS, goal conflict, service quality,
satisfaction, voice behavior and trust in the provider. Additionally, the interview explored
other possible reasons for backsourcing as identified by the informants and their
experiences with outsourcing and backsourcing. Table 4.3 lists the mapping of the
questions in the interview guide to the constructs of interest.
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Table 4.3 Mapping of Interview Protocol Questions to Theoretically Derived Antecedents
Lens

Construct
Asset
Specificity

1.

Economic

2.

Cost
Advantage
Switching
Costs

Strategic

Change in
the Role of
IS

Structural
Changes

1.
1.
2.
3.
1.

1.
2.

Loss of
Control

1.
2.

3.

Relationship

4.

Goal
Conflict

Questions
If you think about your company’s IS processes, how do they
differ, compared to other companies in the same industry?
Can you think of any unique technical skills, extensive business
knowledge or substantial investments in equipment on the part
of the outsourcing provider that your company requires?
What kind of cost savings did your company achieve by
returning the previously outsourced services back in-house?
How long did the transition from outsourcing to in-house take?
What were the difficulties during the transition from
outsourcing to backsourcing?
Were there any extra costs involved in the transition?
Can you think of any changes in the way IS was utilized in your
company during the outsourcing contract?
a. Change in the role of information systems in the success
of your company?
b. Change in your company’s expertise in information
technology and understanding how it can be used in your
organization?
c. Change in the competitive advantage that information
systems offer your company?
Did your company recently merge with or acquire another
company?
Can you tell me of any significant changes in the management
that your company has undergone during the outsourcing
arrangement and during backsourcing?
When you had some special requests to the provider, were they
able to meet them in timely and flexible manner?
Can you think of any changes that you requested from the
provider and tell me about how they responded to your requests
for changes?
Do you think your company had control over the IS processes that
were handled by the Outsourcing Provider and why?
During the outsourcing contract did you feel your company was
able to respond to competitive and environmental challenges in
a timely manner?

1. Can you tell me of any significant disagreements (if any) between
your company and the Outsourcing Provider during the time of the
contract?
a. About specific way work is done or services are provided?
b. About goals and priorities of outsourcing?
c. About specific terms of the relationship between your
organization and Outsourcing Provider?
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Lens

Construct
Satisfaction

Service
Quality

Trust

Voice

Questions
1. What did you think about the
a. IS service performed by Outsourcing Provider?
b. Customer support by Outsourcing Provider?
c. Relationship with Outsourcing Provider?
1. What did you think of the quality of service provided by the
Outsourcing Provider?
a. Physical facilities, equipment, and appearance of staff
b. Willingness to help customers and provide prompt
service
c. Ability to perform the promised service dependably and
accurately
d. Knowledge and courtesy of employees
e. Caring, individualized attention
1. What did you think about the
a. Honesty and accuracy of deadlines set by Outsourcing
Provider?
b. Reliability of the computer systems of Outsourcing
Provider?
c. Willingness of Outsourcing Provider to share
information?
d. Outsourcing Provider’s adherence to agreements?
1. What kind of concerns did your company have about the service
that it was receiving?
a. How did you communicate those concerns to
Outsourcing Provider’s representatives?
b. How did the provider react to those communications?
2. What kind of changes if any did your company suggest to
Outsourcing Provider if there was a problem?
a. How did your company work with Outsourcing Provider
to help improve the situation?

In addition to the above questions, the informants were also asked about their
overall experience with outsourcing, their company’s IS situation after the termination of
the outsourcing relationship, and their experience with backsourcing. Each informant also
named their reasons for backsourcing the discussed outsourcing contract. General
information about the company, the informant’s role in the company and in outsourcing
and backsourcing and their thoughts on backsourcing, were also collected.
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During the development of the interview guide, care was taken to establish the
best sequence of questions and ensure the best wording of the questions. Cognitive
interviews with MIS professionals were conducted to assure the relevancy of the
questions in the interview guide as well as the flow of the interview discussion and
proper wording of all items (Dillman 2000). Questions dealing with the sensitive issues
in the outsourcing relationship, termination and backsourcing, were placed at the end of
the questionnaire.

Data Analysis
Development of Case Descriptions
Following the guidelines of the Case Study Protocol (Appendix C), case
descriptions were composed for each of the cases. A description of the company was
compiled based on the collected archival data and interviews. Then, the company’s IS
operations were detailed using the data gathered through interviews and other archival
sources. It was followed by the description of the provider, the IS outsourcing contract,
and then details of the subsequent backsourcing process. Quotes from the interviews were
used when necessary, to highlight and support the case descriptions. Excerpts from the
interviews with multiple respondents helped triangulate and produce a more accurate
account of the events.
Since reliability depends on explicitly described observational procedures (Kirk et
al. 1986), data collection followed the steps specified in the case study protocol.
Additionally, a digital case study database was created to ensure the reliability of the case
study (Yin 2003). All collected data was organized by case. Case study notes for each
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case were stored in individual computer folders, in a way that other persons can
efficiently retrieve them at a later date. Interview transcripts, corporate documents found
on-line and notes of the reviewed corporate documents inside the company were
organized, categorized, and made available for later access. For case company Alpha,
case documents were additionally organized by each of the four outsourcing contracts.
The researcher used the statements made by various informants for illustrating each case.
No analysis of the interview data was done until all interviews were completed for
each case. This approach minimized imposing what was learned in earlier interviews, on
the participants that were interviewed later (Seidman 1998). If something was not clear in
the transcript, the tapes allowed going back to the source and checking for accuracy. For
analysis, all interviews that related to each case of backsourcing were combined on a
single transcript. The first step in reducing the text of the interview was to read the
interview and mark the passages that: 1) related to the overall information about the
company and descriptions of the information system functions, and 2) that described the
initial IS outsourcing and subsequent backsourcing. After that, the individual passages
were grouped into one of the above mentioned categories. The paragraphs pertaining to
overall information about the company and description of information systems were used
to compose case descriptions. The second category was further analyzed to mark the
statements describing details of the outsourcing contract (SLA, contract terms, dates of
contract, history of the contract, reasons for outsourcing, costs etc.). Those passages were
used to create the outsourcing contract description. Additionally, statements detailing the
backsourcing transition (dates of backsourcing, steps undertaken to transition back in-
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house, negotiation of contract termination, set up of the in-house operations) were used to
compose a brief description of the backsourcing for the case descriptions.

Data Coding
Miles and Huberman (1984) methodology for textual pattern coding was
employed during the analysis of interviews. Following the guidelines of the Case Study
Protocol (Appendix C) all text passages from all the interviews that related to the
outsourcing contract and backsourcing experience for each case were combined on a
single transcript. Then a coding schema was developed, based on earlier theoretically
derived backsourcing antecedents. A preliminary code schema was based on an initial
conceptual model or literature review (Crabtree et al. 1992). Each of the constructs was
represented in the schema and a brief description of the construct was provided (See
Appendix D for final coding schema). Additionally, three more categories were added to
the schema: details of outsourcing contract, transition from outsourcing to backsourcing
and benefits of backsourcing (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4 Coding Schema Categories
Construct Categories
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅

Asset Specificity
Cost Benefit or Disadvantage
Switching Costs
Change in the Role of IS
Control over IS
Changes in the Management
Service Quality
Satisfaction with Outsourcing
Trust in the Provider
Goal Conflict
Voice Behavior

Original Extra Categories
⋅ Details of Outsourcing
contract
⋅ Transitioning from
Outsourcing
⋅ Benefits of Backsourcing
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Emerged Categories
⋅ Multi Provider Situation
⋅ Provider’s Perspective
⋅ Power

To increase coding reliability, two individuals had to independently code the
transcripts of one case. Coding had to be applied to naturally occurring chunks of text in
the transcript. Naturally occurring chunks of text could be complete paragraphs, blocks of
sentences or paragraphs, individual sentences, or even a part of a sentence, if it could be
logically related to one of the categories. Initially the coders met to discuss the coding
schema and ensure that the construct definitions were clear to both coders. A practice
coding was done using several pages of the transcript and the differences in coding were
discussed, reconciled and the coding schema was adjusted to reflect the modified
construct descriptions.
After that, both individuals independently used the revised coding schema to code
the transcript text for one case study. If a passage did not fit into any category, it was
assigned to an “Other” category. All of the text had to be assigned to one of the existing
categories or to an “Other” category. Once coding of the whole transcript was complete,
the coder reviewed all of the “Other” category quotes to decide if any additional
categories surfaced. If a new category emerged, it was discussed with the second coder
and added to the coding schema.
When the coding was complete, the two coders met to reconcile the coded
transcript. They went through the text and marked all the coded passages where they did
not agree on the category. For those passages, after some discussion, they assigned the
reconciled coding that was used in later analysis. The interrater agreement was calculated
using the results from the coding reconciliation exercise. All other cases were coded by
the main researcher using the revised coding schema and the discussions with the second
coder.
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Interrater Reliability
To calculate the interrater agreement, Cohen’s Kappa, a coefficient of the
agreement was used. It is a well accepted standard to evaluate the interrater agreement in
discourse and dialogue processing community (Di Eugenio 2000). To compute Cohen’s
Kappa, a coding agreement matrix was constructed (Table 4.5). Every cell represents a
frequency of occurrences where Coder One coded Category A and Coder Two coded
Category B. The diagonal of the matrix represents situations where the coders were in
agreement, i.e. coded the same category for the same particular chunk of text.
The following formula was used to compute Kappa:

Kappa =

ObservedAgreement − ExpectedAgreement
1 − ExpectedAgreement

where the observed agreement was calculated as the diagonal sum divided by the
total number of coded items and the expected agreement by chance was calculated as the
multiple row marginal times the column marginal and divided by the total number of
coded items.

Kappa =

0.5652 − 0.08098
= 0.527
1 − 0.08098
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Table 4.5. Coding Agreement Matrix

C
o
d
e
r
T
w
o

Coder One
AST COST SWI ROLE LOSS MAN TRU SAT SQ CON VB TRA SLA BEN POW Other Total
AST
5
1
6
COST
5
1
2
8
SWI
3
1
1
5
ROLE
2
2
LOSS
6
2
3
11
MAN
2
2
TRU
0
SAT
2
2
1
5
SQ
1
3
1
1
6
CON
3
1
5
7
1
1
18
VB
1
1
8
3
13
TRA
1
7
1
1
10
SLA
1
4
2
8
1
16
BEN
1
3
1
5
POW
1
2
3
Other
1
1
1
2
5
Total
5
6
3
4
10
2
1
5 17
8
11
11 16
10
2
4
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Cohen’s Kappa turned out to be .527. To assess Kappa’s significance, the
Rietveld and Van Hout scale was used. According to this scale, Kappa between .41 and
.60 indicates moderate agreement, and Kappa between .61 and .80 indicates substantial
agreement (Rietveld 1993). Therefore, calculated Kappa indicated moderate agreement
between the coders and was considered acceptable, especially that the maximum value of
Kappa permitted by the marginals was calculated to be .811.

Kappa max =

∑ min CategoryTotals − ChanceAgreement
1 − ChanceAgreement

where minimum of category totals is the smaller of totals for each category (either
row or column) and chance agreement is the proportion of agreement expected by chance
(Cohen 1960).

Kappamax = .811
The maximum value of Kappa permitted by the marginals demonstrates that there
is a portion of the agreement (1 - .811) that can never be achieved because of differing
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marginals. Discrepancies between coders in their distribution of units into categories, by
nature, constitute disagreement (Cohen 1960).

Synthesis of Results Within Cases
Once the interview coding was complete, a matrix for each case was constructed
by combining the chunks of text assigned to each coding category and arranging it by
each interviewee with coding categories in rows, and informants in columns (sample
matrix is provided in Appendix E). The researcher reviewed the quotes to determine if
there were any differences in the depiction of each category by the informants across
each case.
The quotes in each cell were then used to create a review matrix that summarized
each interviewee’s perspective on every coding category. All cases in Chapter 6 present
a table with a summary of comments made by the informants listed and by the construct
that those comments described. If comments of the informant were contradictory, all
perspectives were described in the cell. The summary matrix was then used to calculate
the agreement between the informants on the status of each category during the described
backsourcing events.
In addition to discussing the details of the contract, each of the informants had a
chance to name their primary and secondary reasons for backsourcing during the
interview. Those reasons were combined into a table for every case. Comparing those
reasons across the informants allowed triangulating the main reasons for backsourcing in
each case.
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Matrixes with quotes were used for descriptions of case results. First, the details
of the passages coded ‘Details of Outsourcing Contract’ for each case, were examined to
determine the reasons for initial outsourcing, if possible. Those reasons were briefly
described in the beginning of each case results section. Further on, the analysis of
backsourcing antecedents were structured around three perspectives: economic, strategic
and relationship. Starting out with economic perspective, the quotes in the matrix for
economic categories, asset specificity, cost benefit/disadvantage and switching costs,
were reviewed. The researcher selected quotes from every informant that related to the
construct and represented their opinion of the situation. Depending on the availability of
material, more than one quote or sometimes none, were selected from each informant.
Then, relying on the quotes, the researcher described the situation with respect to every
construct and used quotes to support the story. For strategic and relationship categories,
the same procedure was performed and the results compiled.
To integrate the perspectives of the informants, the primary and secondary
reasons for backsourcing of the contract were assembled in a table for every case. The
most dominant backsourcing motives were identified and discussed. The impact of
various constructs on the backsourcing decision was evaluated based on the quotes from
the informants. The most dominant motive was also compared and reconciled with the
prior discussion of backsourcing antecedents in the case. Finally, the interrelations
between the constructs in the case and their impact on backsourcing were considered.
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Qualitative Comparative Analysis
In an attempt to answer the research question and identify the primary reasons
that affect the backsourcing decision, Qualitative Comparative Analysis was used to
supplement the above described procedures. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
was developed by Charles Ragin and can be used for statistical analysis of causal
relationships when the number of cases is too small for standard statistical tests, but the
complexity of data is too great for traditional qualitative approaches (Ragin 1987). For
this dissertation this method provided a further insight into the causal relationships
between the constructs in the backsourcing model.
QCA “uses the logic of Boolean algebra to determine the most parsimonious sets
of inter-related conditions that explain the outcomes observed among a given set of case
examples” (Fichman 2004). In this method all possible combinations of the independent
variables are analyzed to determine which combination presents a set of necessary and/or
collectively sufficient factors to produce a specified outcome. The methodology is based
on the assumption that factors affect the outcome differently depending on the presence
or absence of other compounding factors (Fichman 2004; Ragin 1987).
QCA uses a software algorithm to make multiple comparisons of combinations of
variables. It constructs a truth table and continuously applies a minimization algorithm to
select a subset of prime reasons sufficient to imply all configurations (Drass 1992). By
using QCA, factors necessary and sufficient to lead to backsourcing were determined.
Figure 4.1 presents the steps in QCA.

82

Figure 4.1 Steps in Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Triangulation of the Results
Triangulation refers to both the use of multiple data sources, such as
documentation and informant interviewing, multiple informants and various records, and
of multiple methods for data analysis (Crabtree et al. 1992). The study of a complex
phenomenon such as information systems in an organizational setting is particularly
suited for case research methodology that uses a wide range of data collection methods,
both qualitative and quantitative, thus, increasing richness and flexibility of the research
(Dube et al. 2003). In this dissertation, several sources of evidence were used to capture
the data for individual constructs under investigation and multiple informants were
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interviewed. Use of multiple approaches allowed to establish a more complete picture of
the phenomenon under investigation (Kelle 1995). Combining multiple data sources for
the analysis of the same phenomenon is referred to as triangulation (Jick 1979) and it
aims at identifying similar findings coming from different data sources (Sawyer 2001).
Interview data was supplemented by the analysis of existing documents as
interview results may reflect subjective opinions of individuals and thus may be biased.
Documents, on the other hand, represent stable, unobtrusive and exact sources of
evidence by reflecting communication among parties attempting to achieve certain
objectives (Yin 2003). Complaint letters, organizational communication, organizational
charts and other documents were used to corroborate and augment the data from the
interviews. Use of multiple sources of evidence allowed reconciling the differences and
developing a better and more integrated picture of the backsourcing process.
During the data analysis two methods were used to identify the primary
backsourcing antecedents. First, the primary factors were determined by triangulating the
primary reasons for backsourcing in each case as reported by the informants. As an
alternative, qualitative comparative analysis was used to determine factors necessary and
sufficient to result in the backsourcing outcome. Using these two methods allowed
reconciling the differences between the two methods and identifying the factors most
salient in backsourcing.

Ensuring Quality of Research
Several concerns that are relevant for all empirical research involve the issues of
validity and reliability. In case studies tactics to ensure validity and reliability can be
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applied throughout the subsequent conduct of the study and not just at the research design
stage (Yin 2003). This requires the researcher to maintain strict standards of research
design, data collection, data analysis and case study write-up.
Yin (2003) suggested that to increase construct validity the researcher should use
multiple sources of evidence during data collection, so that convergent lines of inquiry
are encouraged; the researcher should maintain a clear chain of evidence during data
collection and also have the key informants review the draft of the case study report. In
this research, all three tactics were utilized in attempt to increase construct validity. In
particular, both interview data and archival written communication between the client and
the provider was used to ascertain the relationship dynamics in the outsourcing
arrangement. In order to maintain a chain of evidence the case study database was kept
that contains the actual evidence as well as the circumstances under which the evidence
was gathered, consistent with the procedures outlined in the Case Study Protocol
(Appendix C). Finally, the final case write ups were shared with the key informants in
each of the cases to ensure that the accounts of the events are accurate.
In terms of external validity the case study approach relies on analytical
generalization. In analytical generalization, the researcher is striving to generalize a
particular set of results to some broader theory (Yin 2003). The results of six case studies
are used to examine the factors critical in the evaluation of backsourcing.
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CHAPTER FIVE. CASE SITE DESCRIPTIONS

This chapter presents case descriptions for all of this dissertation’s case study
sites. Following a case study protocol, it identifies evidence collected for each case and
provides details of three case study sites. Each case description starts with an overview of
the company and its industry, and then describes the IS activities and the role of IS. It is
followed by the details of the outsourcing contract(s) and concludes with the details of
the backsourcing decision and transition back in-house.

Developing Case Descriptions
Following Case Study Protocol case descriptions relied on multiple sources of
evidence (interviews, documentation, and archival records). Using multiple sources of
evidence for the same set of facts or findings allowed to develop converging lines of
inquiry (Yin 2003). Triangulation was also achieved by using interview quotes from
multiple informants to depict the same set of events. Multiple sources of evidence helped
to better reconstruct reality and develop complete case descriptions.

Company One - Alpha
Alpha is a large logistics company that is involved in planning, implementing, and
controlling the movement and storage of materials, in-process inventory, finished goods,
and related information from the point of origin to the point of consumption. Alpha is
part of a consortium of three other companies, Delta, and runs operations in 38 countries
with 7,500 employees. It has over 400 service centers globally that handle more than
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100,000 customers worldwide. The company had almost U.S. $2.5 billion in sales in the
fiscal year that ended on June 30, 2004 with annual sales growth of 4%.

Sources of Evidence
The initial interview at Alpha was conducted with the CIO of the company. This
meeting was used to learn more about the company, IS operations, outsourcing
experiences, and subsequent backsourcing. Through this interview, three separate cases
of backsourcing were identified. The researcher and another person at the meeting took
notes, which were transcribed immediately after the interview. The notes from both
individuals were reconciled in the final interview transcript. This ensured accuracy of the
recorded information.
Shortly after the initial interview the CIO was replaced with another CIO (the
interviewed CIO is further referred to as the former CIO). The new CIO was not involved
in the prior outsourcing and backsourcing activities of the company, but provided
introductions to other individuals within the company who were in charge of IS
operations and were part of the backsourcing transition. As a result, an interview with a
Vice-President of Global Infrastructure and a Director of IT Operations was set up. This
interview was tape recorded and focused on the details of IS operations, and the
researcher was given a tour of the IS facilities in the company. Three separate
outsourcing arrangements that ended up backsourced were confirmed during that
interview.
Following two introductory interviews, all other interviews were conducted using
a structured interview guide (Appendix B) and were tape recorded with the interviewees’

87

permission. Interviews concentrated specifically on outsourcing experiences and
subsequent backsourcing. The Director of IT Operations was interviewed again, as well
as the Global Telecom Program Manager. These two individuals introduced the
researcher to other informants working for Alpha at international locations. Separate
phone interviews were conducted with three individuals, in three global locations, who
were involved in three different outsourcing contracts. Two respondents were involved in
two outsourcing contracts each, and thus provided information about both of those
contracts. Additionally, the now former CIO was contacted again and was interviewed
using the structured interview guide. The individual interviews lasted between 45 minutes
to two hours. To supplement the data gathered during the interviews, news reports and
publicly available company information was used to compose this case description (Table
5.1).
Table 5.1 Company Alpha: Sources of Evidence for Case Description
Non-structured Interview
• Former CIO
• Vice President Global
Infrastructure
• Director of IT
Operations

•
•
•
•
•
•

Semi-structured Interview
Director of IT Operations
Global Telecom Program
Manager
Former CIO
Senior System Administrator
IS Director for Europe
European Relationship
Manager

•
•
•
•

Documentation
Hoover’s Online
News publications
Annual Report
Company History

Company History
Alpha started its logistics business locally in Australia after the World War II and
over time expanded to service customers worldwide. In the 1950’s it was bought by a
consortium of companies, Delta, and has been operating under the Delta umbrella since.
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By the 1990’s, the company ran operations in Europe, Asia-Pacific, Americas and Africa.
Corporate structure and ownership of Alpha was quite complex. Delta owned the AsiaPacific operations, yet another company, Epsilon, was the sole owner of African
operations. Epsilon and Delta partnered in a joint-venture that owned and operated
European and North American businesses of Alpha (Figure 5.1).

Consortium
Delta

Epsilon

Alpha-Africa

Alpha –
Asia-Pacific

JV
50/50
ownership

Alpha –
North America

Alpha Europe

Figure 5.1 Ownership structure of Alpha before 2001
From the period of inception until 2001, each global business unit was responsible
for its own local operations, and businesses were not coordinated globally. It was
increasingly difficult to integrate different regional businesses, and in 2001 Delta bought
Epsilon. Alpha is now wholly owned by Delta and contributes 60% of Delta’s sales
volume and revenues. The former CIO was with Alpha at the time of the acquisition and
described the change in ownership:
“It was a legal mess, it wasn’t clear who to invoice. Local parts were
unwilling to share knowledge, expenses and profits. Before the buyout, we
had to deal with two different masters. Things are easier now.”
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After the acquisition in 2001 the organizational structure of Alpha changed.
Global headquarters were established and a new CEO was hired to head the company.
Regional president positions were abolished and one group of executives became in
charge of the company (Figure 5.2). Alpha worked on centralizing its worldwide
business, and repositioning itself as the world’s leading provider of logistics services.
Two regional divisions Alpha-Europe, which also includes Asia-Pacific and Africa, and
Alpha-Americas both reported to the global headquarters. The director of IT Operations
referred to the new business model as the process of globalizing and standardizing:
“So it is more or less an agreement that we have with all of these legal
entities of Alpha. Now, we are in the process of globalizing and
standardizing the environment to where we have a chair that sits on top of
all the entities from a global standpoint and kind of sends down direction
of centralization to everyone.”

Figure 5.2 Organizational structure of Alpha after 2001
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Alpha has migrated from an uncoordinated local presence in multiple markets to a
strong global presence and orchestrated strategy. The newly centralized Alpha strives to
differentiate itself from its competitors through quality of service delivery, enabled by
innovative application of technology, and the ability to offer a lower cost solution to
customers. Following the changes in the organizational structure and responding to the
business requirements, the IS activities of Alpha have also evolved over time.

IS Activities
Originally subsidiaries in different countries managed their IS operations
independently. This was the result of the overall organizational structure where the
individual geographic regions, and sometimes even countries, were operating
autonomously with little direction from above. In this format, the local businesses were
responsible for providing their own IS support. United States, continental Europe, United
Kingdom and Australia all had separate service agreements with various IS outsourcing
providers that handled the organizational IS needs. The former CIO, who was in charge
of IS from 1998 through 2003, described the status of IS operations in the 1990’s:
“In the 1990’s clearly even through part of 1999, there wasn’t an overall
plan of what we want to be in two years, three years, five years from
information technology, architecture and structure standpoint, and
business standpoint. Each of these countries before I came aboard, they
didn’t report to one central location. They were sort of doing their own
agreements, their own things their own way, whether it would be the
provider contract with Tau, or Kappa or Iota, all those contracts were all
done with just very local point of view, and very limited thinking. And I
think the biggest motivation for most of them was can we save money this
fiscal year as opposed over a period of time. I think that was the biggest
flaw that they all had. And the other thing was even if they were all real
viable and good agreements, not everybody knew what was going on.
Because the business, each business unit itself were not all working
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together and how can we help each other. You end up even if you are all
working the same plan, but you are not talking.”
Each European branch ran its own IS operations to handle programming,
application maintenance, and IS support, hiring outside consultants when necessary. For
printing and data processing, European locations had two different service bureau
contracts, but infrastructure was handled by the same provider, Sigma, all over Europe
(Table 5.2). Africa was self-sufficient with internal staff, occasionally bringing an outside
consultant to help with a major project or conversion. In Asia-Pacific there was an
internal programming and development staff, yet infrastructure and data processing was
outsourced to Tau, the same outsourcing provider that handles IS infrastructure and data
processing for the parent consortium Delta. Summarizing the variety of IS contracts and
arrangements around the world the former CIO stated:
“Each one of those countries had varying forms of contracts with vendors
to do either just come in and do facilities type management or for them all
to do all of the data processing and activities on their behalf remotely.”
Table 5.2 Information Systems Arrangements at Alpha
Location
Europe

Africa
North America
Asia-Pacific

IS Activities
Application development
Data processing – UK
E-mail servers
Financial systems
Data processing –
Continental Europe
Telecommunications
All IS activities
All IS activities
Application development
Data processing
Telecommunications
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Arrangement
Internal
Outsourced to Iota

Outsourced to Kappa
Outsourced to Sigma
Internal
Internal
Internal
Outsourced to Tau

Alpha in North America had a data center and performed all application
development and in-house support. They developed a core logistics application that
supported planning and tracking of the customer’s products, and associated information,
from the point of origin to the point of delivery. Alpha USA has always been self
sufficient and according to the Global Telecom Program Manager, managed IS
architecture and applications internally:
“We already had it in Alpha USA, it was in-house. Our data center was
here. So we had core logistics application which was running on the main
frame, we had Siebel, we had our e-mail system which was backed into
Lotus Notes, now of course it’s Outlook. We had Novell File and Print
Sharing, we had our customer facing application that allows customer to
connect via the Internet and to order and look at their shipments, our
website, all these kinds of things were insourced.”
The former CIO joined the company in 1998. He was originally in charge of the
Alpha North American IS group, however, when the global headquarters for Alpha were
established in North America, he took over Alpha’s IS worldwide. His vision was a
single central operation for Alpha and he spearheaded the new IS strategy for the
company:
“I was the one that caused the centralization in 1998. I started it and in
1999 is when I physically said here is what we were going to do and had a
road map of what we were going to do over a five year period.”
The new centralized approach included building a new data center facility in
North America. Since the core logistics application was running from this facility, Alpha
had to make sure the facility could withstand weather damage to the systems and be up
and running within 48 hours, in the case of a disaster. The new building had to have its
own power generators and be damage proof. Centrally housed IS operations allowed
Alpha to integrate all regional IS activities and design a better IS architecture. The new
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global model involved standardized global infrastructure managed centrally from one
location. The Global Telecom Program Manager explained this decision:
“Alpha was by then divided in several areas: US and Europe that didn’t
talk to each other and had their own systems. And we decided to build a
global network and we decided to be not any more into managed model,
where the service provider manages your equipment.”
Since the new facility was supposed to handle worldwide IS support, the volume
and higher utilization rate allowed Alpha to justify the cost. It was also easier to control
and easier to manage by following common procedures throughout the organization.
Bottom line, the centralized facility allowed Alpha to achieve economies of scale similar
to any large outsourcing provider. The Director of IT Operations bragged about Alpha’s
IS success:
“Based on several surveys that we have done, one being Gartner, we
actually run about 40% under the norm, of what normal data center
operations and IT operations would cost because of that factor.”
Alpha currently has 350 IS professionals on its staff, with about 200 of those
employed at the company’s headquarters. They handle everything from proprietary
application development that supports the logistics business, to enterprise wide financials
and warehousing. They provide the help desk support and global network administration
for Alpha. The Vice President of Global Infrastructure explained the reasons behind
Alpha’s effectiveness:
“We have a lot of people here who have experience in other companies
and our take on it is rather than being a firm that says we don’t have the
expertise, we think that with a small group of key performers we can
provide whatever services the outsourcer had. And we can react in faster
or timely manner with in-house resources.”
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Alpha’s business is heavily dependent on the support from IS. Implementing and
tracking the delivery of customers’ products, and then invoicing customers for performed
services is done by Alpha’s proprietary logistics application. The perception of the role
of the IS by Alpha’s management has evolved over time. The former CIO, who initiated
and oversaw the centralization of IS, perceived IS as the main component of a successful
logistics operations. He left the company in 2003 when he was replaced by a new CIO.
The current top management of Alpha views IS simply as one of the overhead costs to
run the main business of the company, i.e. logistics. Such perception seems to depend
heavily on the individual and their perspective on the role of IS. The Vice President of
Global Infrastructure mentioned that currently IS is perceived as cost to the business by
the top management of the company:
“[Former CIO] used to say ‘We are really an IT company, that happens to
rent containers.’ Ok? Current CEO is a 180 degrees in another direction.
He does not even think about IT. He does not think about anything except
the business. Even if someone says let’s have power in the plug in the wall
and telephones on the desk, he just expects it to work. We are an enabler
for the business, but he does not really consider us as enabler as much as
simply a component of a business that has to work as it is intended to
work. So therefore when we make magic, it’s not really magic to him. It’s
just what is expected.”
IS managers believe IS plays a crucial role at Alpha. It is not only enabling
Alpha’s business, but also is an integral part of Alpha’s operations. Describing the role IS
plays at Alpha, the Vice President of Global Infrastructure accurately pointed out:
“And that’s because Alpha is such an IT driven organization. You don’t
move 200 million pallets around the globe with a spreadsheet. Not an
ability let’s say someone can call up today and say I want the order
tomorrow and it gets there. It’s just the way business has to go.”
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Currently Europe and the Americas completely migrated to the new systems that
are managed out of the centralized location in North America. Africa is scheduled to
transfer from legacy applications to the new system in 2005. The only region that still
outsources network management and data center applications is Asia-Pacific. It is also
slow in converting to the global financial and ERP system.
Alpha is part of the consortium of companies, Delta, which includes three other
companies. Being the parent company, Delta aggregates the demand for IS equipment to
negotiate better deals with the suppliers and attempts to standardize some other
operations. The former CIO indicated that there is collaboration between the members of
the consortium:
“The child companies do collaborate somewhat. For example, contracts
with Dell and Microsoft are managed all together, they also are using
consistent e-mail systems, share project management methodologies, share
security strategies, IP address management.”
Alpha recently backsourced most of its outsourcing contracts globally. So far the
new IS strategy for the company has proved to be successful and cost effective. It is
based on single central operation and allows Alpha to integrate most of the company IS
operations. The details of four separate outsourcing agreements are presented in the
following sections and summarized in Table 5.3. Three contracts were subsequently
backsourced, while the agreement with Tau in Asia-Pacific was modified and is still in
effect.
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Table 5.3 Alpha’s Outsourcing Agreements
Provider
Service

Kappa
Data center

Iota
Data center

Dates
Cost (annual)
Contract
Pricing Basis

1980s - 2002
U.S. $500,000
Fixed minimum
plus
incremental fee
based
on
volume.
No end date
contract, 1-year
termination
notice.

1999 - 2003
U.S. $1,500,000
Fixed minimum
incremental fee
based
on
volume.

Termination
Clause

5-year contract,
early
termination
fees.

Sigma
Network

Tau
Network
and
data center
1998 - 2001
1996 - present
U.S. $600,000
U.S. $1,000,000
Based on nodes Contract
with
and equipment. Delta.
Alpha
responsible for
60% of contract
costs.
3-year contract, 10-year contract,
early termination
early
fees.
termination
fees.

Outsourcing Agreements
Contract One - Kappa
The Alpha contract with Kappa handled data processing and storage for Alpha.
This agreement originated back in the late 1980’s and supported Alpha’s European
operations. At that time Alpha-Europe was jointly owned by the consortium of
companies, Delta, and another company, Epsilon. Epsilon had its own IS services bureau,
Epsilon-IS, that provided IS support for Epsilon’s businesses as well as some other
businesses in the area. Alpha was part of that arrangement and used the Epsilon-IS
services. Eventually Epsilon decided to divest the IS unit and Epsilon-IS was purchased
by Kappa. Alpha’s applications were transitioned under Kappa’s management and the
contract with Epsilon-IS became a contract with Kappa. The Director of IT Operations
described the evolution of the Kappa contract:
“The Kappa contract evolved. Like I said it started out as a sister company
of Alpha within the same ownership structure which initiated the
beginning of it. There was really no cost factors involved, because it
97

would have been cost between associated industries within the same
company. It evolved to a point when Epsilon decided that they were going
to sell that portion of their company off to Kappa. From that point on it
began an outsourced relationship external to the company.”
Kappa’s data processing center supported operations of Alpha - Continental
Europe. Alpha - UK had a separate outsourcing contract with another data center in the
UK that handled the UK data processing. Alpha paid Kappa about U.S. $500,000
annually to manage the data storage and processing in the European location. The main
application handled all of the planning and tracking for the Alpha’s logistics operations
and generated customer invoices. The former CIO of Alpha provided the details about the
contract:
“The contract was to do basically 100% of all of the transaction
management, computer processing, data storage, everything but printing
the output. It was all IBM large mainframe systems, a lot of DASD for all
of Alpha Europe, except Alpha UK.”
“So they did 100%, we didn’t have any employees there or anything. They
just ran based on instructions the software that we wrote. But they didn’t
do any programming or even the application maintenance, they just ran the
stuff. And it was 7x24, they were there all the time.”
Kappa didn’t own the mainframe equipment that it used for processing Alpha’s
data. Instead Kappa subleased it from IBM. The logistics transaction processing software
that ran on the equipment was developed by Alpha, and Kappa was only responsible for
providing the data center facilities and running the applications. The European
Relationship Manager, who was the main point of contact and worked closely with
Kappa, explained the role of Kappa:
“They were responsible for having mainframe computers available for us.
There were main application programs that they were running. They were
making sure that the jobs were started, job scheduling, and back up. They
did not care about, they did not take over the function of data base
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administrators. That was done within Alpha. It was more the operational
work, the machines running the jobs, doing the back-ups.”
Kappa charged Alpha a base cost regardless of the service levels that had to
always be paid at a minimum and then an incremental fee based on the volume of the
data that was processed and stored at the data center. Alpha’s contract with Kappa could
run indefinitely and it required Alpha to give Kappa at least one year’s notice, by
contract, in order to end the relationship. There were some penalties stipulated in the
contract in case Alpha wanted to terminate the relationship sooner.
Contract Two- Iota
In early 1999, a UK unit of Alpha signed a five year outsourcing contract with a
provider in the UK, to handle data processing, equipment and infrastructure. Alpha was
paying Iota about U.S. $ 1.5 million annually for the provided IS services. At the time,
this contract accounted for about 6% of the global IS budget at Alpha. The former CIO
of Alpha described the contract:
“It was around January-February 1999, Alpha UK which is really sort of
Alpha Europe, Alpha UK signed a five year agreement, five years with
Iota in England. That agreement was similar to the Kappa one, a 100% of
the data center type processing and services.”
In the 1990’s, data processing for Alpha UK was handled by Alpha in their own
facilities in the UK, while the rest of Europe outsourced it to Kappa. At that time each of
the regional offices ran logistics operations independently and relied on either internal or
external IS units to support them. Alpha - UK had a small data room on their premises
that housed the servers with the main logistics application, e-mail and financial systems.
However, it was struggling to maintain the IS personnel and eventually decided to find an
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outside provider to handle IS operations. Alpha’s former CIO explained the decision
made by the Alpha - UK office:
“And the only reason that the VP at the time moved everything from our
location to Iota is that they were afraid that they couldn’t retain staff and
the reliability would go down.”
Kappa, who was already managing the applications for the rest of Alpha –
Europe, was not interested in taking upon the servers in the UK. Alpha – UK searched
for another provider that can handle the job locally in the UK. While there were many
providers, not many were interested in taking over Alpha’s operations. Iota, a small
provider running data services for about 50 clients, was selected for the contract. The IS
services were outsourced to Iota in England from January 1999 and the contract was
signed for five years. The Senior System Administrator was closely involved in the
transition to Iota:
“It was really a small system regarding the number of servers. Because we
had a few servers when we tried what we have done just to get to extend
the service and to help out to find the best company for us to take our
system. When we started to consider the system in the beginning the hard
part for here was that no company wanted to take our system because we
have a few servers. And the costs were there but there is no benefit. Then
in just trying to find a medium outsourcing company or maybe a small
one, we found Iota. Iota is a medium range company that can manage
outsourcing. And it was also based in U.K.”
“A lot of people, technical people, left from Alpha because we thought
now we don’t want the people to stay in Alpha because we pay Iota.”
Under the agreement Alpha owned all the equipment and all the software. Iota
provided a room for the servers and operated the equipment for Alpha. They were also in
charge of disaster recovery and customer support. Any required changes to the
configuration of the servers and the applications upgrades requested by Alpha, were
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handled by the outsourcer. The former CIO of Alpha shared the details about the
contract:
“All of the equipment, the servers, the DASD, communications
equipment, everything belonged to Alpha, and they basically took
everything from the Alpha data center near London and physically
transported it and installed it in a multipurpose data center that was run by
this company called Iota. It was help desk, 7x24, data center including
disaster recovery, and all of the operations for all of the servers, a lot of
UNIX equipment and things like that.”
Iota housed the main logistic application that supported the Alpha – UK business.
In addition to that, Iota also hosted financial and e-mail systems for both Alpha – UK and
Alpha – Continental Europe. Iota’s data processing contract was three times the amount
of the agreement with Kappa. The former CIO shared more details:
“Alpha UK is 60% of the volume of all of Alpha Europe combined. So
they did have more stuff. Plus some of the utility applications, like some
of the financial applications and e-mail and things like that, they were all
hosted in the UK, not in Kappa in Germany for the rest of Europe.”
The main reason for Alpha to enter the relationship with Iota was access to IS
expertise, which was unavailable at Alpha. Alpha hoped that Iota staff could manage the
data center more efficiently. Alpha also expected to realize some cost savings.
Contract Three - Sigma
A subsidiary of one of the large telecommunications carriers in Europe, called
Sigma, was managing Alpha’s data networks and telecommunications in Europe. Sigma
provided all the data communication links and access to the European backbone, as well
as the router hardware and software. The provider also handled the network management
for all the nodes for Alpha-Europe, including the routers and switches, and connected all
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of the Alpha offices in Continental Europe and the UK. Alpha’s former CIO recalled the
details of the contract:
“That was a contract for all of the network management, our routers, hubs
and switches physically, and also 24x7 diagnostics and escalation. And
they were the ones that if the network went down, in theory they would
know first.”
The contract was negotiated in August of 1998 and was signed for a three year
term. At the time of the negotiation the IS Director for European Operations was French,
and as a result, a French company, Sigma, was selected for network management.
Midway through the contract another IS Director for Europe was appointed, who was
based in the United Kingdom. He took the ownership of the contract and worked with the
Alpha-France office to maintain the relationship with Sigma.
Pricing of the contract was based on the number of nodes that Sigma was
supporting. Alpha had to pay an average of U.S. $50,000 a month for all the routers,
hubs, and switches that Sigma managed. When Alpha added or discontinued various
circuits, the monthly fees were adjusted accordingly. The fees had to be paid for the
physical equipment rented from Sigma, even if there was no volume on the network. The
service level agreement stipulated the average capacity of the network traffic that Sigma
was supposed to provide.
The design of Alpha’s telecommunications network in Europe was completely
done by Sigma. When Alpha wanted to make a change in IP addressing or add an
additional node, they had to contact Sigma for those services. The SLA specified the
period of time that Sigma had to respond to requests from the client. Every time Alpha
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had a problem with the network and its performance, they had to rely on the services of
Sigma to detect and fix the issue.
Contract Four – Tau
Asia-Pacific operations of Alpha enjoy a close relationship with the parent
consortium, Delta, which is headquartered in the Asia-Pacific region. Delta outsources
most of its IS services and has a very small IS staff. Network administration,
telecommunications and data center hosting for Delta are handled by an outsourcing
provider, Tau. As part of the outsourcing agreement with Tau, the IS needs of Alpha–
Asia-Pacific are also supported by Tau. Alpha’s contract with Tau is a complete
outsourcing service agreement. Tau owns all the hardware and the software and houses
the data center and the network routers at its facilities. Tau provides 24 hour
maintenance, 7 days a week, and on site support for all data and voice networks of Alpha.
The Global Telecom Program Manager at Alpha explained the situation:
“Delta, our mother company, has outsourced all of its IT services. Delta
had small non existent IT stuff. Delta is in Australia. And they have said
we take the telephony and data communications services needs of all of
the Delta businesses in Asia-Pacific region and we bid them out as one
contract, including data center services. So Tau provides data
communications, land line telephony, cellular telephony and data center
hosting and services to all of the Delta companies including Alpha in all of
the Asia-Pacific region including Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong,
Thailand and a couple of other countries.”
The parent company, Delta, was the initiator of the outsourcing contract with Tau.
Delta always tried to aggregate the demand for IS hardware and software and negotiate
better IS deals for its four subsidiaries. The computer equipment for the consortium,
Delta, was able to get a volume discount from Dell. In Asia-Pacific it meant combining
the data and telecommunication needs of the consortium companies and outsourcing IS to
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Tau. The combined contract lowered the IS costs for Delta and all its subsidiaries in the
region. The Director of IT Operations at Alpha referred to the leadership role of Delta in
Tau’s contract:
“Delta was the initiator of that and basically to drive the costs down they
were motivated to interconnect everybody under the same contract, so it
wasn't necessarily each outside business wanted to do it, Delta kind of
drawn that.”
Initially, there was not much accounting going on inside Delta to separate the
expenses and revenues of the four companies that comprised the consortium. However, as
the businesses grew, Delta implemented separate accounting for each of the companies.
For contract with Tau, Alpha was charged a portion of the cost based on the size of their
business. Alpha is the largest of the Delta businesses, globally contributing 60% of the
revenues, and also is the largest in Asia-Pacific. As a result, Alpha ended up responsible
for the largest share of the outsourcing contract’s costs. The former CIO of Alpha
provided the details:
“Also, all of the networks with a company called Tau, which is an
equivalent of [large telecommunications company] in Australia and New
Zealand. Tau had a single contract with Delta and Delta has an allocation
to Alpha for a portion of that cost. But because Alpha is the single biggest
Delta company in Australia, they got the lion share of the expense.”
While Alpha is a separate entity of Delta and runs its operations independently in
various locations globally, in Asia-Pacific, Delta has a strong influence on Alpha –AsiaPacific. The network of Alpha and Delta are bundled together and outsourced under a
Delta contract. Alpha maintains its own data center, and additionally pays Delta for a
back-up facility that mirrors the image of the logistics application.
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Backsourcing
Contract One- Kappa
When it was decided to bring the outsourced data processing from Kappa back inhouse, Alpha worked closely with Kappa’s personnel to manage a smooth and successful
transition. The first step of the transition was the set up of the data center operations at
Alpha’s corporate headquarters. A raised floor data center was built and a new software
environment was acquired and modified to Alpha’s needs. Since Alpha was changing
from legacy systems to a new SAP environment, thorough testing was performed before
the final transfer. The Director of IT Operations oversaw construction of the new data
center and backsourcing:
“From start to finish if you want to think from the concept when we first
thought about doing it to the point when we actually executed it was a lot
of development effort to be done to build the SAP environment, to get it
introduced to where they can support it. And then executing through all
the tests and everything in comparisons, I want to say it was probably an
18 to 24 months process that actually went beyond its original deliverable
date by four months.”
A required one year termination notice was given to Kappa. Alpha’s CIO at the
time negotiated with Kappa and it was agreed that the relationship between Alpha and
Kappa would end upon the expiration of the outsourcing contract in May of 2002. A
backsourcing transition plan was drafted which allowed Alpha to renew the contract in
one month increments after May 2002 if necessary. Alpha ended up extending the
contract for four more months until October of 2002. During those continuation months,
Alpha was required to give a 30 day notice to Kappa if it wanted to stop the services.
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The conditions of the exit were very favorable to Alpha, because it didn’t know exactly
when it could completely convert to a new location.
Most equipment in this deal was subleased, not owned by Kappa or Alpha, and
was returned to the original owner upon the termination of the relationship. Once the new
system was tested, the transition of the data center went smoothly. The users from Europe
were able to access the data from a new location in the United States. Help desk support
for the European employees was also transferred to the new data center. Several new help
desk employees who spoke German, French, Spanish and Italian were hired to support
the multiple languages and provide help desk support to Europe. The former CIO, who
oversaw the backsourcing, felt they were ready for the transition, but they had to adjust
their support to the different time-zones and languages.
“I would say there was about a six month learning curve, but the biggest
issue was the help desk because it took a while for the help desk to figure
out how to answer a phone in German. Probably, the only challenge that
we had to manage with, it wasn’t a problem, but we had to be really-really
good at it, was the time zones. Because Alpha-Europe is six hours ahead
of the corporate headquarters.”
Overall, all informants agreed that the backsourcing process was long but well
planned, and Kappa was extremely cooperative throughout the endeavor.
Contract Two- Iota
Iota provided data center support to Alpha – UK operations under a five year
contract. Several years into the agreement, Alpha considered early termination, yet there
were severe penalties associated with it. Iota was not willing to let Alpha go early, and it
was decided to ride the contract out. Meanwhile, a data center was reconstructed at the
corporate headquarters to house both the U.S. and European data processing. By the time
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Alpha was able to transfer the Alpha – UK data operations back in-house, Alpha already
had a new data center at the corporate headquarters that had plenty of capacity to handle
Alpha – UK data processing. In April of 2003, Alpha finally shut everything down at
Iota.
To prepare for the backsourcing transition, Alpha had to identify all the
applications supported out of the outsourced data center and test if they could move those
applications to a U.S. location and still give the users in Europe the same performance
and user level experience. Some modifications were made to the data room at the AlphaUK location to support the legacy applications that were not going to be moved overseas.
The Global Telecom Program Manager participated in the transition from Iota to in-house
operations:
“I would say it took around 4 to 6 months. Six months. Our data room in
the U.K., because it was now going to host some European applications,
was a little bit improved with a file repressing system that took about two
months. And then actually moving all the servers to the U.S. and to the
U.K. took about a month, but a lot of it was parallel.”
Alpha – UK staff had concerns about the move of the data center overseas. The
backsourcing team had to demonstrate to them that the same level of connectivity,
service, and support would be available from a new location. Since the data center
equipment belonged to Alpha, the transition team had to physically relocate all of the
equipment to a new location overseas. As a result, the data processing services were
interrupted for a weekend. The Director of IT Operations, who orchestrated the
backsourcing transition, identified these challenges:
“Getting the business buy-in to take the outage hit that they needed to take
to relocate the environment was one. Number two was gaining the
confidence of the people within the IT staff who were supporting the
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systems and directly reporting that through the U.K. echelon. So I had to
gain their confidence. I had to basically pull a plan together that had to
satisfy the business requirements on that side and reduce the outage if
possible. I had to show some level of assurance, that I was going to be
able to achieve it, plus have a plan if something wrong did happen
unexpectedly, I could recover from it.”
Iota was not cooperative during the transition, and Alpha had to ensure that all of
the equipment was moved out, tested and operational, before the contract with Iota
expired. Alpha ended up finishing the transition process a few months before the actual
end of the contract. Some older legacy applications presented problems during the
transition. When everything was moved physically back in-house, there were some
challenges in getting everything back to work, communicating with each other and
getting all the functionality back.
Contract Three - Sigma
Alpha had a three year agreement with Sigma to manage Alpha’s network in
Europe. In the third year of the outsourcing arrangement Alpha decided to take the
network management under internal control. Alpha hired four experienced network
engineers, at their corporate headquarters, who worked on redesigning Alpha’s global
network. Then Alpha proceeded to slowly transfer the hubs and switches in Europe,
under their control, and hired a large global telecommunications provider for the
telecommunication services. After the contract was terminated Sigma continued to
invoice Alpha for some discontinued circuits. The issue almost ended up in court with
Sigma threatening to file a lawsuit against Alpha for non-payment. Eventually the case
was settled out of court once it became apparent that the disputed circuits did not exist.
Alpha’s IS Director in Europe was in charge of the contract:
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“It was actually an umbrella contract where by you had access to what
they call the European backbone which was owned by Europe nations all
together, and then you went into domestic in country network which
connected into that backbone. We terminated the European backbone.
First we were going to replace that with [another provider]. And the
second stage is when we terminated all of the domestic networks as well.”
The transition from outsourcing back in-house took about eight months. Alpha
stayed with Sigma until the end of the contract and continued buying their service for
several more months on a few nodes that were not transferred in time. One challenge was
following the time table, to ensure that all hardware was installed and tested before the
network lines transitioned from one provider to another. The comments from Alpha’s IS
Director in Europe demonstrate the amount of work during the transition:
“Implementation, that was the transitioning aspect. Meaning that we had
to have hardware on site, our hardware, and we also had to have the links
ready with the new supplier. We then had to manage the testing, we had
virtually done the whole job ourselves, we had very little outside help.
And as such we were flying people, going to the locations, installing
hardware, testing it. And then we had project managers as well, managing
the transitioning. We had people working on the contracts.”
Alpha transitioned from an outside managed network model to an unmanaged
service and now performs their network management in-house. Yet Alpha still has people
in these countries, locally, who are able to replace components as needed. It was
impossible to completely centralize the network as they own networking equipment and
need to have network support in the remote locations.
Contract Four – Tau
Backsourcing of Asia-Pacific represented a special difficulty as the staff of Alpha
worked closely with the parent company, Delta, and was reluctant to report to Alpha
headquarters. Most information systems in Asia-Pacific were outsourced to Tau through a
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contract drawn with Delta. Alpha’s new CIO wanted to bring back the data processing
and network management into one location. It was decided to renegotiate part of the
contract to give Alpha more control over their network, yet keep it outsourced to Tau as
part of the Delta contract. The Vice President for Global Infrastructure was in charge of
the negotiations with Tau:
“This new contract is going to give us the ability to manage our own
router, which is something that wasn't done before, and it is going to give
us some layers of service that we can’t ignore, so that basically we might
be buying the pipe through Delta but we are going to be able to bring more
and more into what we consider our own.”
The new arrangement allows Alpha to assign its own IP addresses on the network
and manage the network traffic. They have access to the routers and have complete
visibility of the network. Delta built a multi-V-LAN around a city where it is
headquartered. All Delta businesses have access and use this multi-V-LAN as well. As a
result, the telecommunications network in Asia-Pacific is still provided and supported
through a contract with Tau. Yet Alpha can view and modify the network from its
corporate headquarters in North America. The Director of IT Operations has full control
over the network around the globe with the exception of Asia-Pacific:
“With the exception of Tau and Tau only, this is only providing
interconnectivity between the companies within Australia.”
Overall, the Asia-Pacific region was the last one to join the globalization efforts
of Alpha. While all other local businesses migrated to a common platform, Asia-Pacific
still runs legacy applications and has not converted to the enterprise wide systems
implemented at Alpha globally. The Global Telecom Program Manager expects the
transition to be complete in 2006:
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“Right now Australia is not yet completely on board on the Alpha global
system. Our network is connected there, they use our Siebel system from
[corporate headquarters], but Australia is not yet on our SAP system, they
still have a legacy system but it is locally hosted. They are slated to go on
SAP in 2006 I believe, or the end of 2005.”
Alpha backsourced all of their outsourcing contracts except for the contract with
Tau. The company was able to negotiate with the provider and modify the terms of the
contract to allow more flexibility. At this time Alpha’s management does not expect any
changes in the situation and continues to buy the telecommunication lines from Tau.

Company Two - Beta
Beta is a non-profit broadcasting station. Its mission is to serve the public good
and to connect communities through broadcasting, the Internet, and community outreach.
The station serves the 13th largest market in the US and has been on air since 1958. It is
recognized as one of the most watched non-profit television stations in the United States.
The station currently employs 48 people who are involved in production and broadcasting
of TV programs, marketing and fundraising, to support the operations of the station, and
general management.

Sources of Evidence
Contact with Beta was initiated through Beta’s database administrator. The initial
conversation focused on confirming the fact of IS backsourcing, explaining the purpose
of the research, and setting up a time for the semi-structured interview. During the first
on-site visit, the database administrator helped compile a list of individuals who were
involved in the outsourcing arrangement with the provider. Using this list, the
arrangements were made to meet with all the informants individually. Each appointment
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lasted between one and two hours. During the meetings, semi-structured interviews were
conducted and all conversations were tape recorded.
The person doing data entry and batch processing presented an interesting
situation. He was originally employed by Beta, and then left to join the outsourcing
provider when the data processing was outsourced. After several years with the provider
he was fired and returned to Beta. He then interacted with the outsourcing provider as a
client. He was interviewed twice and provided accounts of his experience both as an
outsourcing provider employee working with Beta, and as a Beta employee working with
the outsourcing provider.
To supplement the data obtained during the interviews, on-line news reports, the
company website, and publicly available company information was perused. Requests to
share documentation about the outsourcing contract and communication with the
outsourcing provider were made to all of the interviewees. The Chief Financial Officer
had saved all of his communication with the provider and provided the memos and emails for review, which provided supporting evidence of the relationship’s problems. The
database administrator shared the documents, detailing the transition process from the
outsourcing provider back in-house. Table 5.4 summarized the sources of evidence for
this case.
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Table 5.4 Company Beta: Sources of Evidence for Case Description
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Semi-structured Interview
Database Administrator
Customer Service Representative
Data Entry & Batch Processing
VP for Development
CFO
VP Annual Giving and Outreach
Network Administrator

•
•
•
•

•

Documentation
Hoover’s Online
Annual Report
Company History
E-mail, fax and mail
communication between the
company and the outsourcing
provider
Transition Timeline

Company History
Beta’s revenues for 2004 were almost U.S. $10 million. The station exists through
direct financial support of the community, with over half of the revenues generated
through its member contributions. Anybody in the immediate broadcasting area can
watch the station’s programming. Those viewers who send monetary contributions to the
station are designated as members. Members renew annually to maintain their
membership status and receive member benefits. Currently, approximately 39,000
members from 16 different counties support the station. Beta’s Database Administrator
explained the difference between members and viewers, and the benefits of membership:
“Members also get a monthly program guide that kind of outlines some of
the new shows, local programming events that we do, because we do
outreach as the non-profit. So, at any given point we have about 35, 000 –
40,000. We are pretty big. We cover 16 counties. Viewers are people who
just watch, as opposed to members. , people who actively give to the
station, supporters.”
Additionally, the station seeks corporate sponsorships for its programs and
receives contributions from a variety of corporate and individual donors. Federal, state
and local government grants are also available to the station on a competitive basis and
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account for about 15% of Beta’s revenues. The Vice President for Development at Beta
is in charge of fundraising activities:
“In order to fund the programming, we raise money through individuals
and corporate sponsors to pay for programs. We do that through direct
mail and through on-air support and events and other things and some
government grants.”
Broadcasting is the main business of the station and the largest expense item.
However, fundraising is critical to the vitality of the station as it provides the necessary
resources to run the broadcasting operations. Production of the programming at Beta is
supported by a camera crew, editors and video engineers. Fundraising operations rely on
membership department personnel. For communications and storage, retrieval and
management of data, both production and fundraising are supported by information
systems. The organizational structure of Beta is presented in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3 Organizational Structure of Beta
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IS Activities
Given Beta’s small size, the station’s IS operations are small as well. Production
and broadcasting of TV programs is handled by the broadcasting crew. Video engineers
are in charge of TV programming facilities, equipment and technology. The station has
its own recording and editing equipment that is used by the broadcasting and production
personnel. All video programming is stored internally on file servers. The station is
currently transitioning all of its video programs to digital format. Maintaining a digital
copy of all TV programming requires a large number of servers for data storage. The
Database Administrator described the IS set up at Beta:
“We have 40 to 50 boxes out here on the network. Servers somewhere in
the neighborhood of 10, FTP, file, probably storage is most of what our
network is for, because of all of the video stuff, you know it is data storage
intensive, because of the video, mpegs and all that stuff. They are moving
towards that especially with the video conversion. It could also be an email server, database.”
All office staff at the station have desktop computers on their desks and they are
supported by the internal IS staff. Currently, the station employs two IS professionals to
support its business operations. Beta’s Network Administrator handles the phone
systems, all the computers, all e-mail activity and even does some graphics work. There
are almost 50 computer users at the station and the Network Administrator provides
software, hardware and network support to those users when needed.
The membership department maintains a database that tracks all information and
interactions with the station’s members. Beta uses the database records to devise new
pledge campaigns, monitor current donations and communicate with the members. When
members contact the station, a membership representative can access their account on the
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computer and provide services as necessary. Additionally, the accounting department
utilizes the database to reconcile the monthly bank balance and accounts receivables, as
well as monitor and forecast revenues. The Chief Financial Officer emphasized the key
role of the membership department in funding the station’s operations:
“Membership, and the whole income stream from membership, has always
been an integral part of the organization. So in a sense, it’s such a big
number.”
This database that is used to manage the TV station’s donors, has over 400 tables
that contain more than 300,000 donor records. The station maintains records for both
current and previous donors in the database. In 1998, the data processing and
management of this database was outsourced to an outside provider.

Outsourcing Agreement
A former Vice President for Development at Beta came up with an idea to
combine the membership function of several TV stations in order to utilize the economies
of scale. Because of her executive role at the station, she secured support of the CEO at
Beta, and several other TV stations, as well as a non-profit corporation, Omicron, which
oversees the licensing of non-profit broadcasting stations locally, and guides the stations’
programming. She left the station, wrote a business plan, and got grant and seed money to
start an outsourcing company called Omega. The Vice President for Annual Giving and
Outreach recalled this development during the interview:
“At about seven years into my time here, my former development manager
formed a task force with other development professionals [from similar
TV stations] to see if they could streamline the fundraising and the
management of a centralized database. So they asked for funding for this
project, just a feasibility study, based on each station and what their needs
were if it would work to centralize the database, and that’s how Omega,
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this company was developed.”
In 1998 Beta signed a three year outsourcing agreement with Omega, to manage
the station’s membership database and handle mail communication with the current and
potential members. About ten other non-profit TV stations also signed up for the services
and transferred their databases under the auspices of Omega. The transition at Beta was
spearheaded by the CEO of the station. Membership personnel used the membership
database and were accountable for fundraising activities, but did not participate in the
decision. The Vice President for Development, who oversees contributions over U.S.
$1000, was not involved in the decision making:
“I think part of the problem was that we, as development people, were
never involved in the decision making. Our president decided that we
would want to do this and then we had to make it work.”
The Chief Financial Officer was not fond of the CEO’s decision to outsource
either:
“But our president and CEO was on the board of this organization that was
in charge of centralizing this function. So then we were one of the prime
candidates to be one of the participants. So our CEO said, yeah we’ll do
that. But he dragged us screaming and kicking into the relationship.”
When the CEO of Beta made the decision to outsource the membership database
to Omega, only one possible outsourcing provider was considered. Omega’s founder was
closely familiar with fundraising for a non-profit organization and outsourcing the
membership database was expected to generate significant cost savings for Beta. First,
the new company promised to operate more efficiently by combining the membership
databases of multiple stations, and dedicating staff strictly to database management
functions. Second, the membership department staff at Beta could then focus solely on
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devising successful pledge campaigns and doing fundraising. Beta’s Vice President for
Annual Giving and Outreach detailed the outsourcing benefits expected at the time the
agreement was signed:
“Because they felt it was the most efficient model for the stations, they
would be able to reduce staffing and have a more efficient model and then
the original intention was for cost efficiencies because if all the stations
were pooling their resources and mailing at the same time, the
commodities of scale and printing and processes of mailing didn’t quite
work out that way, but that was one of the original intentions. And then if
the staff was reallocated because now you’re taking away the database
side of it. The remaining staff, their efforts could be allocated having to do
strictly fundraising, not having to do manually data entry and all of the
work that went in with the hands on in-house way.”
Together with the Vice President, another employee left Beta and started working
for Omega. This person was in charge of making entries into the database, working with
the pledge campaigns and lockbox company that processed membership contributions.
He was offered a job at Omega and was one of its first employees. His duties remained
the same, except at Omega he was responsible for handling database updates, pledge
entries, and contribution uploads for up to 9 different TV stations. He worked for Omega
for three and a half years before returning back to Beta:
“The vice president, one of the vice presidents of Beta, left Beta to start
this company. And I followed her over there… But as our company grew
and they got more data-techs in there, they were able to assign these
people to handle these stations, these people would handle these stations.”
Membership department personnel relied on the database the most and used it
daily in their fundraising and membership activities. After the membership database was
transferred, they had to go through training and follow the new procedures for accessing
membership data, submitting modifications, or creating reports. During the outsourcing
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they interacted daily with Omega staff to pull up information from the database or request
changes.
As a result of transition to outsourcing, Beta had to convert its membership
database to a new software format that was supported by Omega. Beta purchased eight
licenses to run the software and accessed the database which was housed on the
outsourcer’s servers via Citrix. The membership representatives had read-only access to
the database, and whenever changes were necessary, a daily log of requests was compiled
and sent to Omega for processing. Omega’s staff also handled the mailings to the
station’s members and was in charge of entering contributions of each member into the
database. Beta’s personnel could view the membership data and had access to several
built-in reports.
The billing in the outsourcing contract was per member, so Beta was charged
depending on the number of the records in the database. For their marketing campaigns
the station targeted different groups of former, current and potential members and worked
with Omega to create the lists for mail drops. Whenever Beta’s staff needed a specific
query or report created, they had to contact Omega and specify the characteristics for
which they were looking. The service level agreement specified that Omega had to
provide the resulting reports within 10 days. Beta was not charged for additional reports,
but only per each membership record in the database. The Vice President for Annual
Giving and Outreach requested the reports most frequently:
“They did a set number of reports each month but then if we needed
something else then we just had to go to them directly and work with them
to get that report, but we weren’t billed extra for that.”
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During the outsourcing contract, Omega provided data storage facilities and
database administration for Beta. They also hired a lockbox company for receiving
pledge payments and worked with them on recording the contributions in the database.
Omega handled printing of mailings to the members during the pledge drive and also
handled the renewal notices.

Backsourcing
When Beta decided to backsource the membership database, it was faced with
rebuilding the in-house expertise in database management. The Vice President for
Development spearheaded the project and developed a transition plan. The contract with
Omega was annually renewable, so she notified the provider of Beta’s intention: not to
renew the contract upon its expiration. At about the same time, one of the employees of
Omega, who previously worked for Beta, was fired from Omega and returned to Beta in a
temporary position. He had the expertise in processing the database entries on the
provider side and was put in charge of processing entries internally. About 5 months
before the expiration of the outsourcing contract, Beta also hired a database administrator
to maintain the database internally.
The database administrator worked closely with Omega and the database software
developer to learn the procedures involved in managing the membership database. Beta
purchased a database server and acquired licenses for the database and the membership
software from the developers. Then the database was set up in-house and testing began.
The transition schedule was demanding with specific dates set up as cut-offs for the
lockbox company, mailing provider, and then for the final transfer of the database (Table
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5.5). The Database Administrator played a key role in transferring the database back inhouse:
“There was a plan, a schedule for the actual transition, you know, on such
and such a date, we stop doing this, and on such and such a date all mail
goes to your box instead of to our box, and on such and such date we give
you the final dump of the database etc. I worked with the outsourcing
company to some degree, in-house IT and the company who actually
develops the application. It is the same application that we transferred inhouse that the outsourcer was using. Probably the first month I was here, I
would say until mid January I went over to the outsourcing company and
actually observed the use of application, got a little bit of training, I had to
know how the application worked. And then, immediately following that I
started getting with the developer to set up test instances in-house, so we
can get a trial dump from the outsourcing company.”
Table 5.5 Beta Backsourcing Transition Schedule
Step
Database setup and testing:
Software setup and deployment:
2nd data export from Omega:
Testing with mail vendor:
Merkle data file layouts:
Parallel test with Merkle:
Omega delivers April renewal:
Testing with CC processor:
Parallel test with EFT
Omega fiscal month adjusts cut-off
Omega Telemarketing cut-off
Omega Lockbox cut-off
Omega scheduled reports cut-off
Omega online pledge cut-off
Omega gift/pledge batch cut-off:
Final data export from Omega:
Omega read-only access:

Deadline
2/11 (2 weeks allotted)
2/25 (2 weeks allotted)
3/08
tbd
3/11(approx. 1 week)
3/18 (approx. 1 week)
3/18
tbd
3/23 (1 week allotted)
3/29
3/29
3/29
3/29
3/29
4/05
4/12
4/12 - 5/10

Beta negotiated with this lockbox company to process the payments on its behalf,
upon the termination of the outsourcing contract with Omega. For printing, Beta signed a
contract with another provider that would be in charge of printing the letters and mailing
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them out to the members. The Network Administrator provided support setting up the
hardware and software during the transition:
“We kept the lockbox vendor that handled all the checks coming in. We
kept them. So we were able to work out a deal with them directly. We
found our own mailing vendor that we ship all our data to and they do all
our mass mailings. And as far as any of the queries that need to be written
we do that in-house now, and our database administrator handles that.”
Beta was successful at transitioning, according to schedule, and transferring the
data from Omega’s server to Beta’s new server. After Omega’s support was cut off, it
took Beta two weeks to finalize the data transfer and test the database. During that time
the database was not available to the membership personnel, and they had to develop
procedures to support the members without the database. The Customer Service
Representative, who handled most calls from the members, recollected the difficulties:
“I know it took about a week to download everything. And when we were
down, and I would just take messages, and then when the system came up
I had to return calls and take care of the situation, because you can’t help
the person who is calling you with the problem. And they are already
aggravated because they want the answers now and I had to tell them the
system is down and they are working on it.”
The person in charge of data entry and batch processing expressed similar
concerns on his end:
“Then there was the actual month or two where we couldn’t do any
processing and that was a difficult time because everything got caught up.
We couldn’t look up people’s accounts in the computer, you know, we
couldn’t do anything. We were just dead in the water. So that was a
difficult time. Once we got over that, very easy, everything flows much
better. There was a lot of cleanup involved, cleanup of the database,
finding all those duplicates. I went through all these catalogues here, I
went through every gift batch that they had processed in the last year and I
checked to see if that money was in the computer, and I found several that
were not processed, either Beta did not send the file to Omega or Omega
did not do it.”
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Once the transfer was complete, Beta’s database manager spent several months
cleaning the database. It turned out that Omega allowed many duplicate records in the
database, and some members were entered in the database two, three or even more times.
The duplicate validation controls were adjusted in the database and the system was able
to recognize duplicates.

Company Three – Gamma
Gamma is a non-profit radio and television broadcasting organization. Gamma
first signed on air in 1964 and originally broadcasted instructional programs for
kindergarteners and school-aged children during the school year. The station’s focus
eventually expanded from the classroom to the community and radio broadcasting was
added in 1980. In 2005 Gamma served the 20th largest market in the United States and the
third largest market in its state.

Sources of Evidence
Initial information about Gamma was collected through publicly available sources
which included Hoover’s Online Database and the company’s website. To gain entry into
Gamma, the researcher first contacted Gamma’s Vice President for Membership. During
the first phone conversation, the Vice President for Membership explained Gamma’s
operations and briefly described the IS outsourcing experience. She also confirmed that
the outsourcing contract was terminated. An in person interview was arranged and later
conducted. At the first interview, a list of potential informants at the station was
generated, all of whom were contacted with an explanation of the purposes of research
and a request for an interview. Subsequently, arrangements were made to meet with all
123

the informants individually. Each appointment lasted between thirty minutes and two
hours. During the meetings, semi-structured interviews were conducted and all
conversations were tape recorded. One potential informant refused to meet in person.
Instead the questionnaire was e-mailed to him, and he responded to the questions about
backsourcing via e-mail. Table 5.6 presents the sources of evidence collected at Gamma.
Table 5.6 Company Gamma: Sources of Evidence for Case Description
E-mail Questionnaire
• Senior Vice President
for Administration and
Technology

•
•
•
•

Semi-structured Interview
Executive Vice President &
General Manager
Vice President for
Membership
IS Manager
Member Services Supervisor

•
•
•
•

Documentation
Hoover’s Online
News publications
Annual Report
Company History

Company History
The mission of Gamma is to demonstrate their interest and support in the
community by providing radio and television programming, free and accessible, to all.
Here is how the Executive Vice President and General Manager of the station described
Gamma’s business:
“Our primary business is to broadcast and to provide programs that
educate, entertain, and inform.”
The station audience is constantly growing, recording on average, a 4% annual
increase in the number of households viewing its TV programs weekly. The radio station
has 125,000 listeners every week and is experiencing double digit growth annually. To
deliver the programming and support of its development activities, Gamma currently
employs 52 full-time personnel. Figure 5.4 presents an organizational structure of
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Gamma. The Vice President for Membership provided some details on the number of
viewers during her interview:
“We have for TV 1.9 million, I think it is 1.9 million viewers, potential
viewers I should say. I think we have 498,000 actual households who
watch us in a given time.”

Figure 5.4 Organizational Structure of Gamma
With revenues of U.S. $6.2 million for the fiscal year 2004, Gamma’s main
source of revenue was donations from its members. Gamma currently has almost 30,000
members that support the station through donations. Gamma undertakes an extensive
capital campaign to recruit new members several times each year. Additionally it seeks
corporate sponsors for its TV and radio programming. The other sources of funding
include federal, state and local government grants. The Vice President for Membership is
in charge of fundraising at the station:
“Our organization is non-profit, a 501C-3 organization, and we receive
some money from the federal government through the non-profit
broadcasting corporation, Omicron, some money from our state
government, and the rest comes from public viewers and listeners who
support us through contributions as a charity.”
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The Executive Vice President and General Manager also emphasized the
importance of the members’ contributions to the functioning of Gamma:
“We are supported by the community through membership support,
program sponsorship support, some government grants. We are noncommercial. We are educational. So the majority of our programs are
educational based.”
Half of the revenue stream is spent on broadcasting, with the rest being split
between administration and development (i.e. fundraising). Figure 5.5 displays the
breakdown of revenues and expenses at Gamma. Recruiting members and corporate
sponsors are critical to the business of Gamma, as it brings in the finances for the
functioning of the organization. Currently the Vice President for Membership and her
staff are in charge of fundraising activities.

Figure 5.5 Revenues and Expenses at Gamma, 2004

IS Activities
Information

systems

at

Gamma

supports

TV

and

radio

production,

communications, storage, retrieval and management of data, and also fundraising
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activities. Currently Gamma employs four engineers that handle video storage and
processing for TV programming. There is also an IS Manager who supports the IS needs
of the administration and membership personnel at the station.
The role of IS has changed over the years at Gamma. Most financial resources at
Gamma are generated through fundraising. The station relies on IS to maintain the
membership database and pursue fundraising activities. On the broadcasting end of the
business, Gamma’s need for storage and advanced IS is growing due to the conversion of
television to digital. The Executive Vice President and General Manager stressed the
changing role of IS at Gamma during the interview:
“The Entire concept of IT needs is changing drastically for us now. Three
years ago, IT would have been running the business, you know,
computers, for desktops, for e-mail exchange, websites, for running
spreadsheets, word processing, a little bit of networking for exchange of
files, etc. But in today’s world of advanced technology, we use IT now
for the membership database because now we have the ability to know you
better as a member of the station and to manage your account so
effectively we can get as much money as we can from you and to do that
you do that through databases and software and that’s all interconnected as
a system here at the station. But even more spectacular is that as we are
entering the digital world to broadcasting, we have already converted TV
to digital. We used to operate the station on tape machines, but now it’s
all based on computers. So I think now we have something like 77
computers back at the TV station to operate the TV station. So technology
is very-very important for us today, more than it was before as far as IT,
information technology, because we are all sharing data.”
To support its growing IS needs, the station relies on a combination of internal
and external resources. Gamma houses its own e-mail, data and accounting servers. All of
the administrative, development, and broadcasting personnel have desktop computers. In
addition to that, the video production crew has extra computing equipment in their
offices. Fifty two full-time employees rely on in-house support for network
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administration, help desk support, hardware and software set up. The IS Manager is in
charge of the day-to-day IS support for the TV and radio stations. During the interview he
described his responsibilities:
“Well it’s pretty much everything that has to do with the business network
here, whether it’s ordering the PC’s, setting the PC’s up, network
administration, repairs, support, pretty much everything, we are a small
shop and a one man department. We have standard word processing,
spreadsheet type applications, we also have accountant applications. We
have internet access, e-mail, they also have membership packages. That’s
most of the business side. Then on the broadcast side, which I’m not over,
the engineering men they go into video editing, audio editing, that type of
stuff.”
The database server is currently housed off site, but the IS manager is in charge of
daily back-ups and ensuring connectivity to the server. As described previously, the
database, which tracks Gamma’s membership, plays a key role in fundraising for the
station.

Outsourcing Agreement
Gamma was one of the stations that joined in the multi-station project to have
their membership and fundraising outsourced to a start-up company: Omega. CEOs of
several stations agreed to serve on Omega’s Board and to outsource their membership
activities to this new company. Omega’s leadership proposed to offer participating
stations more effective pledge campaigns by dedicating its staff to fundraising activities.
In 1997 Gamma signed a contract with Omega and transferred the recruitment of new
members and membership support to Omega. The Vice President for Membership at
Gamma reflected on the events and reasons for outsourcing:
“One was going to be an economy of scales from a fundraising perspective
because we would all send out the same direct mail. We would have a
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group of individuals who would do it. Really each station fundraises
similarly, so the thought was why should each station across the country
have individual staff when there could be one staff that would have an
economy of scale. So that was the first reason to have an economy of
scale for direct marketing. And the second was to all share a server or
servers and be able to afford at that time, which was very expensive
software, called XYZ.”
The process of recruiting members is similar across the stations. Twice a year (or
more often) the station leads a pledge drive on TV. This pledge drive usually lasts for
several days with special advertising and programming on air. Local residents who watch
the station are asked to contribute and support the non-profit station. As members they
would receive a program guide and also additional benefits such as special DVDs, or
invitations to events. Additionally, separate mailings go to existing or discontinued
members with subscription details. Omega’s job was to consolidate the separate pledge
drives of different stations under one umbrella. The Executive Vice President and
General Manager substantiated the expected benefits of outsourcing:
“We all got together as general managers, you know we all do the same
thing. We have a fund drive on TV, we ask you to become a member, we
get your name, we put it in a database, and then we ask you to renew after
about 8 or 9 months since your membership we'll ask you give us more
money, and throughout the year we'll ask you for more money. And we
said, you know we all do it about the same way, yet we all have our own
databases, we all have our own staff to do that, and we're all printing
letters and envelopes. What if we were to consolidate all of that into one
organization so that we could benefit from best practices, by being able to
hire the best people. Instead of you hiring somebody I'm hiring, we all hire
the best person, and by scale of economy we can do it better and do it for
less. So that was the initial concept that birthed Omega. And Omega was
created so they would house all the databases separately but in one
database, manage the database and deal with all direct mail and
telemarketing campaigns, so they were responsible for renewals,
additional gifts, all that telemarketing and direct mail marketing.”
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The outsourcing contract was annually renewable. Omega handled all the details
of fundraising for Gamma.

The membership database was hosted on Omega’s server

and the application, XYZ that helped manage the data, was served to the station from
Omega via Citrix. All pledge campaigns had to be handled through the outsourcing
provider. The database had over 100,000 records for donors as far back as Gamma had
computers. When the membership department devised a marketing campaign, they
contacted the Omega staff with a request and specified the criteria for the mail drop.
According to the Service Level Agreement, requests had to be submitted 10 days ahead
of the due date. Omega created and printed the letters and then collected the membership
contributions, which were posted to Gamma’s bank account. Gamma’s Vice President for
Membership was in charge of working with Omega during the contract:
“They would upload information into a database in server. They did all
the DBA, truly anything that was going on within the software, from
charging, actually charging credit cards, to processing payments, to doing
any kind of upgrades to the software to the server, they were responsible
for all of that. They would do all the direct mail, so they would write the
copy, they would chose who it was sent to, they would send it out.”
The membership department had access to the database for viewing and some
preset queries and reports, but no update capability. Whenever changes were necessary,
Gamma’s staff had to contact Omega for updates. Gamma also had to contact Omega for
any special queries or reports that were not built-in into the application. Gamma’s
membership strategy included frequent contacts with the members and multiple reminder
notices to renew. Omega tried to optimize the renewal, recruitment and funds collection
processes for all client stations and created standardized procedures for handling all these
activities.
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Backsourcing
After three years of outsourcing, Gamma decided to end the relationship with the
outsourcing provider, Omega. The Vice President for Membership was in charge of
bringing the database back in-house. The planning for the backsourcing transition started
about a year before the actual end of the relationship. Gamma first explored its options
and evaluated the possibility of hosting the database in-house. Since the contract was
annually renewable, Gamma notified Omega of the intent not to renew, about six months
prior to the end of the contract.
There were many components to the backsourcing plan. While Omega was
managing the membership database, the membership department at Gamma became
almost non existent and had to be recreated. New business practices and procedures for
membership were created during the planning stage. Then Gamma had to take care of the
direct marketing components that were handled by Omega. It was decided to hire another
provider to process the mailings for Gamma. The station had to acquire new hardware
and software licenses to be able to handle the database internally.
Four months before the end of the contract, Gamma moved the direct marketing
component to a new provider while maintaining the database with Omega. One internal
employee was hired as a database manager and was tasked with handling the database.
The software developer, Lambda, agreed to assist Gamma with monthly clean-ups of the
database and provide remote support if necessary. Multiple tests were performed before
the final transfer of the membership data. The database set up and testing was done in
close cooperation with the database software developer.

131

When Gamma decided to end the relationship, Omega was not very happy to lose
one of its major clients. During the backsourcing transition Gamma received minimal
assistance from the provider. The relationship grew more and more contentious during
those months. Omega was very restrictive with the database access over the course of the
contract, and tried to continue controlling the data throughout the conversion. The Vice
President for Membership ran into major problems with Omega during backsourcing:
“They actually threatened to sue me at one point. When we were exiting
out from Omega, which literally meant we had a server here, we bought a
server, we were taking that back gradually. Because we only had access to
one fourth of the application, we were having to try and learn. Because as
soon as they handed it over they had wiped their hands clean, they weren't
going to lend anything to us. So I can remember specifically going in and
asking one person on their staff, ‘We need to try and create premium
codes. Is that okay?’ It's not going to hurt anything, we knew it's just
basic, but we needed to learn how to do it. And they said yes, so we went
in and created premium codes. But if you look at the fine, fine print of our
contract, it stated that we were not supposed to do any kind of entering,
give me a break. I mean entering premium codes does nothing to the
database. And so their COO called me, threatened a law suit, threatened
to immediately, the next day cease serving our database and that's one that
scary in my mind.”
After the outsourcing contract, Gamma successfully transitioned the membership
database in-house. Less than a year after the end of the relationship with Omega, Gamma
contracted the database software developer Lambda to host the database. The new
contract allowed Gamma to have complete control of its data and the creative component
of fundraising. Only hosting and maintenance of the database is currently handled by
Lambda.
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CHAPTER SIX. BACKSOURCING ANTECEDENTS: CASE
RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of all the case studies and identifies backsourcing
antecedents salient in each case. Following a case study protocol, it describes the steps in
data analysis and provides a detailed account of each of the cases, by reviewing every
backsourcing construct and its possible effects on backsourcing. Every case concludes
with discussion of the factors that were critical in the decision to backsource and the
interplay of those factors.

Company One – Alpha
Contract One - Kappa
Alpha’s data processing contract in Continental Europe originated in the 1980’s.
At that time, Alpha was jointly owned by its present owner Delta and another company,
Epsilon. Epsilon had its own IS department that also handled data processing for Alpha’s
business. There were no cost considerations involved in the original decision as it was
simply an arrangement between two subsidiaries of Epsilon. Eventually Epsilon decided
to divest its IS unit and it was sold to Kappa. Alpha stayed on to continue the relationship
with the new outsourcing provider, Kappa.
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Economic Considerations
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing
Alpha’s data processing contract with Kappa did not have a set expiration date
and could have continued indefinitely. By contract, Alpha was required to give at least 12
months notice to Kappa if it wanted to end the relationship. When Alpha was heading
into backsourcing, the main goal for the company was to avoid costly termination fees.
At the same time, it tried to ensure that Kappa did not lose any money and could slowly
reduce its services as Alpha was transitioning out of the relationship. The former CIO of
Alpha at the time, negotiated with Kappa to end the contract on favorable terms for both
parties:
“I negotiated with Kappa an agreement that was favorable to us both, to
where they wouldn’t lose any money but we didn’t have to pay any
penalties, that’s the bottom line. And we basically paid them a little bit
less money per month than if we discontinued the contract in say another
3-4-5 years. So it was financially good for us.”
Alpha was paying around U.S. $30,000 a month for Kappa’s services, to support
data processing for Alpha-Continental Europe. The costs were reasonable during the
contract and Alpha had always worked closely with Kappa to ensure fair pricing. Alpha
estimated that it would cost them less to host the data and run the same data processing
operations in-house and decided to proceed with backsourcing. The Director of IT
Operations did not think costs were the main deteriorating factor that ended the
relationship:
“There was no deteriorating factors to pull it out, cost wasn’t even
necessarily bad. The pricing structure was reasonable. It was more than it
would have cost us to insource but it wasn’t so outrageous that we wanted
to get rid of it.”
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In the year leading to backsourcing, Alpha invested heavily into a new data center
at the corporate headquarters in North America. Instead of paying for separate data
processing in various geographic sites, Alpha decided to run its main logistics application
from one location. Consolidating data processing and services at the corporate location,
Alpha was able to achieve economies of scale by increasing the utilization rate of its
equipment. The transition was economically justified by the former CIO:
“Because it wasn’t cost effective for us to just have two little servers
sitting on a corner at this huge data center at Kappa in Cologne. And we
were centralizing because it was saving us money. I was able to invest
several million dollars into this central site, where I would have been
replicating the infrastructure, you know, the generators, all of the stuff you
do to put a huge data center with a help desk. They are much more
efficient if you have high volume as opposed to just a little bit of volume
by time zone.”
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement
Except for a few items, the majority of the equipment in the contract with Kappa
was not owned by either Alpha or Kappa; instead, it was subleased from another party.
As a result, the asset specificity of the outsourcing contract with Kappa was low. The
provider simply housed the data of Alpha and multiple other companies at its facilities.
Alpha was not receiving any special services and was merely sharing the data servers and
support desk with several other clients. Low asset specificity justified the reasonable
pricing of the contract.
Switching Costs of Backsourcing
Alpha’s data processing in Continental Europe had been outsourced to Kappa, and
before that to Epsilon-IS for many years. Most applications, including the main logistic
application, were old legacy applications that were developed more than 10 years earlier.
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A few pieces of equipment that belonged to Alpha and used to be housed at Kappa’s
location were old and fully depreciated. Consequently, there were no additional
amortization write-offs or losses during the transition. The former CIO recalled it as one
of the advantages of the situation:
“Now, the other thing was because we had everything in that location for a
long enough period of time, the assets that were ours were fully
depreciated. But lots of times companies would capitalize equipment for
three years or may be even five years. And if you do all this moving
around quicker than three years or quicker than five years you quite often
have to have a write-off to cover the wasted facilities, expense or
infrastructure. We didn’t have to have that with this Kappa situation.”
During the transition, Alpha worked closely with Kappa to ensure favorable
backsourcing conditions for both parties. Because some equipment was subleased from
another provider, Kappa had to renegotiate with them to reduce the number of leased
items. As a result, there were some extra costs associated with arrangements with this
other provider. Kappa passed the incurred expenses down to Alpha during the transition.
However, according to the Director of IT Operations at Alpha, those costs were
insignificant:
“Well, the extra costs was the fact that Kappa had done the same thing we
did. They were leasing the equipment and the operating system from
[another provider], so they had an expectation when they were going to
turn it off as well. And they had to renegotiate their support from [another
provider], so they can continue to offer us that support so they had to pay a
little higher degree of cost which they passed on us. And we actually had
to pay. It wasn’t significant though. I mean less than 10,000 dollars. At the
end of the contract there was no relocation to be done because it wasn’t
our equipment, so there wasn’t relocation cost, hiring personnel, move or
anything like that.”
While there was a large investment into the new data center, it was not done
specifically for the European operations. The data center was originally set up to house
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the North American data processing and then was expanded to handle global systems as
well. The help desk employees were assigned to several shifts to be able to support
different times zones. The former CIO ensured that the help desk was able to answer the
phones in several European languages in addition to English:
“I didn’t have to in any case increase staff. Some places as you can
imagine if some one else is doing all the work and if you move it back inhouse, you may have to have a hierarchy. But I was able to, again because
we were consolidating, I didn’t need to hire people in [corporate
headquarters] because Kappa wasn’t working. I did have to make sure that
I had people on for second, third, fourth shift here in [corporate
headquarters] who spoke languages, but before I didn’t have to worry
about it.”
Alpha pursued some economic benefits in the termination of the relationship with
Kappa and backsourcing. Traditional argument of cost savings was used to justify the
decision. While Alpha was satisfied with the pricing of the outsourcing contract with
Kappa, consolidation at the corporate headquarters allowed Alpha to enjoy economies of
scale and reduce the costs of internal production. Switching costs were almost nonexistent during the transition, as no equipment was relocated from Kappa. The only
incurred expenses were the costs of recruiting multilingual staff for the help desk at the
corporate headquarters, and minor charges from the provider for the return of subleased
equipment.
Strategic Considerations
Internal Structural Changes
Termination of the outsourcing contract with Kappa was a part of a company
wide globalization project orchestrated by a new CEO. Alpha provides logistic services
across the world and uses logistics software for tracking and billing purposes. Once the
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new corporate headquarters were established in North America in 2001, Alpha embarked
on a new project to homogenize its logistics business across the world. The Director of IT
Operations was hired to be part of the globalization team:
“Our current CEO was appointed, and he has been driving this message
that says One Alpha. One Alpha, his goal is to get rid of the variations. His
goal is to get rid of the differences that exist, and to make everybody
provide the same services, common global consistent.”
Redefinition of the Role of IS
Information systems that could support the new global business were part of this
new strategy. The former CIO was tasked with modifying IS operations to fit the new
paradigm. The decision was to globally centralize and standardize information systems
as well. Local IS arrangements had to be transformed into a consistent corporate
infrastructure and systems. The European Relationship Manager, who was in charge of
the Kappa contract in Europe, referred to the new IS as a worldwide function:
“Because I said we had, it was a company decision to centralize IT, it was
no longer a European function, but a worldwide function and we had a
data center in [corporate headquarters]. We did no longer had this split
between Europe and America.”
In the old Alpha, geographic regions ran their operations independently and
managed information systems in their own way. Kappa’s arrangement was supporting the
Alpha-Continental Europe offices and ran old mainframe logistic applications. New
global architecture called for a new global logistic application, corporation wide
financials and customer relationship management software. According to the Director of
IT Operations there was no need for Kappa in the new structure:
“The reason the contract with Kappa was terminated was because they had
basically the regional system for Germany. It was housed on IBM
mainframe environment, they ran an application that was about 25 years
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old. When we integrated the German business into our global architecture
being SAP and CMS etc. at that point on we no longer needed their
services because we weren’t on legacy systems any more. And that’s why
we terminated the contract.”
The decision to backsource was propelled by the corporate headquarters and
aimed at centralizing IS activities. IS assumed a new central role in the business of
Alpha. Because Alpha wanted to standardize its logistics operations globally, it had to
rely on IS to create infrastructure for support. As part of the global business changes,
Alpha was replacing its legacy applications with new enterprise wide systems. The
former CIO presided over the centralization efforts and masterminded the conversion to
global systems:
“Because we were taking all of our legacy systems and converting them to
single global systems, centralized in [corporate headquarters], at the
location where you visited, what we did was as countries were being
converted we then took work away from whoever their processing center
was.”
The decision to backsource the data processing operations from Kappa signified
strategic changes in the positioning of IS at Alpha. The company decided to concentrate
its resources on state-of-the-art logistics and utilize technology to track the movement of
its resources across the globe. To improve operational efficiency, Alpha was transitioning
to a new corporate ERP system. The former CIO referred to the changes as the business
reengineering process:
“Because we were centralizing. We were strategically centralizing all of
our applications into one global location. It just happened to be in
[corporate headquarters]. But it was because we were centralizing our
applications. And the timing of it was because we were converting to SAP.
It was really they had a brand new application. So that was a big business
reengineering process change for the company.”
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Loss of Control over IS
Alpha had personnel on location in Europe to monitor the activities of the
outsourcing provider. Kappa was consistent in providing regular reports and full
disclosure of the outsourcing details. Additionally, Alpha had a database administrator
who regularly checked on the quality of the data processing by the provider. The
European Relationship Manager felt she was in control of the situation during the time of
the outsourcing contract:
“Control and so far that I got reports, regular reports to follow up service
level agreements. And if we had our DBA who checked in addition, so it
was a kind of control of what was done. And we could check batch
schedule and so on, so it was kind of control of the work that was done.
We checked whether all back-ups were done as requested and so on.”
The main business of Alpha is logistics and it is critical for the company to have
control over billing its customers for logistics services and the tracking and scheduling of
their equipment. When the data processing was housed at Kappa, Alpha had access to the
systems and had control over the logistics processes. Alpha did not have actual control
over the operating system and the environment, but it could fully monitor the performed
activities and modify them when necessary. The Director of IT Operations at Alpha was
not worried about loss of control over the outsourced services:
“We had control of the process aspects, from actually performing day to
day processing in through Alpha. We didn’t have control over the internal
operating system. It was kind of unique in fact that the server and
operating systems licenses that ran on that environment Kappa had
contracted through [another provider] directly and we just paid a subset of
the amount every month for using it. So, we didn’t own the environment,
therefore, there probably was some liability of some shape with the fact if
we got onto changing things versus them maintaining it. In application
yes, we had some control over it, from the other side of the house no.”
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The corporate strategy of Alpha suffered significant changes with the arrival of a
new CEO, who aspired to build a globally consistent and prominent logistics business.
The new strategy necessitated changes in IS as well. All of the old legacy applications
were replaced with corporation wide systems and uniform IS infrastructure across the
world. The perception of IS shifted at Alpha from being a disorganized support function,
to a thoroughly orchestrated core activity that enables logistics business. Change in the
role of IS was associated with the overall changes in the organization driven by the
changes in internal corporate structure.
Relationship Considerations
Service Quality of Outsourcing Arrangement
Alpha outsourced its data processing to Kappa for many years. Before Kappa, the
contract was managed by Epsilon-IS, a subsidiary of Epsilon, which at the time partly
owned Alpha. When Epsilon-IS was sold to Kappa, all the staff was transferred to the
new owner and continued to service Alpha. Over many years Alpha developed a good
rapport with Kappa and its personnel. The provider always delivered quality service and
promptly responded to Alpha’s requests. The former CIO expressed his satisfaction with
the relationship during the interview:
“From a business stand point and from a technical stand point, good
rapport, we were managing based on written documented service levels.
And they always did whatever we asked them to do, may be that is the
best way to put it.”
Kappa’s contract performance was always exceptionally good throughout the
relationship. All of the outsourcing activities were structured, and there were specific
procedures to follow for every situation.
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The employees acted according to the

stipulations in the service level agreement and were well aware of their individual roles in
the project. The former CIO of Alpha was impressed that the relationship was always
business-like:
“They are so business-like and structured, and there is nothing gray,
everything is black and white. Everybody knew what everybody was
doing. It was a very structured business-like relationship. Because we
didn’t have to go up the ladder across and down in order to get two people
to do something.”
Kappa’s service levels were consistently high and Alpha was happy with the
relationship. In rare cases of emergency, Kappa was always ready to assist Alpha with
their data processing needs. Kappa’s personnel were very understanding and tried to
ensure that Alpha’s database was back up and running as quickly as possible. All the
procedures at Kappa were standardized and the personnel were well trained to always
follow those guidelines. The Director of IT Operations praised Kappa as very
professional:
“And all indications that I had was that Kappa was very professional and
the service they were providing was very good. I mean they had strict
guidelines that had to be followed if changes were to be made. The
German community followed this. They weren’t opposed to respond to
things quickly as an unusual occurrence and we respected that. The quality
of service was very good. So, the relationship and the service that Kappa
provided was very good.”
As with any service contract from time to time, some issues surfaced that required
the provider’s attention. However, most of those issues were minute and were addressed
properly by Kappa. A few times Alpha experienced situations where Kappa’s staff was
not taking personal responsibility for the problem. Yet it always happened on the
individual level and was quickly resolved. On the company level Kappa followed
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documented service levels and the former CIO described the problems coming to mind as
minimal:
“The only things that came up that I would say were negative if there were
any, is every ones in a while again at the technical level, you know a
systems programmer, a technician, would say “He did this”, the other guy
would say “No, he did that”, or “Hey, they can’t fix that”, or “We can’t
fix that”. But that was really-really minimal, it was not a big issue at all.”
Trust in the Provider
During the entire time of the contract there was no need to micro manage Kappa.
The outsourcing staff was always courteous and willing to help. Time after time Kappa
delivered on time performance and kept its promises. There was not a sign of
opportunism in Kappa’s actions and the provider always acted in the best interest of its
client. The former CIO was confident that Kappa would adhere to contract’s deadlines
and never take advantage of the situation:
“We didn’t have to follow up and manage them. They did what they said
they would do. So if we said we want some new equipment installed in
three weeks, they would make sure that equipment got installed in three
weeks, kind of thing. In fact, it was just an example were Kappa was
doing their best to make sure we didn’t get charged for things we didn’t
need to get charged for.”
During the contract, Kappa consistently gave Alpha the highest standards of
service quality and problem resolution. Alpha felt very comfortable outsourcing its data
processing to Kappa and trusted Kappa to handle those activities as its own. The provider
was perceived as an honest agent and was trusted to always do the best they could on
behalf of Alpha. When asked if he trusted the provider, the former CIO responded:
“Very much so. And both in terms of trust in a sense of integrity and also
trust in the sense would they do what they said they were going to do. I
knew that they would do an honest and an efficient job.”
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Goal Conflict
The outsourcing relationship between Alpha and Kappa was almost conflict free.
Part of the reason was that Kappa strictly adhered to the service level agreement. The
provider never tried to take advantage of Alpha or be opportunistic during the contract.
Alpha trusted Kappa to always perform to the best of its abilities. On one occasion Kappa
had to negotiate with its subcontractor to protect the interests of Alpha. Even though it
displeased the subcontractor, Kappa stood its ground and put Alpha’s satisfaction and
welfare first. The former CIO could not recall any major problems with Kappa, instead he
detailed a situation where Kappa worked hard to resolve a problem with another provider
that leased the equipment to them:
“There were none. There were none at all. The only problems we had, and
it had nothing to do with either Kappa or Alpha, but because they had to
use [another provider], for example, as a subcontractor. For example,
[another provider] provided software to them so they can do their job. And
there were issues at times between them and [another provider], because
we had some older versions of operating systems, MDS operating systems.
And [another provider] said, hey we are going to discontinue support of
those systems, the next layer, or the new version of the system would be
expensive and Kappa would have had to charge us more money. We said
we don’t want to pay more money. So Kappa had to go back to [another
provider] and said we are not going to upgrade even though you are
refusing to support us. So, but again, it did not affect the relationship.”
Similarly, the European Relationship Manager could not recall any conflicts with
Kappa. She worked closely with them on day-to-day activities and was happy with the
way problems were addressed:
“Not really. It was if at all day to day issues. Where we think the job
should have started and they think they started it and we said you did not
something. Only day to day issues, if at all. No real issues.”
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Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship
Overall, all informants expressed their satisfaction with the relationship they had
with Kappa. The provider delivered consistent, high quality service over many years.
Whenever there were issues to solve, Kappa acted promptly and professionally to address
them. Conflict was almost non-existent in the relationship and there was a lot of
communication. The former CIO even referred to the Alpha and Kappa outsourcing
relationship as a perfect relationship:
“Very positive, very good. And if we were to do it all over again, I
wouldn’t have changed that particular relationship, or that contract or
anything. It was very good. It made for a perfect relationship. That’s again
why I am saying that we felt real comfortable that it was almost as if they
worked for us. They worked pretty well.”
The relationship between Alpha and Kappa was truly cooperative. The Director of
IT Operations praised the relationship as well:
“So the relationship between vendor and customer went very well. There
was a lot of cooperation there, anything outside of the norm that came up
that wasn’t expected was handled appropriately. So the relationship was
very good.”
Voice Behavior
Communication with Kappa was very structured. Every employee knew how to
address the problems and there was a hierarchy for escalating any issues that surfaced.
An initial attempt was always made to resolve the problem at the level where it
originated. Therefore, if it was a network problem, the network administrator first got
involved. If that person was not able to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of Alpha then
the problem was escalated to a higher level. All of the communication was logged and
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any problem could be tracked from the moment of its origination to the point of
resolution. The former CIO of Alpha was the last person to get involved:
“There were hierarchies of who talked to who, and who did what, and the
follow up and escalation stuff. It got escalated and she would talk to their
manager, but if it was, the reason it was 5 or 6, the network guys would
talk to the network guys, computer operations would talk to computer
operations, applications would talk to applications. That’s why there were
several people but it really had to do with their technical discipline, not
because it was out of control. In fact, and even the way we had it set up,
anytime that there was a problem or an issue or anything it had to be
logged, had to be escalated and had to be communicated.”
To monitor the relationship, a senior manager from Alpha was designated as a
local point of contact with Kappa. She reported directly to the former CIO of Alpha and
was responsible for the day-to-day activities and communication with Kappa. She was
able to speak with the provider’s personnel in their native language and address the
problems locally. She also monitored the progress of the contract and held regular
meetings with Kappa to foster the relationship. The former CIO visited the location
several times a year as well:
“Now, one of the things I was required to do, they were in Germany, these
are all Germans, and I don’t speak good German. Now they spoke fairly
good English, but I had a manager, a senior level IT manager in Cologne,
Germany, who could drive there in 20 minutes. And so she, would go and
meet and talk to them in their language at least once a month. So that also
kept a lot of good rapport.”
Kappa’s style of communication was very open. Even though there was a great
deal of structure to the contract and all the procedures, Kappa’s staff remained open to
suggestions. Alpha developed a friendly relationship that helped to communicate Alpha’s
needs and concerns. As the main local point of contact, the European Relationship
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Manager addressed issues directly with the management of Kappa, who in turn was
always willing to help:
“The people had an open style to communicate and things were discussed
in a friendly environment. Very directly and openly. I called to manager of
data center and told him about the concerns or problems and he tried to
help. They really tried to help.”
Most of the time during the contract the problems were resolved very quickly.
From time to time the European Relationship Manager organized meetings with the
provider to discuss the issues and arrive at solutions. If there was a complex problem, the
provider worked closely with Alpha to resolve it. Even in case of emergency, Alpha
could rely on Kappa to deliver satisfactory service and prevent business problems. The
European Relationship Manager worked closely with the provider’s employees to resolve
any issues:
“Most of the time the agreed service level was fulfilled. If not we had
regular meetings to discuss what caused it and to solve problems. But it is
a problem to announce in advance if you have a problem on a Friday
evening. And there was an emergency number or a number you could call
but it did not always work as we expected.”
Over the years, the European Relationship Manager developed a personal
relationship with the staff at Kappa. In the original contract with Epsilon-IS she could
contact the members of the data center 7 days a week, 24 hours a day if there was an
emergency. When the contract was transferred to Kappa, she could no longer contact
Kappa’s personnel directly at their residences. Instead there was a general emergency
number available for all the clients. Yet the European Relationship Manager still
maintained a warm relationship with Kappa’s staff, which ensured even better service
and responsiveness in time of need:
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“As we worked with this company for a long time I knew all the people
that worked for Alpha. So the operators, I knew them personally, and I
knew another, the team leader that cared about the operators. So I could
contract every person. I even knew their private numbers for weekends. So
it was… and that was the point that changed when Kappa took over. So
we were not allowed anymore to call an operator or people to get this
direct help if necessary.”
When Alpha decided to exit the relationship, good rapport with the provider
helped to negotiate favorable terms for the transition. While Alpha’s own interests were
most important, Alpha also sought to ensure that Kappa did not suffer financially because
of the termination. The transfer of services went smoothly, and data was transferred to
new systems in North America without a loss. The transition was transparent to the users
and they were able to access the data without any disruptions.

The former CIO

negotiated with Kappa during the backsourcing and found them to be very cooperative:
“But because we had a very good working relationship. Kappa was
extremely cooperative, we didn’t have any transitional problems
whatsoever, we didn’t lose any data, there weren’t any outages, or
anything.”
Relationship wise, the contract with Kappa presented a perfect scenario. Kappa’s
personnel were always professional, responsible and willing to help. Kappa’s business
policies and procedures were well documented and relentlessly followed. By the account
of all involved, the provider consistently delivered excellent service and resolved
problems promptly and to the best of their ability. Alpha trusted the provider and there
was almost no conflict during the relationship. The communication remained friendly and
open, and Kappa addressed Alpha’s questions to the client’s full satisfaction. The
relationship was fully satisfactory and there was no indication of discontent on behalf of
either party that could lead to the termination.
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Emerging Themes
Power
The arrival of a new CEO was one reason for the business globalization and
centralization of IS activities at Alpha. The former CIO worked under the CEO’s
direction to consolidate IS operations and backsource the contract with Kappa. The CEO
and the former CIO used their position of formal authority to drive the changes across the
organization and make decisions. Alpha pursued backsourcing of the Alpha-Kappa
relationship despite Kappa’s satisfactory performance on the contract and good rapport
with the provider. The executives exercised their structural power and justified
backsourcing by redefinition of corporate goals. Interestingly enough, the transition of IS
services from Kappa to Alpha was supported by Alpha’s local IS employees in Germany.
Employees displaced as a result of Alpha-Kappa contract termination were relocated to
other positions within Alpha.
Integration of Perspectives
All informants unanimously named centralization as the main reason for
backsourcing of the data processing services previously outsourced to Kappa. Table 6.1
presents the primary and secondary (if available) reasons for backsourcing as identified
by the interviewees at Alpha. Centralization of IS activities was encouraged by Alpha’s
CEO as part of the company-wide strategy of globalization. This new paradigm entailed
standardization of logistics services worldwide, and IS played a critical role in enabling
such standardization. Alpha’s former CIO masterminded the consolidated IS strategy that
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included: global IS infrastructure and corporation-wide financials, main logistics
application and customer relationship management.
Table 6.1 Alpha – Kappa Contract: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant
Informant
Former CIO
Global Telecom Manager
European Relationship
Manager
Director of IT Operations

Primary Reason
Centralization
Centralization
Centralization

Secondary Reason
Cost

Integration, centralization

The former CIO justified termination of Kappa’s contract by expected cost
savings. By establishing a corporate data center, Alpha was able to consolidate most of its
worldwide data processing into one location. Economies of scale generated cost savings
and Alpha is proud to be operating its data center at a lower cost than the industry’s
average. During the outsourcing contract with Kappa, the cost factor was not profound by
itself to result in termination of the relationship. However, as a result of backsourcing,
Alpha did generate some cost savings by combining data processing of multiple
geographic regions into one location.
Table 6.2 reconciles the perceptions of different informants on the characteristics
of the relationship between Alpha and Kappa, as well as economic and strategic factors
that were considered as possible antecedents of backsourcing. It shows that the
informants provided consistent accounts of the outsourcing contract and agreed on the
evaluation of the main factors, on average, 98% of the time (Table 6.3).
Overall, the backsourcing transition out of the Alpha – Kappa contract was first
and foremost driven by the strategic changes at Alpha and the redefinition of the role of
IS within the company. Information systems at Alpha were undergoing major changes
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with legacy applications being replaced by new global systems and a global corporate
network. The strategic changes came as a result of changes in the corporate structure and
the appointment of a new CEO. He was responsible for the new strategy and global
consolidation. Economic factors played a supporting role in the decision to backsource
Kappa’s contract by economically justifying the transfer to the corporate data center. The
relationship factors signaled a healthy and strong relationship between Kappa and Alpha
and did not indicate premature ending. Rather, the former CIO described the outsourcing
contract as ‘perfect’. Decision making authority of the new CEO and former CIO
impacted the Alpha-Kappa backsourcing decision. If it had not been for centralization,
Alpha would have continued to outsource to Kappa.
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Table 6.2 Alpha – Kappa Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant
Informant

Former CIO

Global
Telecom
Manager

European
Relationship
Manager

Construct
Cost Advantage Saved
money,
volume justified
lower
internal
costs.
Switching Cost Did not lose any
money.
No
increase in staff
Asset
All
equipment
Specificity
owned by Kappa
Centralization, Centralization
Change in the Centralization
SAP
Role of IS
New applications SAP
implementation implementation
Reengineering
Loss of Control Had control
Had control, got
reports

Structural
Changes
Service Quality Very responsive,
good value, very
structured

Good
service
level. A bit
bureaucratic but
fulfilled
the
task.
Trusted. Very
open
relationship.

Trust

Did not have to
manage. Trusted
very
much.
Behaved as if
worked for client
Goal Conflict
None
Satisfaction
Relationship very
positive,
very
good
Voice Behavior Good rapport
Structured
communication

Director of IT
Operations
Cost
of
outsourcing not
bad.
Internal
cheaper.
No
relocation
cost, overall very
small cost.

Centralization
SAP
implementation
Had control in
process
and
applications, not
in
technical
aspect.
New CEO
Very
professional, very
good
service,
strict guidelines.

None
Provider
did Relationship went
best to fulfill very well
client’s wishes.
Open
communication,
personal
relationship,
always
responsive

Power
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Table 6.3 Alpha – Kappa Contract: Informant Agreement
Construct
Cost Advantage
Switching Cost
Asset Specificity
Change in the Role of IS
Loss of Control
Structural Changes
Service Quality
Trust
Goal Conflict
Satisfaction
Voice Behavior
Power

Total Number of
Coded Quotes
13
6
1
15
5
1
14
6
3
14
11
0

Number of Informants
who had Quotes
2
2
1
4
3
1
3
2
2
3
2
0

Agreement on
Construct
100% (2/2)
100% (2/2)
One opinion
100% (4/4)
83% (2.5/3)
One opinion
100% (3/3)
100% (2/2)
100% (2/2)
100% (3/3)
100% (2/2)
No coding

Contract Two – Iota
Alpha’s 5-year outsourcing agreement with Iota was signed in 1999. Alpha –
U.K. originated this contract in an attempt to manage the uncertainty associated with the
recruitment of IS personnel. At the time, Alpha was struggling to maintain expertise inhouse and decided to gain access to the IS knowledge base by outsourcing IS activities to
Iota. The CIO of Alpha-Europe at the time negotiated the contract. Once the outsourcing
agreement was signed, Alpha terminated all of its existent IS personnel and completely
relied on Iota to handle IS applications.
Economic Considerations
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement
Iota housed Alpha’s data, e-mail and application servers at its data center facilities
and provided on-site support when necessary. The provider’s duties included regular
back-ups of the data, upgrades to the software when required, and other basic server
maintenance. From the technical point of view, asset specificity of this outsourcing
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contract was low. The Global Telecom Program Manager did not think there was
anything complicated in Alpha’s requirements:
“The only thing they did for us was host a server and do basic things. Like
if we ask them can you reboot the server, they press the power button, they
check that the backups were running. And it is nothing sophisticated to the
point where they needed special knowledge for us.”
On the other hand, Iota had to learn Alpha’s business policies and procedures.
Frequently, providers are not very willing to adjust their outsourcing processes to fit the
requirements of a particular client. However, Alpha insisted that Iota follow the
procedures established at Alpha for the handling of the application, e-mail and data
servers. From the business processes point of view, Alpha required some very specific
attention to its data. Alpha’s Senior System Administrator, who was based in France, had
to travel to the U.K. on several occasions to train Iota’s staff and ensure that specified
practices were in place:
“Because it was hard to Iota to understand the business of Alpha and
hardware, interfaces and our requirements. It was not easy for them. I just
may be spent six months just traveling to U.K. and trying to make things
easy for Iota. And the different meetings most of them were technical area
and transfer of knowledge from Alpha to Iota because we had special
procedures and we needed the condition for Iota to follow the procedures.
We didn’t want to modify anything and we got really all the knowledge
and then we can make suggestions.”
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing
The pricing of the outsourcing contract was based on the amount of data housed
on the servers and the service requirements of Alpha. The contract had a fixed monthly
minimum to pay for the rented space. The minimum fees had to be paid regardless of the
utilization of the servers or the volume of service requests by Alpha. Alpha’s former CIO
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felt the agreement was not negotiated well from the start, and as a result, put Alpha at a
disadvantage financially:
“That was one where there was a minimum whether we needed it or not,
so it was a bad contract the way it was negotiated from the financial
standpoint, secondarily it was actually costing more money to outsource
during those few years, than it would have we left all of the processing
internal in Weighbridge in our own building.”
Iota’s contract turned out to be more expensive than initially expected. In fact, it
was costing Alpha more than what Alpha used to spend to keep the servers in-house
before outsourcing.

At the same time, Iota was not addressing Alpha’s concerns

satisfactorily, and Alpha’s personnel had to travel to Iota’s facilities to resolve the
problems on location. The IS Director for Europe was unhappy with the contract because
he was paying for the services of Iota, yet incurred additional expenses to designate
Alpha’s staff to fix the problems at the Iota’s data center:
“It got to a stage where we were sending people off to site to resolve the
situation which we were paying Iota for anyway. So we were paying them
to do a job that they weren’t doing, and then we were sending our own
people. So we were paying twice for this kind of thing.”
Facing steep prices for support of its data and application servers, Alpha’s
management decided to re-evaluate the outsourcing agreement with Iota. The contract
proved to be economically unsound, and Alpha decided to explore its options for
termination of this arrangement. Alpha’s former CIO summarized the two major financial
problems with Iota’s contract:
“I would say the biggest challenges we had with Iota were we had a
contract, a base contract that was more expensive than had we never done
a deal at all.”
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When Alpha considered backsourcing the services handled by Iota, it performed a
comprehensive financial analysis of all possible options. First of all, it received a quote
from Iota for continuation of the existing outsourcing contract. It then estimated the costs
of transferring the data servers and hosting them in-house at the data center in its
corporate headquarters. According to the IS Director for Europe, backsourcing of Iota’s
contract was financially substantiated:
“But we wanted to make sure we were making that on the basis of the
savings. So what we did, we asked Iota, the contract was coming to an end
by the way, there was another six months to go, so we asked Iota how
much it would be to extend the contract given the certain service levels
over the next two or three years. So we then compared that cost against
our own cost of moving the system in-house, so insourcing those systems.
And then from there we then decided to proceed and bring the systems inhouse.”
During the re-evaluation of the Iota outsourcing arrangement, Alpha also
considered terminating the outsourcing agreement and finding another provider. Staying
with Iota was quickly ruled out as economically impractical. However, Alpha then
compared the potential costs of hiring another provider and the expected internal
expenses. The estimated in-house costs at the data processing center were lower than any
other option. The IS Director for Europe was convinced that Iota was no longer an
alternative:
“If it was too expensive we probably done something different. And
something different meaning, we would probably go from Iota to someone
else. I don’t think we stay with Iota.”
Switching Costs of Backsourcing
When Alpha decided to end the relationship with Iota, the contract was in the
middle of its five year term. Alpha’s management met with Iota’s contract manager to
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negotiate a possible ending. Alpha quickly found that there were steep termination fees
associated with a premature exit and Iota was not willing to let the client avoid those
costs. Alpha’s Director of IT Operations recalled the details:
“It was a couple of years early. And there was some terminology in the
actual contract that they had signed. Basically we were liable for quite a
bit of money had we just pulled out of it. There was no termination clauses
that say if you want to leave you can. It had to have a reasonable amount
of loss involved in it for us to be able to pull out without paying anything.”
Once Alpha realized that the early termination fees were unavoidable, it tried to
minimize the costs by continuing with the contract as long as it could. Meanwhile, Alpha
pursued the groundwork for the transition of the data center to a new location at the
corporate headquarters. Alpha’s former CIO spent almost a year working out acceptable
terms for both parties, to end the relationship:
“And that was financially unfavorable for us because we were not in a
good negotiating position because we were trying to get out of an
agreement that was very legitimate. So, it ended up becoming at least from
cash stand point a war. But it was … we didn’t have to get the attorneys
involved, but the negotiations took about eight-nine months.”
As a result of backsourcing, Alpha transferred all of its data servers to its
corporate data center. The facility had enough space to house the additional data volume
and also had enough human resources to support the transferred services. So, Alpha’s
internal data center did not endure additional expense associated with hosting the
European data. According to Alpha’s IS Director for Europe, Alpha was able to achieve
costs savings by discontinuing services from Iota:
“We were able to absorb the systems with the existing head count, with
the existing computer room space. So really we didn’t have to pay any fee
to Iota. So, yes there is a direct savings which would be the fee to Iota.
And all we did was an internal cost of us running it, but it wasn’t
additional internal cost, it was an existing internal cost.”
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Alpha shipped all of the hardware that was located at Iota to a new location in the
United States. Most applications that were housed at Iota were Alpha’s legacy
applications. During the transition, some of them were replaced by new applications at
the new data center. Other applications had to be physically transferred to the new
facility. Alpha decided to minimize the risk of losing the applications by transporting the
data servers intact and then simply plugging them in at a new location. The IS Director
for Europe described various switching costs associated with backsourcing:
“Yes, there were costs of shipping, we shipped the hardware back to US.
The reason for that was safer for us to do that from an operations point of
view. If you wanted to buy a new system or operational software we prefer
to move the box as it was. It was very old systems and it was dangerous
for us to rebuild it. So basically we shipped boxes back to US, there was
cost of that. And there was cost also of having people flying to the US, we
needed to have people who were going to take care of the system from
US. We had a few people in the US from here during the project for a
month and a bit. And we also asked Iota to help us prepare the transfer of
the skill sets and the operational procedures.”
Once all the preparations and transfers were complete, Alpha was able to end the
relationship with the provider. In addition to the shipping expenses, Alpha incurred the
early termination fee. It was agreed that Alpha would pay Iota six months worth of
contract fees for breaching the agreement. The Director of IT Operations at Alpha was in
charge of the transition and acknowledged that Alpha experienced short term financial
losses at the time of backsourcing, due to termination fees and moving expenses:
“If you are looking at your day to day run rate, I had to agree to pay Iota I
think it was six months of their expected revenue stream to terminate the
contract. That had to be paid in one lump sum thirty days after we moved
out. So you had a spike right after I moved out of six month worth of
payment going out at one time. You also had some expense of moving
physically moving the equipment that you normally would not have had.
And some expense on the other end of set up because you had to have a
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small amount of professional contractors available in case you had a
problem while you were reengaging the systems to be on stand by.”
Alpha’s staff worked diligently to finish the transfer process on time and within
budget. Apart from the expense of the termination fees, all other activities stayed within
the estimated budget of U.S. $80,000. The expected long term cost savings justified an
early exit from the relationship and all the switching costs. The Director of IT Operations
estimated that Alpha recovered the cost of backsourcing within a year:
“So that was probably I think I had an 80,000 dollar budget to do it and I
came in under budget. Somewhere around 80,000 dollars. Getting things
up to a point that we felt comfortable putting the servers back into the
environment. But overall and long term we were able to recoup the money
all the money that we expensed in the first 12 months.”
Alpha’s outsourcing contract with Iota was financially detrimental for Alpha from
the very beginning. Despite hefty termination fees, and some expenses necessary to
physically relocate the servers to the new location, Alpha decided to pursue
backsourcing. As a result of the transition, Alpha was able to incorporate the European
data servers into its global data center without any extra expenses for equipment or
personnel. Alpha achieved significant costs savings by ending the relationship with Iota
and transferring the data processing to its corporate data center.
Strategic Considerations
Redefinition of the Role of IS
When Iota’s contract was in the third year of the relationship, Alpha experienced
some significant changes in its business strategy. The company embarked on a worldwide
globalization project, bringing all of its disparate business locations under one corporate
umbrella. Alpha standardized its business procedures across the world to become a global
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player in the logistics business. Alpha’s former CIO at the time of the Iota contract,
referred to the transformations as a strategic change in Alpha’s business:
“Yet you made a strategic change in your business say in a year two or
three of the agreement. And that’s what happened. We changed our
business plan.”
It was decided to implement SAP as a corporate wide information system and
have it hosted at the data center, at the corporate headquarters. The proprietary logistic
application and customer relationship management software, Siebel, was also installed at
the new data center. As a result of the new IS strategy, Alpha no longer needed the
outsourced data center in the U.K. The Global Telecom Program Manager referred to the
change in strategy and centralization as the reasons for ending the relationship with Iota:
“When Alpha changed the strategy to become a global company,
centralized IS systems that got a ball rolling. Also because the function of
that data center in U.K. became smaller. Because now we already had
SAP hosted out of the US. We only had Siebel and some of the Novell
servers and Lotus notes hosted out of the UK. That’s why we ended that.”
Most applications that ran on the servers at Iota, were legacy applications. Since
Alpha was transitioning to new corporate applications, the old applications were being
phased out of service. Consequently, Alpha’s contract with Iota became obsolete and
Alpha sought termination of the relationship. The Director of IT Operations at Alpha
blamed the changes in technology for the backsourcing of Iota’s contract:
“The other one was that the decision was made to make the environment
global, completely change the platform long term. Which prompted other
technologies being introduced in the environment and also prompted a
new support staff to be built. Because you are changing from legacy to
what is soon to be the new platforms, right.”
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Alpha’s former CIO admitted that the decision to backsource Iota’s contract was
entirely driven by the consolidation:
“That one, in almost its entirety, was consolidation.”
Internal Structural Changes
Prior to centralization, Alpha had separate IS departments in each geographic
region. When Alpha launched its globalization project, it established corporate
headquarters in North America. The executives at the headquarters pioneered the changes
and worked on centralizing the business, and especially the management, in one location.
The Senior System Administrator, who was based in France, recalled how the corporate
executives from the U.S. masterminded the backsourcing decision:
“When we started this project we said we stop here because at the
beginning we had European information systems, American information
systems, Australian information systems, you know we have a region by
information system. And the discussion there was to say we take SAP but
for global vision not just for Europe we need also to include other regions
across the world. From that discussion when we said this, then people
from [corporate headquarters] come here and decision was to say we need
to do a global Alpha for the IS. When we started here the American people
said we will have a data center in [corporate headquarters] and we will
move everything to [corporate headquarters], and we don’t want Iota.”
When Alpha signed the agreement with Iota, Alpha-Europe had its own CEO,
CIO and other executives who were responsible for the European operations. Less than
two years into the contract, Alpha’s parent consortium, Delta, appointed the CEO of
Alpha-Americas as a global CEO of Alpha. Together with the new CEO, Alpha hired a
new executive team. As a result, most former staff at Alpha-Europe left the company.
The Director of IT Operations was part of the new team that joined Alpha:
“Like I said at the time of the agreement being executed, E.F. was the CIO
of Europe. Under that structure you had CEO, CIO and a full executive
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staff in Europe and also in the US. Probably a year and a half into that
contract Delta decided to replace the CEO here in the US and make him
the CEO of both. So that was the significant difference. So we had a new
CIO hired, which was now for both environments who they never dealt
with. And they replaced most of the IT staff at the same time.”
Alpha’s former CIO was pursuing IS centralization under the overall direction of
the CEO, who was aiming to standardize Alpha’s business across the world. The former
CIO did not believe in outsourcing and wanted to consolidate all of the IS activities under
his supervision. The Director of IT Operations recalled that the backsourcing decision for
Iota’s contract was made by Alpha’s former CIO even before any financial numbers were
available:
“A.B. who was the CIO of Alpha. At the time him and the CEO of Alpha
who was C.D. didn’t believe in outsourcing. So it could have been the best
contract in the world and they were going to be motivated to bring it back.
Because his motivation was to bring everything back. He openly said that
before he had any facts and figures on how the environment actually was.
So the underlying thought process began the day he walked through the
door.”
The former CIO went on to establish a data center at the corporate headquarters
and followed the new global IS strategy. A big component of the consolidation was the
termination of various outsourcing agreements and backsourcing of those services into
the corporate data center. The Global Telecom Program Manager believed the former
CIO was one of the biggest reasons for backsourcing:
“Yes. A.B., the CIO. He wanted to centralize everything. So it was a big
driver to build a big data center in [corporate headquarters], and get rid of
most of the other things. Yes, that definitely was a factor.”
To help him with the centralization, the former CIO hired new IS staff. Since his
intent was the consolidation of Alpha’s global IS systems, he brought on board
individuals who had considerable experience working for various outsourcing providers.
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Those people formed the core team that undertook the design of the data center and the
subsequent transition of the services outsourced to Iota, back in-house. The Senior
System Administrator was the only person left on the IS staff in Europe after the
reorganization:
“The next point is really related to the people because the people that
come to [corporate headquarters] and I think most of them come from
[large outsourcing providers] or something like this. They had already the
experience for outsourcer. They say we have this experience we can create
our data center and we can manage it as an outsourcing company. The
change was coming after may be two years of the contract when most of
people in Alpha left Alpha. You know when the people that worked there
all left Alpha except me. You see, even the top management.”
Changes in the management and establishment of the corporate headquarters,
initiated strategic overhaul at Alpha. The business changes necessitated the redefinition
of the role of IS at Alpha, centralization of IS activities and subsequent backsourcing.
However, backsourcing of Iota’s contract was also driven by another important factor.
The IS Director for Europe suggested that Alpha’s need to regain control over its IS was
also critical in the backsourcing considerations:
“It came about for two main reasons. The first one is that we wanted to,
we had a policy, we meaning Alpha, we had a policy and decided to
centralize our systems into one data center in [corporate headquarters]. We
didn’t really want to, we didn’t just have a contract with Iota, we had
Kappa as well, we had other people around. From a strategy point of view,
we wanted to have control over our own environment. We decided to
move the major systems, not legacy but major systems that are going to
stick around for the next two or three years to move to [corporate
headquarters].”
Loss of Control over IS
Iota was responsible for the maintenance of the application, data and e-mail
servers for Alpha. Sometimes such maintenance entailed configuration changes or
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upgrades, other times it meant changes to the hardware. The Global Telecom Program
Manager recollected that some changes took longer than others, and as such, left Alpha
with less control over the situation:
“We could react if it was just a configuration change, we could react
quick. But if we had to move something in hardware, then we were less
able to.”
Comparing the two data processing outsourcing contracts, Alpha’s former CIO
felt that Iota’s contract did not allow him much control. There was a constant need for the
monitoring of Iota’s activities and frequent reminders on behalf of Alpha. Iota was slower
to react to Alpha’s requests and as a result, it slowed down Alpha’s responsiveness to
business changes:
“No nearly the control that we had at Kappa. I believe what you can say,
we would have to often follow up and remind them. You know like this
Saturday, if were going to do something really big, there had to be a lot of
phone calls. Where in the Kappa example we would call them once and
they would take care. That kind of thing.”
All change requests had to be submitted to Iota. While Alpha was still in the
driver’s seat, in terms of decisions about the data center and maintenance, Iota was the
one acting upon the decisions made by Alpha. Frequently, requests for services
necessitated an agreement from Iota and Alpha was dependent on Iota to perform those
services on time. The Senior System Administrator lamented that Alpha always had to
confirm Iota’s availability before making any IS decisions involving the data center:
“We have the technical knowledge here and also to be sure that for the
business we are delivering exactly what they are waiting for. We say in the
beginning we must double check what Iota is doing. You know just it is
always the major decision it is always taken by us. And Iota also you
know there is also for the management there is change control should be
agreed and all the people involved in this and we can not change any thing
without the agreement, you know all of these possibilities were in place.
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And we can not modify anything without this agreement.”
Iota was responsible for updates to Alpha’s software housed at its facilities.
Unfortunately, Iota was not consistent in performing those updates. The trouble with Iota
was that frequently the provider did not exercise control over the data servers. The IS
Director for Europe felt that Alpha could not have control over the data center because
Iota did not have control over those activities in the first place:
“So they weren’t in control themselves. So there is no way we would have
had control when our own supplier wasn’t in control anyway. So, no we
weren’t, we weren’t in control.”
Iota did not modify Alpha’s environment unless it was requested to do so by
Alpha. The Director of IT Operations believed Alpha had control over what changes were
to be done to the data center environment, even though the changes had to be done by
Iota’s personnel:
“Yes, ok? The reason I say that is because we draw most of the changes
that were happening. Be it right or wrong they usually didn’t do anything
to the environment unless we told them to. So we had control. We may or
may not have told them to do everything in a right sequence. Or we may
or may not told them they could actually perform the maintenance they
needed to perform.”
However, the Director of IT Operations felt Alpha was not able to respond to
business changes as quickly as required by the business. Iota was located several hours
away from the Alpha-U.K. headquarters, and when the situation necessitated quick
response, the distance caused delays for Alpha. The Director of IT Operations felt Alpha
suffered from a loss of control over the IS, because of the remoteness of Iota:
“Because their people, the data center and Iota was in Birmingham, ok, the
Alpha office was in Weighbridge, it’s just outside of London. So there was
80 to 100 miles distance between the two and on occasion when you had
to do something physically, the person had to travel there. It is a 6-7 hour
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drive, or a 2 hour flight and it wasn’t necessarily convenient, decreased
responsiveness.”
According to the IS Director for Europe, Alpha experienced difficulties making
changes to the software hosted by Iota. Because all requests had to be submitted to Iota
for processing, it caused delays for Alpha. The logistic business required continuous
attention and Alpha had to rely on Iota to ensure that the applications and e-mail ran
without glitches. The IS Director for Europe was concerned about the impact the delays
had on the business of Alpha.
“We weren’t really able to change things when it was required by the
business. If we wanted to change the software, upgrade any piece of
software, maintenance upgrade, or our application, if we wanted to
upgrade our own application, critical updates of the systems we just
weren’t able to do it. That was the impact to the business. The business
can’t, our business was a truly 24x7, we needed 24x7 SLA, and we were
not able to get it for our business. So as result we had loss availability
some of our on site in Europe, we also had loss of availability of
applications, people couldn’t get to the application. And in terms of
upgrades people weren’t receiving upgrades. It was quite messy.”
From a strategy point of view, there were several changes happening at Alpha that
led to the backsourcing of the contract with Iota. First of all, Alpha experienced internal
structural changes that had an impact on the positioning of IS globally. The new
management team was determined to centralize the IS activities in one location at
Alpha’s corporate headquarters. As part of the consolidation, Alpha was implementing
new information systems, and thus, reducing the need for Iota’s support of the European
data center. At the same time Alpha was also experiencing a loss of control over its IS
because Iota was not able to react promptly to Alpha’s needs on a daily basis.
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Relationship Considerations
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement
The relationship between Alpha and Iota started out well. Iota presented itself in
a favorable fashion during negotiations and helped transfer Alpha’s equipment into the
outsourcing facilities. For the first several months Alpha was happy with the quality of
the service. Gradually, however, the resources dedicated to Alpha’s contract
diminished, and Iota no longer provided the original levels of service. The IS Director
for Europe believed the service quality deteriorated over time:
“It actually got gradually worse. In the beginning during the migration
they put resources in and they were delivering, but gradually throughout
the contract every malfunction got a bit worse. And the simple things they
weren’t really I wouldn’t say that complex that you needed to do. And
they just didn’t have the resources. They had a high turn over of staff
which didn’t help.”
Part of the problem with the poor service quality was inadequate staffing of the
contract. Initially, Alpha’s contract was serviced by very capable staff, but as time went
on, Iota relocated its most knowledgeable personnel to new projects. In effect, Alpha was
left with an inexperienced service crew that did not provide an adequate level of support.
The Director of IT Operations suggested that changes in the staffing of the contract led to
the decrease in service quality of the outsourcing arrangement:
“What we found after the environment was left at Iota initially they
probably did provide your SLA <service level agreement> that they
agreed, but as things went on as in most contracts that I have been
associated with, they pulled their top people out of there because they
want to use their top people to draw new business, right. And they started
putting lower qualified people in the environment that’s where the
support, quality of the support dropped.”
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Another reason for incompetent personnel was high turnover rates at Iota. By the
middle of the contract the provider lost many of its staff members and had difficulty
staffing the project adequately. Alpha’s Senior System Administrator was frustrated that
he had to constantly train Iota’s newcomers to ensure the outsourced service conformed
to Alpha’s requirements:
“At the middle of the contract it became hard because a lot of people from
Iota leaving Iota, you know there is a turnover and in Information Systems
it is always the case whatever the company. And what happened for us
always to do the same thing, to spend much time to explain them the
procedures, the requirements and so on and so on. And really we were
upset by this because each time you need to explain the same thing to
different people.”
The incompetence of Iota’s personnel was exemplified by the difficulties in
communicating problems to them, and having those problems addressed promptly.
Frequently, Alpha’s representatives had to speak to several people at Iota before the issue
was understood and resolved. Noticeably, the staff did not have the expertise to deliver
quality service. The Vice President of Global Infrastructure complained that the charges
were excessive for the level of service Alpha was receiving:
“As in Iota the problem that we ran into was that their expertise was not
great in UK but now you had one operator or two operators sitting there
and now you are trying to talk through a problem and nobody knows what
you are talking about. But that’s the service you are paying for. Even
though you are paying prime dollar but that’s what you are getting.”
On one occasion, someone at Iota had accidentally pulled some cables and
unplugged Alpha’s server. Consequently, Alpha lost access to its applications and
suffered financial losses. On other occasions, Iota suffered power outages and again
brought Alpha’s systems down. Even though Iota had a first rate infrastructure, Alpha’s
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former CIO contended that the system availability in Alpha’s contract suffered frequent
problems and often was below the levels stipulated in the SLA:
“The best way I can say that is system availability, and there were periods
when the system would be down, or would be available only 80% when it
supposed to be like 95. So there would be a month or two in a year in
which it was well below of where we all wanted it to be. So in that sense I
can’t say that they were reliable. But they had a first class operation. It
was big and they were doing work for a lot of different companies, and all
that. So they had the infrastructure to accommodate it.”
Whenever there was a service issue, Iota always referred to the SLA and only
addressed the problems that were specified in the contract. Alpha was billed additionally
for all other requests. Iota was unhappy because Alpha had many small applications
running on its servers and Iota had to provide support for all of them. It sometimes
necessitated contacting the software manufactures, and Iota always tried to charge extra
for those services. The Global Telecom Program Manager did not think Iota’s staff was
willing to help when Alpha had concerns:
“They would go to little things and there was less willingness to help, they
would always go back to the stamp of approval, to the contract.”
Interestingly enough, not everyone at Alpha was completely disappointed with
Iota’s service quality. On several occasions, Iota proved itself as a competent data center
operator. The Senior System Administrator believed Iota tried to follow the structure and
praised the provider on the fact that the data was never lost. Even though there were
system and server failures, Iota provided a good back up service and was always able to
recover the lost data:
“Next point is Iota strongly followed our procedure, especially for the
back up. You know we outsourced our information to Iota and we nevernever lose data. If system crashed we were able to recover from the back
up which means the back up taken by Iota was good. And the procedures
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to take the back up offsite also was good. And the procedure to restore the
back up was good. Really good.”
Poor service quality on the part of Iota caused some financial losses at Alpha.
On one occasion, the services were down for a full week, and Alpha-Europe was forced
to recruit a third party to support its business activities during the system outage. Alpha
also relied on the same third party when it had to repair certain things that Iota was not
willing to do because it was not in the contract. In the experience of the IS Director for
Europe, Iota was unable to support Alpha at the required level:
“But also we lost money because we had to pay third party extra to
support us because the systems weren’t either available or they didn’t do
what they were supposed to do. In some cases they lost complete site so
we had no availability, in other cases is they lost complete service for a
period of days and in one case it was actually a week. So you know it was
a whole range of problems all to do with their inability to support us.”
Alpha maintained a record of all service issues and system failures caused by Iota.
Whenever Iota provoked financial losses for Alpha, because of poor service, Alpha tried
to impose financial penalties on Iota. The former CIO estimated that by the time the
contract was terminated, Iota owed Alpha around U.S. $75,000 for failure to provide the
quality and responsiveness stipulated in the service level agreement:
“Iota faltered on their service levels that they were supposed to give us,
you know, how much of the system will be available, the response times,
things like that, that you typically have in all of our contracts. But anyway,
what happened was Iota was, I want to say around 50 to 75 thousand
dollars US in penalties with Alpha from contractual arrangements.”
Trust in the Provider
Because Iota delivered mediocre service quality on the contract, Alpha found
itself needing to monitor the provider’s activities. It created extra work for Alpha’s
personnel, to always double check that the required updates were performed, data was
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backed up, and the system was running at its full capacity. The Senior System
Administrator wanted to be confident that the systems were running according to Alpha’s
requirements and used to frequently check Iota’s performance:
“It is always double checking what Iota is doing to guarantee that the
service for Alpha is always good, and I to make sure that everything is ok.
But I think the natural is that if you outsource your system I suspect you
need you can’t be confident at 100% for the outsourced company. Always
to double check by yourself to be sure that what you are looking is there.”
Poor service quality undermined the trustworthiness of Iota in terms of Alpha’s
expectations of the provider, to deliver a satisfactory service. The mistakes were so
frequent that Alpha could no longer trust Iota to maintain the applications and data
reliably. The former CIO expected honesty from the provider, yet realized that the service
may suffer because of the incompetence of Iota’s personnel:
“So we didn’t distrust each other in terms of just they were honest. But
they weren’t competent enough when things really went wrong their
operation staff, not the management, their operation staff didn’t manage
problems very well on several occasions.”
The relationship between Alpha and Iota deteriorated over the duration of the
contract. Consequently, the trust between the partners either never developed or
weakened over time as well. By the time the Director of IT Operations joined Alpha and
got involved in the relationship with Iota, he could not trust Iota to perform in Alpha’s
best interest:
“No, it was obvious we couldn’t trust them to run things. And I have to
assume that things have deteriorated over the years to the point that they
just really didn’t give a care anymore.”
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Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship
The relationship between Iota and Alpha at the inception of the contract was very
congenial. Both parties were satisfied with the details of the outsourcing arrangement.
Alpha was happy to gain IS expertise that was missing within the organization and was
pleased with the timeliness and quality of the delivered services. Iota was happy to see a
significant income from servicing Alpha. Both companies were enthused about the
contract and were working hard to streamline the day-to-day operations of the agreement.
However, that contentment subsided as the partners encountered conflict along the way.
Alpha was no longer happy with the levels of service and Iota was not willing to deliver
extra services to Alpha. By the time the Director of IT Operations got involved with the
project, the relationship became hostile:
“I would think at the initial time of the contract it was probably very good.
I mean as most contracts usually when they start you are on your maiden
year and each is trying to figure out how to work with each other and you
have some give and take on both sides. Things are probably very ecstatic.
As things progressed I think it got to be very hostile, ok, up to the point of
me entering.”
The Director of IT Operations was not with Alpha when the Iota contract was
negotiated. But, from his conversation with other employees, he learned that Iota had a
certain expectation of increased service volume and as such, increased revenues as the
contract progressed.

However, Alpha was no longer interested in expanding its

agreements with Iota, and instead, was trying to exit the relationship. The Director of IT
Operations presumed that this unfulfilled promise may have caused some of Iota’s
discontentment:
“Which can also kind of drive your relationship to the dirt because
negotiating monetary values and things you can and it is perfectly business
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correct to give an implication of some expansion, some implied additional
functions that you may need.”
Goal Conflict
As was mentioned earlier, Alpha insisted that Iota follow the procedures
established at Alpha for data back up, server maintenance, application updates and other
activities. This meant that Iota had to provide a customized service to Alpha, and
frequently, Iota was not interested in modifying its business practices to satisfy just one
client. Iota wanted to keep customization to a minimum, to realize economies of scale.
These two different perspectives caused tension between Alpha and Iota. Alpha often
needed Iota to perform systems updates and maintenance over weekends, when it was
less costly for the business to have interruptions in service. However, frequently Iota
followed its own schedule of maintenance for all of its data center equipment, which at
times conflicted with Alpha’s needs. The Senior System Administrator described one
such occasion when Iota was performing generator testing and caused power outages for
Alpha’s equipment:
“When Iota did some tests in the tower, but not get informed just by email but not from the top management. You know sometimes you receive
a lot of e-mails but if you don’t read them you don’t know what is the
contents of the e-mails and what is the implication of the e-mails if Iota
applied this. Sometimes the e-mails were sent by not the top management
of Iota but by just low level people and we have ignored them. And the
consequences were that Iota started to test the generator when they break
down power it has cost us one day for the business was down. And we had
major disagreements with them.”
Major disagreements in the relationship centered around the service level
agreement. Alpha believed that Iota was not delivering the levels of service specified in
the SLA. On the other hand, Iota always referred to the SLA before performing any
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service requests to ensure that that particular type of request was part of the agreement.
The IS Director for Europe was disappointed with Iota’s inability to perform as
contracted:
“The major ones were about their inability to deliver against SLA, in
terms of very basic tasks like doing back up, and changing operating
system updates and so on. The major disagreements were all around their
inability to deliver what they agreed by contract to deliver.”
While there was an inherent goal conflict in the arrangement between Alpha and
Iota, the relationship proceeded amicably for several years. But as soon as Alpha
announced it was exploring the possibility to terminate the contract, things started to get
confrontational. Iota did not want to lose the income arising from servicing Alpha, and
insisted on collecting the payments, until the end of the contract, regardless of Alpha’s
participation in the contract. Alpha, on the other hand, was not satisfied with the service
levels and arrangement’s costs and wanted out as soon as possible. The Director of IT
Operations felt the parties were trying to blame each other for the unsuccessful
relationship:
“But there was no harshness or no animosity in those people. It didn’t
really start out getting confrontational or disruptive until we actually told
them that we were interested in pulling out of their facility and then
blames started trying to be assigned.”
Voice Behavior
As part of the contract, Iota provided 24/7 monitoring of Alpha’s servers.
Whenever there was a problem with Alpha’s equipment, Iota informed the client of the
situation. Alpha’s Senior System Administrator was the first to be contacted and he then
escalated the issues to Alpha’s management if it were necessary. Depending on the
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severity of the problem and its impact on Alpha’s business, different layers of
management at both companies were involved in the resolution of the situation:
“The first point is I think for 24 hours monitoring. We get alerted at any
time because it is part of the agreement for major issues like server crash.
We have a person for escalation you know. The first contact it was me,
and then if the problem was not resolved maybe in 15 or 30 minutes and
we describe this to my manager here at Alpha and also to Iota manager.
We continue with escalation until we get to the top manager and the
decision must be taken.”
In addition to the daily problem reporting, Alpha and Iota held weekly and
monthly account management meetings to address contract issues. During those
meetings, day-to-day operational matters were discussed and resolved if necessary. All
unresolved conflicts were escalated to senior management of both Iota and Alpha, and
Alpha’s IS Director for Europe was the top decision maker on Alpha’s side:
“One was regular account management meetings and at those meetings, it
was a weekly meeting and then went to monthly meeting, the main
monthly meeting, so we had an opportunity to put our case through and
escalate through those meetings as far as account management process.
But also we had escalated through that operating for their service people,
their end service people we escalated problems as they occurred. So we
had two mechanisms, so as a problem occurred we could escalate its
severity, and if it is still not resolved then escalate to internal
management.”
On Iota’s side, the highest authority was the company’s Senior Director.
Alpha’s IS Director for Europe worked closely with Iota’s Senior Director to address
the complaints. As the service quality deteriorated, the IS Director for Europe found
himself meeting with Iota more frequently. He also had to personally travel to Iota’s
facilities to assess the situation and develop a plan for improvement:
“My relationship with them in terms of working problems and the account
management and meeting their Senior director. Basically what happened
especially toward the end, not toward the end even in the middle of the
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contract it happened, we escalated to their senior management several
times, we met them several times, we went to their location in
Birmingham. We discussed the issues, we came up with a plan to put it
right, but still nothing happened.”
Once a month Iota sent Alpha a formal report that listed all service requests,
system problems and resolutions during the prior month. The report contained detailed
information on the time of the incident, individuals involved, efforts to resolve the
situation and the time the service request was fulfilled. Through such reports, the former
CIO was able to assess the service quality of the outsourcing arrangement:
“And then once a month, I believe it was once a month they would give us
a report of all the problems for the prior thirty days and their status, it was
called in at 8, here is the problem, it was fixed by this date, so the details
on all of these issues we would get from them in writing every month.”
When Alpha first considered backsourcing, it informally approached Iota to
discuss possible options. The contract did not have a termination clause, and Alpha was
required to continue with the contract, or at least continue paying Iota. At that point,
Alpha sent formal letters to Iota notifying them of its intent to terminate the relationship.
Iota responded by specifying the requested termination fees. Multiple letters traveled
back and forth between the senior management, in an attempt to arrive at a mutually
acceptable solution. The Director of IT Operations had a chance to review those letters
and described the communication as quite unflattering:
“Prior to me getting involved there was some verbal discussion, I guess
that you would consider informal. And there was also some formal
discussion at a CEO, CIO letter of exchange level. But I do know that
there was some formal exchange in the letters because I’ve seen the letters
that went back and forth. And in most cases it was very business like, very
to the point, not too complimentary on either side. Because it was always
at the point when they were trying to associate blame with other side.”

176

In its attempt to exit the relationship Alpha relied heavily on documented
service levels. All the prior reports from Iota, showing frequent problems with the
service, were used to demonstrate inadequate service quality and reasons for
termination. Iota was previously aware of various issues and now faced a client who
wanted to end the relationship because of Iota’s unsatisfactory performance. The IS
Director for Europe believed regular account management significantly helped Alpha
support its claims against Iota:
“Because we had account management, one of the things that was actually
to be in place was regular account management both from a service point
of view but also from a commercial point of view. And because we had
that on a regular basis, things like this I prepared the ground well in
advance by saying to them we are not happy with the service, we asked
them to improve and if you don’t we are going to walk. And I was pretty
honest with them well in advance of this happening. So it wasn’t shock to
them. They knew this was coming. They did have problems with other
clients, they lost other clients for the same reasons anyway. So that wasn’t
surprise to them.”
To amicably end the relationship, Iota wanted to receive a lump-sum termination
fee, accounting for minimum monthly payments for the rest of the contract term. In
return, Alpha used documentation of system failures to demonstrate damage to the
company and requested a credit from Iota. Because Alpha possessed thorough records of
service levels, it was able to negotiate a reduced termination fee. Alpha’s former CIO
agreed to continue to pay Iota as long as Alpha required its services, but only for the
actual services without a base minimum fee:
“The way we negotiated with them, we went back and said “OK. We want
out two years early. And we don’t want to have to pay our minimums
because the volume actually went down instead of up on the monthly
limited billing.” And what we said was we’d forgive the 75,000 dollars
that would be an immediate debt that we sort of wanted to get credit on if
you will let us have an early termination without penalty and allow us to
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only pay for the volume and the DASD and whatever we use but no more.
They agreed to that.”
Multiple relationship factors played a role in the decision to backsource Iota’s
contract. Service quality declined throughout the time of the contract, because of the
unwillingness to address the concerns and the incompetence of Iota’s personnel, which
may have been due to high staff turnover rates at Iota. Alpha and Iota were never able to
resolve the innate goal conflict with Alpha focusing on its needs and Iota concentrating
on the benefits to its business processes. Poor service quality necessitated frequent
monitoring of the service by Alpha, and undermined building trust between two parties.
As a result, overall satisfaction with the relationship was not high throughout the contract
and then took a deep plunge when Alpha embarked on a backsourcing project.
Comprehensive service records and frequent communication, helped Alpha to end the
relationship on financially acceptable terms.
Emerging Themes
Power
The decision to backsource the Alpha-Iota contract was a result of structural
changes that happened within Alpha and led to the redefinition of Alpha’s business
strategy and role of IS. These structural changes shifted the power distribution within
Alpha. The new arrangement eliminated the position of the CIO for Alpha-Europe and
replaced it with a CIO for Alpha overall. The authority and decision making rights were
centralized at the corporate headquarters in the United States. The new corporate
executives made the decision to backsource the Alpha-Iota contract as part of the
consolidation of IS activities.
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The new executives justified the termination of the Alpha-Iota contract for
inadequate service quality and high costs. The European IS personnel, on the other hand,
perceived the contract as fairly successful. The Senior System Administrator, who was
based in France, believed the backsourcing decision was first and foremost driven by the
corporate decision makers, and had nothing to do with the quality of the arrangement:
“The Europeans in the beginning when we outsourced to Iota we were
happy to be honest. Then Americans said we don’t like to outsource.”
The European personnel were not happy with the decision to backsource the
Alpha-Iota contract. There was a fear of losing control over IS activities. The new
organizational structure imposed new roles and forced the European staff to work with
the Americans, who were suddenly in charge. The U.S. executives exercised their
decision making authority and rationalized the backsourcing decision. Confrontation
between the headquarters and the local personnel was the biggest challenge during the
backsourcing transition, according to the Director of IT Operations:
“In Europe the biggest challenge there was that the business was very
comfortable with having it in their back yard…And the people that were
doing it from U.K. side were very confrontational.”
The CIO of Alpha-Europe left as a result of the centralization, and some IS
positions were altered to fit the new structure. The staff of Alpha-Europe, who used to be
responsible for the Alpha-Iota contract, lost their authority. One of the informants was
even demoted from the Unix and Oracle Manager in Europe, to the Senior System
Administrator as a result of backsourcing. He complained about his new position and new
politics at Alpha:
“I was downgraded to a Senior Systems Administrator with a new politics
of Alpha.”
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Integration of Perspectives
Many different factors were involved in Alpha’s decision to backsource its
contract with Iota. There was some disagreement among the informants as to the reasons
for the backsourcing of Iota’s contract (Table 6.4). Two informants claimed that changes
in the role of IS, and centralization of IS functions in particular, were the driving force
behind the backsourcing decision. Two other informants believed that poor service
quality necessitated backsourcing. Centralization, however, was also mentioned by one
informant as the secondary reason for backsourcing, while low service quality was not.
High costs of the existing outsourcing arrangement were the most popular secondary
reason for backsourcing with one informant assigning costs to the primary role.
Table 6.4 Alpha – Iota Contract: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant
Informant
Former CIO
Vice President Global
Infrastructure
IS Director for Europe
Director of IT Operations
Global Telecom Program
Manager
Senior System Administrator

Primary Reason
Consolidation
Poor service quality

Secondary Reason
High Cost
High Cost

Poor service quality
Regain control
High Cost

High Cost
Centralization
Regain control

Centralization

Management
changes/Power

Poor service quality during the contract contributed to the need to regain control
over the information systems. Iota was struggling to address Alpha’s concerns promptly,
and on several occasions, had systems failures which caused financial and business
problems for Alpha. Alpha felt they had low control over the actual activities carried out
by Iota. Internal management changes lead to the redefinition of Alpha’s business
strategy, and as a result, the repositioning of IS as a global function and consolidation of
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IS activities in one location. High costs exacerbated the overall dissatisfaction with the
relationship and justified the backsourcing decision.
By informants’ accounts, the contract with Iota was very expensive (Table 6.5).
Nevertheless, the financial aspect of the relationship only played a secondary role in the
backsourcing decision. It was a combination of all other factors that undermined the
relationship and changes in the strategy that led to backsourcing. But as for any business,
cost considerations were important to Alpha and backsourcing helped reduce the
company’s expenses. The IS Director for Europe insisted that the financial aspect was not
the main reason for backsourcing:
“I don’t think it was even the financial aspect of it, I mean the financial
aspects came into the thing.”
Similarly, the Global Telecom Program Manager suggested that reductions in
contract fees would not have changed Alpha’s decision to backsource. Interestingly
enough, it was the same person who named cost savings as the primary reason for
backsourcing. His comments also demonstrate that centralization was the main reason for
backsourcing Iota’s contract, as he refers to the transition as ‘centralization’:
“Even if they would have dropped the price in half, I am pretty sure we
would have centralized anyway, backsourced anyway.”
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Table 6.5 Alpha – Iota Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant
Informant

Former CIO Vice President IS Director Director of IT
Global
for Europe Operations
Infrastructure

Global
Senior System
Telecom
Administrator
Program
Construct
Manager
Cost Advantage Cost savings
Cost savings:Cost savings: Cost savings: Cost savings:
Expensive
Expensive
Expensive
Expensive
contract
contract
contract
contract
Switching Cost Termination
Settlement, Short term
Transfer costs, Termination
fees, transfer
transfer costs costs, long
data center
fees, transfer
costs
term savings costs
costs
Asset
Not asset
Asset specific:
Specificity
specific:
Provider had to
Provider only learn Alpha’s
hosted data
procedures
Change in the Strategic
Change in needs Centralizatio Centralization Centralization Globalization
Role of IS
business
n
Centralization
change:
consolidation
Loss of Control Low control: Some control
No control: Some control: Some control: Some control:
low response with monitoring provider was Alpha made application
provider
time, frequent software
not in control decisions, but level good, low followed orders,
reminders
either
slow provider on level of
but slow
equipment
response
Structural
New CEO,
CIO was a big New
Changes
CIO who
factor
management
didn’t believe
experienced
in outsourcing
being providers
Service Quality Low service Low expertise, System
Initially good, Not too
Followed
levels, poor poor response outages, got but declined flexible,
procedures,
response
times
gradually
over time
unwilling to never lost data,
times, outages
worse
help
prompt, but high
turnover
Trust
Had trust: but
Had no trust Had no trust Had trust
Frequent double
staff not
checking
competent
Goal Conflict
Could not Confrontation Not many:
Extra charges,
deliver SLA many conflicts only pricing unwillingness to
issues
do extra
Satisfaction
Good
Good in the Good in the
Frustration
Good
business
beginning, beginning, but
relationship in
relationship,
later
got hostile
the beginning
bad contract
problems
Voice Behavior Documented
Account
Written
Escalation,
problem
management communication maintenance
reports
meetings
policies
Power
Europe was
Americans did
confrontational
not want to
outsource
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Even though there was no perfect agreement in the comments of the informants,
there was only one category (asset specificity) that the two informants did not agree on at
all (Table 6.6). Average agreement in the descriptions of all constructs was 82%. Overall,
the accounts of all six individuals had many common threads and helped depict a
complete picture of the relationship between Iota and Alpha and bring together the true
reasons for backsourcing of Iota’s contract.
Table 6.6 Alpha – Iota Contract: Informant Agreement
Construct

Cost Advantage
Switching Cost
Asset Specificity
Change in the Role of IS
Loss of Control
Structural Changes
Service Quality
Trust
Goal Conflict
Satisfaction
Voice Behavior
Power

Total Number
of Coded
Quotes
25
14
2
19
24
8
31
8
10
18
19
7

Number of Informants
who had Quotes

Agreement on
Construct

5
5
2
6
6
3
6
5
4
5
4
2

100% (5/5)
100% (5/5)
0% (0/2)
100% (6/6)
67% (4/6)
100% (3/3)
83% (5/6)
60% (3/5)
75% (3/4)
100% (5/5)
100% (4/4)
100% (2/2)

In summary, the decision to backsource the contract with Iota was first and
foremost driven by the centralization that was taking place at Alpha. Such centralization
was a result of internal management changes at Alpha and a shift of decision making
authority to corporate management who did not believe in outsourcing. Poor service
quality and high costs of the contract contributed to the dissatisfaction with the
relationship. Through backsourcing Alpha was able to regain control over its IS
applications and provide better support to its personnel.
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Contract Three – Sigma
Alpha-Europe outsourced its telecommunication network administration to Sigma
in August of 1998. The contract was negotiated by the IS Director in Europe and
involved telecommunication lines, equipment, and management of the network for Alpha
offices in Continental Europe and UK. Alpha-Europe did not have prior experience in
negotiating telecommunication contracts with an outsourcing provider, and chose Sigma
because it was based in the same country as Alpha’s IS Director in Europe. Sigma was
also affiliated with a large European telecommunications carrier, which afforded it some
credibility.
Economic Considerations
Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement
Sigma owned all the routers, switches and other telecommunication equipment
that supported Alpha’s European network. Sigma provided access, for Alpha, to the
European backbone and leased its own telecommunication lines out to Alpha locally. The
asset specificity of the outsourcing arrangement was low, as all lines and equipment were
the property of Sigma. Alpha required access to the network in multiple countries, and
Sigma had the ability to provide that within Europe.
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing
The pricing of the outsourcing contract with Sigma was based on the number of
nodes that Alpha had on its network. Those nodes included all the computers, servers,
hubs, switches and routers connected to the network. The network traffic volume was not
part of the contract pricing, and even if there was no volume, Alpha had to pay the fees.
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Such pricing put Alpha at a disadvantage because as the company grew it could not
increase the network capacity. The former CIO felt the contract with Sigma was not well
negotiated to begin with:
“And also the contract was very expensive. In other words, other
companies could have done it less expensively. And I think we could have
bid on the job a little bit more.”
Alpha – Europe did not have experience in negotiating network contracts and
selected Sigma as a provider because it was a subsidiary of a large European
telecommunications company. The agreement was poorly structured and Alpha – Europe
had no knowledge of the network status or its capacity. Sigma had full control over the
network and the traffic volume. The Senior System Administrator believed Sigma was
exhibiting some opportunism and was overcharging Alpha:
“But I am convinced because from Sigma I think they understood that
Alpha had no knowledge in the network in Alpha and may be they take
this opportunity and they have charged us maximum for this.”
Overall, the contract proved to be very expensive because it was based on the
number of nodes on the network. Alpha-Europe continued to expand throughout the time
of the contract and had to pay increasing amounts to Sigma. The Global Telecom
Manager expected the costs of the contract to decrease as the contract went on, because
typically telecommunication costs go down, yet Alpha-Europe saw its network costs
continuously increase throughout the contract:
“And apart from that it was also quite costly. But on the other hand, in
general telecommunication costs go down a little bit during the
relationship.”
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Switching Costs of Backsourcing
Taking into consideration the exorbitant costs, Alpha decided to exit the
relationship and pursue backsourcing. Once the backsourcing decision was made, Alpha
hired four network engineers to design the company’s new global network. The new
engineers also took over the network management that was previously provided by Sigma
in Europe. The Global Telecom Manager felt the transition expense was justified by the
excessive costs that Alpha was incurring during the contract with Sigma:
“Because the company we did business with charged us a lot of money for
the management of our routers, and that is the fact that I had to hire four
experienced engineers, that cost us still much lower than management feel
they charged for managing all of our routers. So, Alpha hired experienced
network engineers, not only to build a network but also afterwards to
manage it. And then Alpha has hired its own network support stuff to
maintain network equipment and install network equipment, configure it,
monitor it”
During the backsourcing, Alpha incurred significant expenses for the set up of the
new global network. Its network engineers had to travel to various locations across
Europe to physically set up the equipment and test the network. While there was no
additional salary expense because the engineers were on Alpha’s payroll, the company
incurred many travel costs. The IS Director in Europe was overseeing the set up of the
new network:
“We had people flying all over the place if you can imagine, we had
expense for hotels, people cost was minimal because it is our people. We
had costs of canceling the network, we had to cancel some links so we had
termination costs, we had costs where we had during the migration we had
two networks running parallel, so we had double cost for that. So yes we
had a whole range of both internal and external costs.”
Even though there were a lot of work and switching costs involved in the
backsourcing, Alpha proceeded with its plans to terminate the relationship. While it built
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its own network, Alpha continued to purchase network services from Sigma. It
discontinued the outsourced nodes slowly, as the new Alpha-owned nodes were added to
the network. The Global Telecom Manager’s staff spent several months installing the
equipment and testing the network:
“Obviously Alpha had to buy network equipment, where before it was part
of the service. So it was a major investment. We had travel cost, we had
people traveling across Europe installing all the equipment, car rentals,
flights, hotels, everything. And always when you do this because it takes
multiple months to implement all the sites, for a while you basically run
two networks in parallel. So you have double network costs, because you
can not terminate the old link before you are sure that the new link is
working.”
During the transition period, one potential expense was the early termination fee.
Initially Alpha considered ending the contract prematurely but was stopped by the high
penalties for breaching the contract. Since building a new network took a significant
amount of time, Alpha continued the relationship with Sigma while slowly discontinuing
the unnecessary circuits. It was cost effective since the contract was priced per node, so
Alpha avoided the early termination fees, yet cut its interim expenses by reducing the
number of nodes. However, Sigma continued to charge Alpha for some discontinued
nodes and when the contract was terminated, Sigma tried to collect around 80,000 euros
through court. Obviously, Alpha was not willing to pay for the nodes that did not exist,
and brought charges against Sigma for mismanaging its network. The companies got
involved in a lengthy legal battle, but in the end the parties settled out of court. According
to Alpha’s former CIO, Alpha did not have to pay any extra fees:
“So in that case no money changed hands, but to give you an idea of the
volume, I believe at one time they felt that we owed them something like
80,000 euros, something like that. But we proved to them finally that we
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don't owe you 80,000, in fact if nothing else you would owe us, because of
the harm that you have caused the company.”
Transition to a new global network significantly improved network capacity for
Alpha. In fact, the new set up allowed four times the capacity previously offered by
Sigma. At the same time the costs of the internal network management coupled with the
fees for purchased bandwidth from another provider, were dramatically lower than the
price charged by Sigma. Clearly, the contract with Sigma was overpriced by as much as
50%. The IS Director in Europe emphasized the importance of the cost factor in the
decision to backsource Sigma’s contract:
“As a result of this change we quadrupled, we more than quadrupled our
capacity in terms of our network and we actually are now paying slightly
less than what we paid before. So you can imagine if the costs were
enormous, there was no other way we could save we had to upgrade and
get the four time the capacity that we required. And if we stayed with
Sigma it was going to cost us a lot more than we pay, more meaning as
much as 150-200% of what we have today. So the costs were actually
important.”
The decision to backsource Sigma’s contract was based heavily on considerations
of economic efficiency. The contract was poorly negotiated and very expensive. The fees
continued to escalate throughout the time of the contract and Alpha made the decision to
end the relationship. There were significant switching costs associated with the
backsourcing transition. Despite these hefty costs, Alpha was convinced that the new
internally managed network would allow Alpha to reduce its network costs and enjoy
better capacity and service. In fact, after the transfer was complete, Alpha successfully
integrated Europe into its global network and reduced the costs of network
communication by more than 50 percent.
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Strategic Considerations
Internal Structural Changes
Termination of the network outsourcing contract with Sigma was part of the
company wide reorganization at Alpha. The new CEO redefined and restructured the
company’s logistics business and pursued a globalization strategy. The new approach
also included consolidated information systems. It was decided to design a global
corporate telecommunications network and manage it from one location. Alpha’s former
CIO was working on centralizing the network:
“Similar to the other ones, because I was consolidating all my network,
management and operations under one infrastructure kind of control in
[corporate headquarters], I was able to pull it in, and manage it from nodes
in England and [corporate headquarters].”
Redefinition of the Role of IS
As part of the globalization process, Alpha also replaced all of its legacy
applications with new enterprise wide systems. At the corporate headquarters, a new data
center was built to house the new financial applications, as well as the main logistics
application that tracked Alpha’s services and customers. Alpha decided to serve these
applications globally from its corporate headquarters. To accomplish that, Alpha
designed its own network and purchased telecommunication lines across the Atlantic
Ocean from a large telecommunication services provider. The IS Director in Europe
described the changes that were taking place:
“We were going through a large program in Europe of rolling out SAP and
we were rolling out CRM Siebel. And as a result we needed a lot more
capacity in place and those products required a lot more than what we had
at that time. We also had a data center in [corporate headquarters] where
those products were actually based. So we had transatlantic links that
needed to be upgraded. So we had a technology change as well as it was
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an upgrade to our systems across Europe. It was our change program. But
we needed to make a change anyhow.”
Centralization of the network administration signified a new approach to the
management of telecommunications at Alpha. Working with the outsourcing provider,
Sigma, Alpha paid for the telecommunication lines, for the network equipment and for
management of its network. The new strategy involved purchased telecommunication
lines, but Alpha-owned network equipment, and internal personnel to design, test and
administer the network. The Global Telecom Manager supervised the engineering team
working on the global network project:
“Alpha then decided to go globally, especially when they decided to
implement SAP. They would have to have a communications network
spanning at least Europe and the US and Canada. So it was decided to
build a global network. So the change in there, both the change the whole
Alpha world and change in the business world to become a global
company with respect to network specific. Change from a model where a
service provider managed both the network links and the equipment to go
to a model where the service provider just supplies you with links but you
provide the equipment, you install it and manage it etc.”
Redefinition of the business strategy at Alpha resulted in consolidation of the
corporate information systems and changes in the management of its network. The new
model relied on internal engineering staff and consequently necessitated backsourcing of
the outsourcing contract with Sigma. However, Alpha’s former CIO did not see the
centralization in Alpha’s IS as the main driver in backsourcing of Sigma’s contract. He
felt there were other compounding factors that played a role in this decision:
“I wouldn't say centralization was the main driver. It was just one of
them.”
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Loss of Control over IS
Sigma was in charge of the network equipment and managed the assignment of
the network addresses for Alpha. When Alpha wanted to add a new node to the network
it had to submit a request to Sigma and wait till it was completed. Alpha was not able to
make modifications to the network on its own or reroute the traffic when necessary. The
Global Telecom Manager believed that one of the benefits of backsourcing was increased
control over the network:
“And at that point it was also decided to get more control and management
of the equipment ourselves. And I see that as a vital point to manage it inhouse, because there are so many requests for changes that we can react
very quickly. It's impossible in my opinion to outsource that. You can
never achieve the level of service that we have here.”
Network capacity and network utilization rates are important factors in network
management. Unfortunately, under the Sigma contract, Alpha did not have access to the
network equipment and could not evaluate the network capacity and utilization. Those
tools were only available to Sigma employees. Frequently, Alpha experienced slow
network traffic, yet it had no way to assess the reasons for the delays or fix the problems.
The Global Telecom Manager complained about limited flexibility in network
management as one of the problems of Sigma contract:
“We didn't have any flexibility, so we could not for example see the
utilization of the network. There was not a lot of tools provided to see
actually how we were using the network. So it was pretty much blank, if
the network was slow, we didn't know why. Because we didn't know if it's
slow because the provider has an issue, or is it slow because we over
utilize our links. We didn't know. So it was limited network management
tools and little flexibility by Alpha.”
Limited control and lack of flexibility on the network plagued the contract with
Sigma. Alpha struggled to make modifications to the network to address the changing
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requirements of its business. Because the company was growing, it was increasingly
difficult to make timely adjustments to its sprawling network. Changing from a managed
service to an internally administered network was one of the solutions to the problems
with the Sigma contract. The IS Director in Europe believed Alpha could never have
control in a managed environment:
“Did we have control? No, I don't think we did. I think the challenge with
the network, they were providing an outsourced service, they were
providing a managed network, not just the lines. They were also running
the routers and switches, they were running the hardware and software.
The challenge there is that you are never going to have control because
you are relying on their technicians to effect changes to a schedule that
meets their requirements which may not be yours.”
Quick access to the network and prompt modifications when necessary were
important to Alpha. It was relying on the network for the support of its logistics business
and customer billing. Losses in connectivity had a negative impact on Alpha’s business,
yet Alpha had no control over the repairs to the network. It could not even determine if
the problems occurred on Alpha’s side or Sigma’s side without further involvement from
the provider. The IS Director in Europe was frustrated with the limited control that he
had:
“If the network goes down it impacts my services, but I don't have control
over their technicians and their resources even though they contracted to
provide me a level of service. But the control from the management point
of view, so you are managing a service and the routers and switches, is
less than if you are doing it yourself.”
Loss of control over the telecommunication network was negatively affecting
Alpha’s business by restricting Alpha’s ability to quickly react to changes in its
environment. Frequently, loss of control over the outsourced activities impedes
company’s competitiveness (Lacity et al. 2001), especially when the outsourced activities
192

are critical to the business. According to IS Director in Europe, loss of control was an
important driver that influenced the backsourcing decision in the contract with Sigma:
“And another driver was that we wanted really, again we wanted a certain
level of control over the network, so we wanted to be able if a piece of
hardware goes down, we wanted to be able to monitor and we wanted to
be able to respond and fix as quickly as we could.”
Several strategic considerations played a role in the decision to backsource the
network management from Sigma. First of all, corporate changes necessitated shifts in
the positioning of IS in the company, and company wide globalization resulted in the
consolidation of information systems, including telecommunication networks. At the
same time, Alpha could not quickly respond to environmental changes and competitive
pressures in Europe because its IS network was outsourced. The provider, Sigma,
restricted access to the tools that provided detailed information on network utilization and
allowed its modification if necessary. The network was an important component in
tracking logistic operations and responding to customers requests. Loss of control over
the network management forced Alpha to realize the need for internal management of its
network.
Relationship Considerations
Service Quality of Outsourcing Arrangement
One of the main problems that troubled Sigma’s network management contract
was the inadequate service quality delivered by the provider. Most of Alpha’s complaints
stemmed from failures in network availability. When the network was down, it was
challenging to find a person within Sigma who was responsible for fixing the problem.
There was a lot of finger pointing at Sigma, yet little action to remedy the situation.
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Frequently Sigma was not even aware of the problems on the network until Alpha
brought it to their attention. Alpha’s former CIO criticized Sigma for lack of
responsibility and multiple mishaps in service:
“And the issue there was surely really bad service. The network would go
down, they wouldn't repair it, they didn't even know about it sometimes, it
just was a mess. I would say there were multiple occasions where they
didn't change the routing in time, or they weren't managing the switching
time, and so again on those network kind of things, the local DPT was
complaining about saying it's not our fault, then someone like say it's not
our fault, and then would be these guys who are supposed to manage the
whole thing say it's not their fault, but blaming the other guy. So, that
happened too many times.”
On several occasions the network downtime cost Alpha lost business revenues
and dissatisfied customers. When the network was slow or unavailable, Alpha’s staff
tried to address the issues with the provider and have the network back up and running
promptly. Sometimes the resolution was not available within the agreed time frame, and
Alpha sought reduction in outsourcing charges to account for Sigma’s poor performance.
However, Alpha’s Global Telecom Manager felt the reimbursements were not solving the
network problems and certainly did not help to repair the damage done to the business as
a result of the outages:
“Links connection goes down and it would not be repaired within the
agreed time frame. Although you can always escalate and get a little bit of
money back, but in my case it does not help me to get some money back if
I've got a major site down. The money that I get back does not weight
against damage that it is costing the business and also with users that are
going to complain and are unhappy. So from that perspective there were
some issues, I know that.”
Apart from frequent network failures, another problem that disrupted the service
was unknown capacity of the network. Alpha expected to have certain traffic volume on
the network, yet it could not control the actual capacity or even measure it. When Alpha
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experienced delays in network traffic, it felt that the telecommunication lines had lower
capacity than specified in the contract. Unfortunately, there were no performance reports
available from Sigma to prove one way or another. Alpha’s IS Director in Europe was
frustrated with Sigma’s poor performance:
“The networks went, they went down quite often, capacity was, the
capacity we were paying for wasn't provided, and also there wasn't really
performance reporting provided to us even though it was part of the
contract. There was a mixture of things. It all goes down to the lack of
performance and lack of reporting and availability of the network.”
Part of the problem with Sigma’s performance derived from the provider’s poor
managerial practices. While the staff may have been qualified for the job, there were no
clear procedures for troubleshooting the network, or policies, to assign responsibility for
fixing the problem to an individual or a team. The fact that the network was down quite
often certainly did not help either. Alpha’s former CIO admitted that there were some
knowledgeable employees at Sigma, yet the overall service was inadequate:
“Now they had some people in their organization that were very
competent good people. But the way they provided service was poor.”
The original contract was negotiated by the IS Director in Europe who was based
in the French offices of Alpha. Sigma was also located in France which made it easy for
the IS Director to communicate with the provider’s staff in their native language. Later in
the contract, another IS Director for Alpha-Europe was appointed who was based in the
UK and did not speak any French. Sigma was not prepared to work on an international
agreement and struggled when discussing the details of the contract and the problems in
English. The IS Director in Europe who was in charge of the contract felt that language
barrier posed a major difficulty in the relationship:
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“And they found it difficult, Sigma to support an international agreement
from an account management point of view and with someone who didn't
speak French. And that was one of the difficulties there.”
When problems surfaced, the communication between Sigma’s employees and
Alpha’s staff proved to be complicated. Most of the provider’s personnel did not speak
English well, and most Alpha employees did not speak French. A lack of good rapport
resulted in frequent misunderstandings and a strained relationship overall. Sigma
perceived Alpha as always unhappy and trying to end the relationship, while Alpha was
never content with Sigma’s performance. Alpha’s former CIO never personally met any
of the Sigma’s employees, and had to manage the contract through the IS Director in
Europe:
“I think it was just there was never any rapport between my management
team in Europe and them. It was like all in water. It was just a bad
relationship. They, I think, I personally never met any of them, but I think
what the situation was that they felt we were always trying to get out of an
agreement, and we always felt they were trying to keep us in agreement
that was really-really poor, and that we were stuck. Nobody was happy.”
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship
Sigma’s contract suffered from lack of performance and many conflicts, which
resulted in overall dissatisfaction and Alpha’s inability to control its own network and
business. Alpha’s former CIO contrasted Sigma’s contract with the relationship that
Alpha had with another provider, Kappa, where Alpha built an excellent rapport with the
provider and trusted the provider to always perform in Alpha’s best interest. Sigma’s
contract was a complete opposite, and Alpha’s former CIO could not recommend
partnering with Sigma again:
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“I'd say we'd never use them again, and I would say that was the situation
that was the opposite of Kappa where we did not feel we were able to
control. I think we felt we were pretty much at their mercy.”
Poor performance coupled with many conflicts put a strain on the relationship
between Alpha and Sigma. Alpha’s changing business requirements necessitated more
bandwidth and a stable network that could reliably support its customers. Sigma often
failed to conduct business and deliver the contracted services, according to the service
level agreement. Dissatisfaction with the outsourcing arrangement on the part of Alpha
resulted in reconsideration of the contract and a decision to exit the relationship and
pursue backsourcing. The IS Director in Europe was not pleased with Sigma’s overall
performance on the contract:
“Because the driver there, it was probably the driver there was one to do
with the lack of performance on their part and the lack of ability of
responding to our changing business, we needed more bandwidth, we
needed more capacity and we needed better performance. And they were
not able to do that, and wasn't providing the right SLA.”
Trust in the Provider
Because of repeatedly poor performance by Sigma, Alpha had to dedicate one of
its employees to continuously monitor the contractual performance of the provider.
Sigma claimed they were maintaining the network and performing the services according
to the SLA, yet there were frequent mistakes and network failures. The IS Director in
Europe did not have any trust in the provider, and as a result,, he had to assign one of the
staff members to supervise Sigma’s actions in order to ensure that Sigma was not taking
advantage of Alpha:
“The emphasis is on us, us Alpha to prove to them they weren't supplying
the adequate bandwidth for what we contracted. And luckily for us we did
happen to, so we were able to do that, and according to them they kept
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putting it right but it kept going wrong, it is almost a full time job. I asked
someone who was here full time to just keep monitoring what they were
providing which is not necessarily what you want. We didn't trust them at
all. They weren't really providing the capacity that we were paying for.”
Goal Conflict
While there were many conflicts throughout the term of the contract, the major
disagreement arrived when Alpha decided to end the relationship. As part of the
transition plan, Alpha was establishing its own network, thus duplicating an already
existing network of Sigma. When a new component was tested and ready for service,
Alpha transferred that part of the network, under its own management, and discontinued
the matching circuits on Sigma’s network. Nonetheless, Sigma continued to bill Alpha
for terminated circuits as the contract pricing was based on the number of nodes in
service. Financial disagreements culminated in a legal battle, which was later settled out
of court without much loss for Alpha. Alpha’s former CIO spent a lot of time negotiating
with Sigma over the billing issues associated with the discontinued circuits:
“But the other thing where there were some pretty big disagreements is we
would discontinue a circuit, they charged us so much per circuit. We
would discontinue a circuit, they would still keep billing us. And then
three-four-five months later we would say we were not going to pay the
bill because you overcharged us, they would say we don't have a record
that you discontinuing it. There were constantly arguments over
overcharge, undercharge of invoices, bills.”
The IS Director in Europe referred to the same conflict during his interview:
“We also notified them that several circuits that we no longer required we
wanted to have them canceled. And there also was some issue in terms of
invoices, some of the environments, some of the circuits across Europe
that were decommissioned, we were still being charged for it. So these
disagreements were very much financial disagreements. We started with
what was promised and they existed through out the contract, and then on
top of that started having commercial, financial issues. We were invoices
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for things we didn't have, and we were invoiced for things that were
terminated.”
Voice Behavior
To resolve the conflicts, Alpha’s personnel contacted Sigma by phone or e-mail.
The latter was the most popular way to communicate with Sigma as it always provided a
trail of communication to fall back to if needed. As the problems escalated with Sigma,
Alpha resorted to more written communication to document Sigma’s failure to comply
with the contract. Most written communications were at the senior level as Sigma
consistently failed to address Alpha’s concerns on the lower levels. Alpha’s former CIO
served as the highest level for problem escalation:
“E-mail, almost constantly. Towards the end it go to where it was in
writing and, you know, legal, we are going to take it to court kind of stuff.
But it was typically any time there was a specific disagreement it would be
e-mail or something in writing as opposed to just a phone call. There were
phone calls certainly but e-mails were sent to their management and to our
management so that there was a record of what was going on and what
was happening.”
In Europe the highest authority for problem escalation was the IS Director in
Europe. He was in charge of the Sigma contract, and all IS personnel in Europe reported
to him. The IS Director in Europe traveled to France several times to meet with the staff
of Sigma and address the issues around the contract. However, he felt Sigma was not
responsive to Alpha’s concerns and was not very cooperative in a relationship. He
speculated that one of the reasons for Sigma’s lack of attention to Alpha may have been
the small size of the contract:
“I think to be honest I don't think that from a relationship point of view
and the account management point of view enough was done by Sigma.
Even though I even went into France a couple of time, I flew into France
because we had an office there. And I made an effort of meeting them
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every time I was there, but it wasn't a two way relationship. I don't think
also we were that big account for them. There wasn't really a sizable
amount of revenue in the grand scheme of things, it wasn't really that great
for them. So the amount of effort put on the account was pretty limited.”
There was a standard procedure for communicating network problems to the
provider. Every issue had to be logged in by one of the Alpha’s employees and then the
provider was contacted with the request for service. On the provider’s side, the staff was
also supposed to record the problem and then try to address it promptly. If the problem
was not addressed to the satisfaction of Alpha, the IS Director in Europe contacted the
management of Sigma, seeking resolution. On several occasions the IS Director in
Europe had to personally meet with Sigma’s personnel to deal with the troubled network:
“So any problems that we had, we had to log them, escalate them and they
also had a regular accounting, a regular event account management. So we
had those two methods of escalation though problem management and
through their accounting procedures. I also escalated through the senior
management and I also went and saw them several times in France about
this.”
Overall, there was little communication between Alpha and Sigma other than to
report a problem. Internally, Sigma seemed to suffer from poor communication as well.
Sigma was slow to respond to problems because there was lack of structured
communication internally, and as a result, a lack of responsiveness when clients needed
help. Alpha’s former CIO complained about Sigma’s communication patterns:
“And I would say that was basically where there was very little
communication other than may be a phone call every once in a while.
And there wasn't a lot of communication upwards or downwards within
that company where they would be responsiveness if there was a contract
or some big issue. And certainly not very responsive to us when we had an
issue or concern to be dealt with.”
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When it was decided to end the relationship with Sigma, Alpha sent a formal
letter to the provider informing them of the decision to terminate the contract. The IS
Director in Europe personally met with the management of Sigma to work out a transition
plan. Part of the new arrangement involved renting the lines from another
telecommunication provider that could offer the services globally. Sigma was notified of
the upcoming stages in the transition and the proposed time table for the transfer was
made available to them. The IS Director in Europe oversaw the transition:
“The first stage they were notified that we are moving the network away.
And we notified them both verbally, we've met with their managers and
told them and discussed it, and we also notified them by e-mail and mail
as we had to. And it was very much a notification that we were going to
transfer services to someone else and we worked with them for a period of
weeks putting that together.”
The second component of the transition entailed the transfer of the previously
leased equipment and network management under Alpha’s internal supervision. By then,
Alpha already designed a new network and purchased bandwidth from the new provider.
In stages, the new equipment was installed in Europe by Alpha’s team of engineers. After
scrupulous testing, the new network components were added to the global network and
the old components were terminated. The IS Director in Europe recalled that Sigma was
not very cooperative during the transition and even continued to bill Alpha:
“Stage two was once we gave them notice, we still have a period of
transitioning and in that period of transitioning they started overcharging
us for circuits and refusing to apply credit against invoices, you know
things we were misinvoiced.”
When Alpha refused to pay for the terminated circuits, Sigma threatened to bring
a lawsuit against Alpha for non-payment. Alpha was able to demonstrate that Sigma was
notified about the termination of each of the circuits in question and the charges were not
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substantiated. Sigma also claimed that Alpha breached the contract by exiting before its
expiration. In reality, Alpha simply continued to reduce the number of nodes in service,
and slowly phased out of the relationship. Yet Alpha stayed with Sigma through the end
of the contract, thus avoiding early termination fees. Alpha’s former CIO had to rely on
Alpha’s internal legal counsel to resolve the confrontation:
“[Alpha] sent them a letter of termination, and that was one where we
showed it to our attorneys, internal attorneys, there wasn't a law suit but
basically they were claiming that we owed them money because we left,
we walked from the contract before it was done.”
The Alpha and Sigma relationship was troubled by many conflicts. Alpha was not
satisfied with the network capacity and frequently felt that Sigma was not addressing its
concerns in a timely manner. From the technical perspective, the network suffered from
frequent downtimes and as a result, Alpha’s business was hurting financially because of
the delays. The communication was difficult between Alpha and Sigma because of the
language barrier and overall lack of rapport between the two companies. Alpha even had
to designate a full time employee to monitor the contractual behavior of Sigma to ensure
that Alpha received the stipulated services. When Alpha tried to voice its concerns about
the service, Sigma perceived it as another attempt on the part of Alpha to escape from the
contract. Sigma was never responsive to Alpha’s requests and was not cooperative during
the transition.
Emerging Themes
Power
The decision to backsource the Alpha-Sigma contract was made by the executives
at the corporate headquarters of Alpha. The original contract was negotiated and signed
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by Alpha-Europe executives, but due to changes in corporate structure, it was transferred
under the headquarters’ authority. Backsourcing of the Alpha-Sigma contract happened
as part of the consolidation of the IS activities and the centralization of power at the
global headquarters. The Senior System Administrator suggested politics was involved in
the decision to backsource the Alpha-Sigma contract:
“It is a company and it is hard to say this and to prove this. There is
always politics for the people.”
Integration of Perspectives
The backsourcing of Sigma’s contract was motivated by several different
considerations. First, the contract was very expensive and the costs continued to increase
throughout the time of the contract because it was priced per node on the network. All
interviewees named high cost as one of the reasons for the backsourcing (Table 6.7).
Despite high switching costs required to build a new network in Europe and lease
telecommunication lines from another provider, the termination of Sigma’s contract was
justified by almost 50% in cost savings.
Table 6.7 Alpha – Sigma Contract: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant
Informant
Former CIO
Global Telecom Manager
IS Director in Europe
Senior System Administrator

Primary Reason
High cost
High cost
High cost
Management
changes/Power

Secondary Reason
Poor service quality
Regain control
Poor service quality
High Cost

Second, the important concern for Alpha was inadequate service quality
demonstrated

by

frequent

network

failures,

low

network

capacity,

and

an

unresponsiveness of the provider’s personnel. Frequent conflicts, because of
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disappointing service, undermined the trust between the companies and led to Alpha’s
overall dissatisfaction with the contract. Poor performance also contributed to several
business losses for Alpha and as such, left the client helpless in the situation. Loss of
control over its network was a concern for Alpha and was identified by one of the
respondents as the second most important reason for the termination of the Sigma
relationship.
While both high costs and inadequate service quality seemed to be salient for the
backsourcing decision, a majority of the respondents agreed that cost was the dominant
factor in this situation. Specifically, the IS Director in Europe expressed his conviction in
the importance of the economic factor:
“And also they were expensive, cost was another driver. I would say cost
was actually a bigger driver here than even performance because their
costs were enormous for the services they were providing, they were
definitely too much money.”
The informants admitted that Alpha was undergoing globalization of its business
and centralizing its information systems (Table 6.8). However, centralization was not
perceived as dominant motivation in the backsourcing of the Alpha – Sigma contract.
One interviewee stressed the role and politics of Alpha’s corporate management in the
decision to transition out of Sigma’s contract. Consolidation of Alpha and the
establishment of global corporate headquarters resulted in shifts in power and authority
inside Alpha. Formerly, each Alpha office ran its own operations and was independent of
other offices worldwide. The new approach centralized the corporate power in one
location and forced all other locations to conform to the new strategy.
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In summary, backsourcing of Sigma’s contract was motivated by a combination
of economic, relationship, and strategic factors. There was consistency across the
accounts of the informants (Table 6.9). Exorbitant costs and poor performance served as
the main reasons for the ending of the relationship. A lack of trust and many conflicts in
the relationship, combined with inadequate service quality, left Alpha without control
over the network and possible business failures. Strategically, Alpha underwent changes
in corporate structure and management of the company and was pursuing centralization
of all of its activities globally. Consolidation of the network was inline with the new
corporate strategy. Sigma’s contract was causing Alpha huge financial losses, suffered
from poor performance and was impossible to control.
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Table 6.8 Alpha – Sigma Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant
Informant

Former CIO

Construct
Cost Advantage Costly contract

Switching Cost

Global Telecom
Manager

Costly contract
Backsourcing
less by 150%
Cost for new
equipment, staff,
network
Some: Business
in
many
countries
Global network New
software
platforms
No control, no No control
flexibility

Costly contract
Backsourcing
costs less
No termination Cost for new
fees
equipment, staff,
network

Asset
Specificity
Change in the Centralization
Role of IS
Loss of Control

IS Director in
Europe

Senior System
Administrator
Costly contract
Provider
opportunism
Cost
for
purchased
bandwidth

No knowledge
of the network
Structural
Backsourcing
Changes
initiated
by
corporate
headquarters
Service Quality Poor: network Poor: network Poor: network Poor: network
less failures, lack of
failures, delays, failures, delays failures,
capacity, lack of reporting
no
one
reporting,
responsible
language barrier
Trust
No trust: never Had to trust but No trust: full
use them again had concerns
time monitoring
Goal Conflict
Some conflicts: Some conflicts: Some conflicts:
billing issues
service
level termination
low,
billing clauses
issues
Low:
bad Low:
bad
Satisfaction
Low:
relationship
relationship
No rapport, bad
relationship
Communication
Communicate
Voice Behavior Written
communication, with provider to problem, lack of
response,
lack of response address issues
escalation
Power
Americans
decided, politics
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Table 6.9 Alpha – Sigma Contract: Informant Agreement
Construct
Cost Advantage
Switching Cost
Asset Specificity
Change in the Role of IS
Loss of Control
Structural Changes
Service Quality
Trust
Goal Conflict
Satisfaction
Voice Behavior
Power

Total Number of
Coded Quotes
13
13
1
8
9
2
19
4
6
5
9
1

Number of Informants
who had Quotes
4
4
1
3
3
1
4
3
3
3
3
1

Agreement on
Construct
100% (4/4)
100% (4/4)
1 opinion
100% (3/3)
100% (3/3)
1 opinion
100% (4/4)
67% (2/3)
100% (3/3)
100% (3/3)
100% (3/3)
1 opinion

Contract Four – Tau
Alpha – Asia-Pacific’s telecommunications and data center operations were
managed by an outsourcing provider: Tau. The contract was actually drawn between Tau
and Alpha’s parent company Delta. Delta aggregated the demand for IS services from its
four subsidiaries and negotiated volume discounts with Tau. Alpha was charged a portion
of the outsourcing contract costs based on its share in the revenues of the consortium,
Delta. Recently, Alpha renegotiated part of the contract and transferred some services
under internal control. However, most IS activities in Asia-Pacific remained with Tau.
Economic Considerations
Asset Specificity of Outsourcing Arrangement
As part of the outsourcing contract, Tau provided a telecommunication link
between the Alpha – Asia-Pacific offices and the corporate headquarters in the U.S. After
Alpha successfully terminated the telecommunications contract with Sigma in Europe, it
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brought back the network administration activities in-house, and purchased bandwidth
from a large global telecommunications carrier. Tau only had local presence in the AsiaPacific region and Alpha was not happy with Tau’s connectivity to North America. The
new telecommunication carrier, which Alpha signed up for the network, could provide a
direct link to Australia. The former CIO mentioned that he preferred a dedicated direct
connection:
“Because Tau did not provide a direct link to the U.S., Tau provided a link
to Sydney, I believe to Kuala Lumpur, Kuala Lumpur to Frankfurt,
Frankfurt to London, and that's how they got back to U.S., it was the way
network went.”
Because most of Alpha’s IS activities were carried out in the IS center at the
corporate headquarters, Alpha needed a direct connection with its Asia-Pacific
operations. Unfortunately, the current provider, Tau, could not deliver such a customized
link. Because of its asset specific requests, Alpha negotiated with Tau to terminate the
existing connection and purchased the line between North America and Australia through
a global telecommunications provider.
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing
Delta outsourced IS services to reduce IS costs by aggregating the IS demands of
all its subsidiaries in Asia-Pacific. However, Alpha by itself was large enough to achieve
similar economies of scale internally by combining all its global IS needs in one location.
Therefore, Alpha no longer needed the contract with Tau and wanted to run its IS
activities inside. The former CIO believed that in-house IS operations were the most
economical for Alpha:
“The second issue is Alpha just happens to be big enough, and most of its
areas of IT kind of services and things they do where there is enough
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volume, enough inertia, enough mass to where it is justified to do it inhouse. Because of the peak period they are able around the world to lower
the volume, it gives them different time zones, when Alpha-Europe
processing is going on it is at a different time than when USA is going on,
when Alpha is calling us the help desk for service, other people are asleep
and so on and so forth.”
It was not cost efficient for any individual regional unit of Alpha to run an
internal IS operation. Consolidation allowed Alpha to aggregate the needs of all of its
offices worldwide and manage all IS services from the corporate headquarters. According
to Alpha’s former CIO, consolidation justified an internal IS center:
“So I think Alpha just happens to be, now if you just took Alpha-USA by
itself and you didn't do all of this consolidation, I would say Alpha-USA
by itself would be a very good candidate for outsourcing. Alpha-Canada
for sure could be outsourced if it was all by itself. Mexico - definitely.
Outsource everything, because it's 20 employees and you can almost run it
on a real small server, outsource the whole thing.”
Alpha considered backsourcing telecommunication services outsourced to Tau in
Asia-Pacific. However, the contract with Tau was signed by the parent consortium, Delta,
and not Alpha itself. Delta received a discount from Tau thanks to a large volume of
outsourced services. Consequently, Alpha was not able to terminate the contract by itself
and had to take Delta into consideration. Because Alpha is owned by Delta, the parent’s
financial matters were a big concern for Alpha. The former CIO could not end the
relationship with Tau as it would have put Delta at a disadvantage:
“If Alpha were to pull, and say hey we are going to bring all of that stuff
back in-house, Delta would be stuck with this overhead of equipment,
material, contracts with vendors and whatever, and empty floor space in
the data center, an extra air conditioning, whatever that they don't need,
and it would hurt because it's one company, and Delta is, and Delta owns
Alpha. So it wouldn't make sense to do anything that would hurt the
parent.”
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While backsourcing was economically justified for Alpha, it was not beneficial
for the parent company. The former CIO pursued termination of all other relationships,
yet had to maintain the relationship with Tau:
“Even though from a management day to day it is always nice to have
everything in one room and everybody works together and they are not in
Melbourne and Sydney and all scattered all around. Even though there is a
benefit to do that, it is not cost justified to say well let's throw away 10%
of our overhead because it's cleaner if we split up. So I would say that's
probably the major reason.”
From an economic perspective, both high costs and some asset specificity
supported Alpha’s decision to backsource Tau’s contract. However, Alpha had to take
into consideration the interests of its parent consortium, Delta, and continue with the
arrangement. Part of the contract was renegotiated to address Alpha’s needs for a direct
telecommunications link between North America and Asia-Pacific.
Strategic Considerations
Redefinition of the Role of IS
The original set up of the IS activities at Alpha had each individual office running
its own IS operations. When global headquarters were established, Alpha embarked on a
new mission to standardize its businesses worldwide. The former CIO deemed the old
arrangements incongruous with Alpha’s new strategy and decided to standardize the IS
systems as well:
“I think that there was a situation where the agreements were out of sync
with where the business was headed. And so, and there is probably a lot of
businesses that get into that situation, and so that's one issue.”
The contract with Tau was one of several regional outsourcing contracts that
supported the IS operations of Alpha. A new centralized IS warranted backsourcing of
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the outsourcing contracts and the establishment of a consolidated IS center at the
corporate headquarters. Tau’s contract also had to be reevaluated in the new light.
Loss of Control over IS
Because Tau’s contract started out as a local IS arrangement, over the years the
Alpha – Asia-Pacific personnel had established a decent rapport with the provider’s
personnel. However, when the senior executives at the global headquarters tried to take
over the management of the IS operations, some tension developed between Alpha’s
local Asia-Pacific staff and the IS personnel at the headquarters. Asia-Pacific employees
continued to perform their duties and work with Tau without reporting to the
headquarters. At the same time, Alpha’s executives wanted to centralize the power in
their hands and felt they did not have control over the IS activities in Asia-Pacific. The
former CIO had to restructure the relationship with Tau to regain control over the
network and the data center activities in Asia-Pacific:
“The guys in Australia they had that relationship with Tau, the guys in
Orlando who now own all the circuits and need to pay the bills, they don't.
So the local people in Australia feel that they are being, they are losing
their authority. Losing responsibility, losing control, where the guys in
Orlando feel that they are out of control, they are not following the rules,
they are not coming to us when they want to install a new circuit or a new
router or a new switch or whatever.”
Changes in Management
Changes in management at the headquarters and the appointment of a CEO and a
former CIO, shifted the distribution of power at Alpha. The regional offices no longer
made their own decisions or controlled their business. The strategy was dictated by the
senior executives who wanted to have full control over Alpha’s business. The former CIO
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was working on centralizing IS activities at the corporate data center and was trying to
backsource all existing outsourcing contacts:
“So one issue is just internal Alpha management where one business unit
wants to have this local touch and feel and control and the other unit says
No, we are the global business and everything has to come through us and
we are in charge.”
Several strategic components called for backsourcing of Tau’s contract. Alpha
was consolidating all of its IS services globally, under the direction of its new
management, and Tau was one of the outsourcing contracts that had to be backsourced.
Alpha also wanted to have more control over the network in Asia-Pacific, and be able to
administer it remotely from its corporate headquarters.
Relationship Considerations
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement
One reason for considering backsourcing options in the relationship with Tau was
the inadequate service quality. The staff at the Asia-Pacific office of Alpha was not
happy with delays in service and poor responsiveness of Tau. They often sensed that Tau
had a monopoly in the Asia-Pacific market and Alpha had no choice but continue
purchasing Tau’s services. Alpha’s former CIO recalled that one of Alpha’s managers
complained about his frustrating experiences with Tau:
“[Manager in Australia] would tell me often that he would call Tau and
Tau would not be responsive. That he would say hey we are going to do
this on a weekend, they wouldn't do it. And there were many-many
occasions where it was just bureaucratic. Tau is just huge and they have
like monopoly in Australia. So, Tau as a vendor, as an outsource vendor is
sort of like we can do no wrong, we are better than everybody, and since
you don't have any other competition no other place to go, I don't think
they really pay a lot of attention.”
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Alpha was aggravated by Tau’s frequent delays in service. It had to rely on Tau
for any modification to its network, updates to the routers and the assignment of IP
addresses. Unfortunately, all requests had to be submitted to Tau and then cued to be
addressed and resolved. The Global Telecom Program Manager sometimes had to wait
for almost a month to be able to implement a change on the network:
“So in the past we had many problems when we requested a change
sometimes it took a month to implement. And it became a very frustrating
experience. That has improved a bit.”
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship
Satisfaction with the relationship with Tau developed, based on Alpha’s
experiences during the contract. The former CIO described the relationship between Tau
and Alpha as “strained”, the Global Telecom Program Manager was “not too happy” with
the relationship and the Vice President for Global Infrastructure stated that he was “very
unhappy” with the relationship.
Voice Behavior
Whenever concerns about the contract came up, Alpha tried to communicate with
Tau to resolve those issues. One problems was the assignment of IP addresses to the
network nodes at Alpha. Since most of Alpha’s network was managed internally, but part
of it was managed by Tau, Alpha and Tau ended up assigning conflicting IP addresses.
Tau worked with Alpha to resolve discrepancies and was cooperative in instituting a new
policy for the assignment of IP addresses for Alpha – Asia-Pacific. The Vice President of
Global Infrastructure described the situation:
“Some of the challenges you have there, if you understand like
networking, you have what we call public IP addresses and internal IP
addresses. And so our challenge is when you have an outsourcer with a
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piece of the world, they tend to use IP addresses which conflict internally
with others.”
Alpha was not able to backsource the contract with Tau. However, it negotiated
with the provider to gain more control over its network. One of Alpha’s major concerns
was its inability to evaluate the utilization of the network. As a result of renegotiation,
Alpha received read-only access to the routers in Asia-Pacific and could now monitor
network usage. The Global Telecom Program Manager was pleased with the improved
level of control:
“But for example one of the things that Tau allows us now we have at
least what they call read access to the routers, which means we can
actually measure the utilization in the network. So they have given us at
least the access to look into the network, we can't change anything, but we
now have some visibility.”
To increase the level of control over the network in Asia-Pacific, Alpha relocated
one of its network engineers to Australia. It allowed Alpha to closely monitor the
activities of Tau and thus, improve the service. Alpha was able to establish a new contact,
who could communicate directly with Tau, yet reported to the upper management in
Alpha’s global headquarters. The Global Telecom Program Manager was satisfied with
enhanced response levels:
“And one of my engineers who used to work in the UK moved to
Australia. Now that I have someone local who can speak to them face to
face, I get a much better response.”
On the relationship front, Alpha was dissatisfied with the service it was receiving
from Tau. Since Alpha was not able to terminate the relationship, it negotiated with Tau
in an attempt to improve the objectionable state of affairs. Tau was responsive to the
requests and shared some network utilization tools with Alpha.
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Emerging Themes
Power
Alpha was not able to backsource the Alpha-Tau contract and had to settle for its
partial renegotiation. The termination of the contract was in line with Alpha’s new
globalization and centralization strategy, but it had to succumb to the pressures from its
parent consortium, Delta. While Alpha wanted to centralize control over IS activities in
one location, Delta was consolidating IS services in Asia-Pacific to reduce costs through
economies of scale. Delta fully owned Alpha and thus, it was the more powerful of the
two organizations. It was able to use its power to persuade Alpha to continue with the
outsourcing contract with Tau, despite economic and strategic benefits of backsourcing.
In addition to the power struggle between the two companies, there was some
internal discontent within Alpha. Its Asia-Pacific offices were used to operating
independently. Centralization suddenly shifted the power from local managers, to the
corporate executives, who wanted everyone in Asia-Pacific to report directly to them.
According to the former CIO, the Asia-Pacific personnel feared losing control and
resisted changes in the governance:
“You have a little bit of geographic clash internally in Alpha and then the
third issue is that Delta is the one that negotiated the contract. And you
don't want to hurt the parent company's financials.”
Integration of Perspectives
The contract with Tau was not backsourced and is still in effect to this day. Some
components, however, were renegotiated. Nevertheless, Alpha had several reasons to
backsource this particular arrangement. Table 6.10 presents an overview of the various
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factors identified by the informants, who provided consistent accounts of the details of
the Alpha-Tau relationship (Table 6.11). First of all, Alpha experienced changes in the
corporate executives who introduced a new global strategy of standardization and
centralized control. As part of the new plan, IS activities were consolidated at the
corporate headquarters. Alpha also struggled with unsatisfactory service quality and the
overall relationship with Tau was tense. Alpha was unhappy with the low responsiveness
of Tau and as a result felt it could not control IS activities in Asia-Pacific.
Alpha had to maintain the relationship with Tau under pressure from its parent
consortium, Delta. Delta derives economic benefits from aggregating the demand for IS
services from all of its subsidiaries in the Asia-Pacific region. While Alpha estimated that
it would be cost effective to backsource Tau’s contract, it had to continue with the
relationship to spare Delta any financial losses. The bottom line, Delta was Alpha’s
owner and Alpha had to act in the best interest of its parent.
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Table 6.10 Alpha – Tau Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant
Informant

Former CIO

Construct
Cost Advantage Alpha is large
enough to enjoy
economies of
scale. But Delta
would
suffer
financially from
backsourcing
Switching Cost
Asset
Tau can not
Specificity
provide a direct
link
between
US
and
Australia
Change in the Contract is out
Role of IS
of sync with
where business
is headed
Loss of Control Can not control
the network
Structural
Contract was
Changes
negotiated by
Delta
Service Quality Delays
in
service,
poor
responsiveness
Trust
Goal Conflict
Satisfaction
Strained
Voice Behavior

Power

Global Telecom
Program
Manager

Director of IT
Operations

Vice President
Global
Infrastructure

Poor ability to
adapt to change
Contract was
negotiated by
Delta
Delays
in
service,
poor
responsiveness

Not too happy
Negotiated to
have visibility
of the network

Internal clash in
Alpha, Delta’s
interests first
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Very unhappy
Negotiated new
policy
for
internal
IP
addresses
Need
representation
in Asia-Pacific
to
negotiate
with Delta

Table 6.11 Alpha – Tau Contract: Informant Agreement
Construct
Cost Advantage
Switching Cost
Asset Specificity
Change in the Role of IS
Loss of Control
Structural Changes
Service Quality
Trust
Goal Conflict
Satisfaction
Voice Behavior
Power

Total Number of
Coded Quotes
2
0
1
1
2
2
3
0
0
3
1
3

Number of Informants
who had Quotes
1
0
1
1
2
2
2
0
0
3
2
2

Agreement on
Construct
1 opinion
No quotes
1 opinion
1 opinion
100% (2/2)
100% (2/2)
100% (2/2)
No quotes
No quotes
100% (3/3)
100% (2/2)
100% (2/2)

Company Two – Beta
Outsourcing provider, Omega, managed Beta’s membership database during a
three year period. The decision to outsource at Beta, and other non-profit stations, was
driven by coercive pressures exercised by the non-profit broadcasting corporation,
Omicron. The outsourcing provider, Omega, started under the auspices of Omicron and
was supported and initially funded by a grant from the corporation. While each station is
run independently, they all function under the umbrella of Omicron and carry its logo.
The stations also depend on Omicron for some of their funding that comes in the form of
grants.
Omega planned to consolidate membership processing for several stations and
thus, achieve economies of scale. At the same time, Beta hoped to focus its efforts on
development and membership growth instead of maintaining database and printing
mailings, which would result in cost savings for the station. All in all, the initial
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outsourcing decision at Beta can be explained by coercive pressures from the non-profit
broadcasting industry as well as expected economic benefits.

Economic Considerations
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing
Beta’s outsourcing provider, Omega, was a new company established specifically
for the purpose of handling the membership operations of broadcasting stations. Being a
start-up, Omega relied heavily on its clients for the operating capital. To have the capital
flowing, Omega charged its clients for services two or three months in advance. This
created an extra outlay of funds for Beta that received most of its funding from its
members. The Chief Financial Officer of Beta expressed his dissatisfaction with the way
the payments were set up:
“They would estimate what their costs were going to be for a certain
period of time, and then they would send you a bill, they would way
overestimate because they needed to have this working capital, and then
they would send you a bill and you would prepay all these fees. And then
after a period of time they would attempt to settle up with you.”
Payment for managing the membership database was calculated on a per
member basis. As the membership of Beta increased over the years, so did the
fees that Omega charged. Beta felt it was paying too much for the services it was
receiving, especially that there was a large monetary outlay ahead of time.
Additionally, there were significant difficulties in settling those prepayments with
Omega afterwards. The employee in charge of the data processing at Beta
complained about the escalating outsourcing charges during the interview:
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“Omega charged so much for every member that Beta had. And as the
years went on Beta would increase its membership, and therefore the cost
would increase. So they charged for that, every member.”
Switching Costs of Backsourcing
Beta believed it could cut down its costs by bringing the membership function
back in-house. Beta had to hire a database administrator to handle the membership
database in-house. It also had to purchase a server to host the database and computer
equipment for the membership department.

Membership software licenses were

transferred from the provider to Beta. Beta had to renegotiate its contracts with the
lockbox company and find another provider to handle the printing of the renewal notices
and other membership mailings. The Network Administrator was in charge of much of
the technical set up at the station:
“You would have to purchase whatever hardware you would need which
we ended up buying a server and a whole new set of computers for them
upstairs. Software, I don’t believe there were any costs because we own
the licenses.”
By backsourcing, Beta saved the money that was paid to Omega as part of the
contract, which had to be made several months in advance. The additional expense to set
up the operations in-house was less than the amount of money Beta was paying Omega,
to manage its membership services. The Chief Financial Officer believed Beta did not
experience any extra costs as a result of backsourcing:
“No extra costs, because we were paying for all these sorts of things
anyway as part of the total cost and now we are just sort of carving them
all out individual things, you know, the licensing fees and the training.”
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Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement
Omega was providing the same membership services to several broadcasting
stations. All stations were non-profit organizations that relied heavily on the members
contributions for their operations. The membership database and pledge campaigns were
the core of their business. Each station had its own fundraising staff that was responsible
for charitable campaigns. The Chief Financial Officer at Beta described all non-profit
broadcasting stations as very similar:
“I would say it is probably incredibly similar to other non-profit stations.
Everybody pretty much does business the same way and the IT systems
are probably quite similar. In fact, the system that we have, XYZ, was
developed for public broadcasting.”
Omega, at the peak of its business, was handling the membership for 14 different
broadcasting stations. Omega combined the data from all stations into one database and
managed it as one large piece. While stations carried out their recruitment of members
differently, they all had the same goal, i.e. membership contributions. Omega attempted
to standardize the membership operations at all client stations by creating a set of
procedures that all stations had to follow. Some stations were reluctant to change, but
they had to adhere to the new guidelines to be able to operate through Omega. Sometimes
the reports that Omega provided were not exactly what was needed, but Beta’s personnel
had to make them work, recalled the Network Administrator:
“I know that they did some custom queries for us. I am not really sure
about that but I think that they ended up basically modifying something
that they might have done for someone else. So, a lot of times it wasn’t
quite what we needed, but it worked.”
From the economic perspective, the expected cost savings for Beta did not
materialize in the Omega contract. While higher costs sometimes can be explained by
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extremely asset specific services, it was not the case with Beta. All the stations carried
our similar fundraising operations and Omega forced the stations to follow the
standardized procedures for membership. Beta decided to pursue backsourcing because
internal production costs combined with the backsourcing switching costs were lower
than external outsourcing costs charged by Omega.

Strategic Considerations
Redefinition of the Role of IS
Beta is in the business of television broadcasting, and membership may seem to
be a peripheral activity, yet membership is critical to Beta’s financial vitality.
Membership is responsible for over U.S. $5 million annually, which accounts for over
half of the station’s revenues. The membership database that was managed by Omega
contains all of the membership data at Beta. It is used to create mailing lists for
contribution campaigns and recruit new members. The quality of the membership pledge
drive is directly responsible for the amount of contributions collected from Beta’s
members. The Chief Financial Officer emphasized the role of the membership in Beta’s
business:
“Membership and the whole income stream from membership has always
been an integral part of the organization, so in sense it’s such a big number
and there are other dynamics aside from the information system that come
into play. And it has always become more and more important over the
years. And part of that is the information systems, and so having the
problems that we have had with Omega didn’t allow us to leverage that
line of business, that income the way we wanted to.”
The outsourcing decision was driven by the non-profit broadcasting corporation
and was justified by the expected cost savings. The membership employees who had to
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daily interact with Omega, and rely on the provider for help with the membership
recruitment, did not have any input into the outsourcing decision. Beta did not realize the
role that membership data played in the station’s business, until it transferred the database
out to Omega. Unquestionably, the membership database was the foundation of Beta’s
recruitment efforts and a major source of the station’s funds. The Network Administrator
suggested that during the outsourcing contract, Beta learned the importance of the
database and membership to its business:
“I think they realized the kind of power you can get out of your data.
There was a lot that they wanted that they weren’t getting.”
Loss of Control over IS
The outsourcing provider Omega had complete control over Beta’s membership
database. According to the service level agreement, Beta had to make a request for any
kind of reports in writing and there was a ten day turn around on those requests. That left
Beta at a disadvantage as it could not respond quickly to any situation involving
membership. The person in charge of data processing felt helpless when the membership
database was outsourced to Omega:
“Whenever I was here and we converted to Omega, I felt helpless because
I didn’t have the control, I just couldn’t go in and do something. I had to
send it to them to do it and that was frustrating.”
While Beta could view the individual records in the database from its work
stations, the access to reporting and querying capabilities was only available to Omega.
Beta’s membership personnel were not able to pull up any aggregate information or make
any changes to the database. Every modification had to be submitted to Omega for entry.
While it was its membership data, Beta did not really own it. Omega was in charge and
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allowed Beta only limited access to the database. The Network Administrator expressed
his frustration over the situation during the outsourcing contract:
“They had control over what kind of data we were getting. And the thing
is we could not see the queries that they were writing so we didn’t know
what their results were based on necessarily. So they would give us the
results and we had to trust that they were what we asked for.”
Membership contributions were solicited in several different ways at Beta. The
renewal notices were sent out four months before the renewal date. If the members did
not renew right away, renewal notices were sent once a month until the membership
expired and then for three more months. Additionally, TV pledge campaigns aired in the
viewing area and appealed to viewers to contribute and become members of the station.
Another solicitation mechanism involved sending recruitment materials to the viewers in
a certain geographic area with certain demographic characteristics. Such mail drops were
devised, based on the lists of viewers extracted from the database. Every time Beta
wanted such a list during the outsourcing contract, they had to submit a request to Omega
and wait until it was fulfilled, which slowed down the membership recruitment process.
The Vice President for Annual Giving and Outreach did not have control over the
membership database during the outsourcing contract:
“And that we had a lack of control over the database. As part of the reason
we are heading into a capital campaign, we need to have information at
our fingertips. And the length of time of having to wait to get information
was not conducive to us beginning the capital campaign. We needed to
have somebody on site who could get that information quickly and not
have to wait 10 days and we knew that we’d have a lot more specialized
information that we needed over the next coming months.”
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Internal Structural Changes
Beta did not undergo any external structural changes. The station has been on air
for over 45 years and has not merged or acquired any other entities. However, when the
decision was made, there were some internal changes at Beta. The failure of the Omega
outsourcing contract served as a demise of his CEO tenure at the station, who played a
key role in the original decision. Once it was clear that the outsourcing of the
membership was not successful, the station and even the station’s board wanted to end
the relationship with Omega. Yet, the CEO never admitted to the mistake and continued
to support the outsourcing project. Eventually, he had to resign, and after his departure,
the station was able to pursue backsourcing. Beta’s Network Administrator reflected on
the CEO’s departure:
“Our CEO resigned and he was the one that was kind of on the forefront
of that and after he had left that’s when they said let’s pull this back and
bring it back in-house. The number one and number two person, they
both, the board kind of moved them out, so we got a new CEO.”
During the outsourcing contract with Omega, Beta reevaluated the role that the
membership database played in its business. It realized that while IS and the database
were not its principal business, the database enabled fundraising, which was crucial for
the station. At the same time, the station experienced a loss of control over its
membership data. The way the agreement was structured limited Beta’s fundraising
flexibility and took away from its core competency of recruiting subscribers. To regain
control, Beta had to bring back in-house the outsourced membership database activities.
The change in the management did not directly affect the decision to backsource, yet the
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departure of the CEO allowed Beta to pursue the backsourcing plans without any internal
confrontation.

Relationship Considerations
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement
Omega operated on a ten day turnaround policy. All requests for service had to be
submitted in writing and then were handled in a cue. Frequently, the employees at Beta
experienced a long wait, and felt helpless in the situation. The lengthy turnaround
undermined the service quality of the outsourcing contract. The CFO was one of the
people at Beta who experienced a lot of delays in having the issues addressed:
“Well, they, like I said, they would probably have a priority list of things
to do, and they would say ok we’ll put that on the list. And it would be on
the bottom of the list somewhere and it wouldn’t be handled, and they
would say we could get to that and that’s one of things that we’re going to
work on in three months. So we never felt like we were getting any
attention to our problems.”
The type of requests ranged from a simple update to an account to more complex
queries, such as a list of all potential subscribers with certain features (for example, those
who contributed five years in a row). Frequently, Beta wanted to see several lists quickly,
so it could devise a successful fundraising campaign. As the number of stations under
Omega’s management grew, the number of requests increased and the quality of the
services started to slip. Sometimes, Omega also failed to send out a renewal mailing on
time, which caused problems for Beta as it was expecting contributions based on the
mailings. The Vice President for Development recalled that Beta ended up in dire
financial distress because of Omega’s delays:
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“Or a mailing would be delayed by two or three weeks and we were pretty
close to the wire financially. And there were never any “Well, we’ll make
adjustments” to my knowledge they weren’t eager to make adjustments
and take responsibility for their mistakes.”
From Omega’s perspective, its employees felt they were performing their duties
to the best of their abilities. When multiple stations were having pledge drives, it put an
extra strain on Omega employees. Unfortunately, on those occasions, Omega did not
have enough man power to support all stations at the same time, which caused delays and
obvious aggravation on the part of the stations. The Omega staff tried to stick to their
deadlines, however, one former employee of Omega admitted during the interview that
sometimes the deadlines were missed:
“Most of the time the deadlines were met. It was really hard sometimes
because we wouldn’t have enough people working. I know during pledge
time the stations required certain things to be done before pledge started
and sometimes the deadline would come and things were done. But if the
backlog got too much, the pledge would start and they would not have
certain items. And they would get very upset about that.”
Goal Conflict
One major conflict between Beta and Omega arose towards the contract’s end.
During the transition period, Beta was finally able to get its hands on the database and
review the records. To Beta’s dismay, it found multiple records that were duplicated in
the database. The problem stemmed from the fact that Omega set up the duplicate
controls loosely in the database. The record was not recognized as a duplicate even if
only one of many database fields was different. The employees entering the data into the
database did not follow uniform standards, and some of them abbreviated addresses,
while others did not. Consequently, some members ended up with several accounts in the
database which should have been discarded as duplicate if the name and most fields
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matched an existing record. The Vice President for Annual Giving and Outreach brought
this problem to Omega’s attention during the transition period:
“Particularly the way they managed the database they used very loose
rules if you will or variables for mailing so we had a lot duplicate accounts
created and that was a big issue for us and it continued throughout the time
of the contract… So you end up having three pieces of mail going to the
same address and one would be for example “Road” and the next one
would be “Rd” and the next one would be “Rd period” but it wouldn’t
match so there would be three to the same person. So there’s three pieces
of mail, which means we’re spending to print three pieces of mail.”
After duplicate records were discovered, Beta requested a refund from Omega.
After lengthy negotiation and under the threat of a legal battle, Omega refunded a small
amount to Beta. After the backsourcing was complete, it took Beta four months to
completely clean the database of all duplicate records. One of Beta’s employees
expressed his suspicion of Omega mishandling the database on purpose, to increase its
revenues:
“I have no proof of this, but I think it’s true. I have absolutely no proof of
this, but because Omega charged by the member, the number of records,
they loosened the controls in the computer that checked for duplicates, and
therefore whenever a file was uploaded, the computer did not check as
thoroughly as it should have to see if this person was already in the
database and therefore it would create a new record. And if it creates a
new record, they can charge more money, because here is a new member
even though it is the same person. That happened a lot.”
Another issue that came up during the outsourcing contract with Omega was the
mishandling of accounts receivables. Many members contributed to the station on a
monthly installment plan. Omega recorded such contributions in an annual lump sum
payment in the database instead of recording monthly installments and the total expected
contribution. As a result Beta was not able to accurately account for the funds that were
actually received and the funds that were still pending (account receivables). The CFO of
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Beta spent numerous hours trying to reconcile the membership contributions recorded in
the database and the actual money received in the bank:
“They understood fundraising very well and they understood how to
manage a large database of members, so the problem was they didn’t
understand accounts receivable. They didn’t understand that if somebody
pledges $100 to you and then you’re going to send them a renewal notice
once a month and they pay you $10 a month and you’re going to send
them a renewal notice once a month for 10 months. They could not
understand that we wanted to know how much do they owe us today.”
Trust in the Provider
As the contract progressed more and more conflicts occurred in the relationship.
Some issues were resolved with a phone call, some required more extensive follow-up,
and sometimes even the CEO’s involvement. Beta tried to resolve all the issues amicably
with Omega, but the problems only got worse. Beta’s staff could never trust Omega, and
frequently had to communicate with the provider several times a day. The Vice President
for Development spent a lot of time monitoring the provider:
“You could never rely on them taking care of it. You always had to go
back and check to see if it was taken care of. My lack of confidence in
them created double work because I had to contact them to change
something, to make a correction. Then I had to go back to make sure that
it was done and then if it wasn’t done I had to call them again.”
Beta’s CFO expressed similar sentiment:
“So there was always conflict just in the relationship. We were always
weary of what they were doing and trying to make sure they were doing
the right thing.”
Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship
Any relationship develops over time, and often the quality of the relationship
affects the decision to either continue the relationship or to end it. Beta’s relationship
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with Omega started cordially, but over time it became contentious as described by Beta’s
employees. The dissatisfaction came as the result of multiple factors including inadequate
service and escalating costs. The CFO of Beta expressed overall dissatisfaction with the
contract:
“Beta was never really fully satisfied with the situation. And we did
everything that we needed to do but they weren’t really capable of
satisfying us as a customer, for the money that we were spending with
them.”
Membership personnel never welcomed the outsourcing contract because it was
forced onto them from above. Furthermore, the staff experienced various problems with
the service and felt they could not control their own membership activities. Yet the
membership personnel were ultimately responsible for failed pledge drives, and missed
financial goals. While most individual interactions were amiable, there was a growing
sense of resentment among Beta’s employees. When asked about his opinion on the
relationship between Beta and Omega, the Network Administrator described it in the
following way:
“Cordial. But I think there were some people that kind of resented it
because it was so expensive. And it wasn’t really their decision.”
The problems with Omega exacerbated over time. Beta’s personnel grew more
and more frustrated with the service they were receiving. In many instances, Beta had to
modify its business procedures to adhere to the new standards imposed by Omega. Still
Beta was convinced that it knows fundraising and know its membership, and wanted to
have more access to its data. The Vice President for Annual Giving and Outreach had to
deal with a lot of frustration:
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“It became worse. I think that there were definitely territorial issues on
both sides and frustration. I think that it was a good model for other
stations but not for our station.”
Voice Behavior
To communicate their concerns, Beta’s employees worked with various
individuals at Omega. Initially, when the contract started, the membership personnel
communicated their concerns to their supervisor (VP for Annual Giving and Special
Events), who in turn contacted Omega. As the contract progressed, however, more and
more people were communicating with various constituents at Omega directly. If there
were errors in the data entry or requests to modify a particular account, a data processing
person was contacted. For reports and queries, requests were sent to the database guru at
Omega. Commercial issues were addressed with the account manager, who was one of
the executives at Omega. Additionally, the CFO communicated with the comptroller at
Omega about financial discrepancies. The Vice President for Annual Giving and
Outreach was a designated contract manager at Beta:
“Each station was assigned a point of contact. We had our accountant
manager, if you will, but then if there was a problem the account manager
wouldn’t know on a detailed level so we would have to go to the actual
person who was doing the data entry and the work. And then there was a
third person who was involved. He did the actual writing of the reports
and getting the queries together. So he was a technical person. You had to
talk to him to get the information that you needed. So the account
manager was strictly the marketing person, if you will, to go over the mail
plan and you have a technical person that if you just had a day to day
question about why didn’t this check get this person’s account you had to
go to the third person. It was sort of a three-tiered situation.”
On several occasions, Beta tried to rectify the problems with the unsatisfactory
service at Omega. The delayed mail drop caused Beta significant financial losses. Beta
approached Omega for adjustments on their account, but Omega was not willing to take
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the financial responsibility for the mishandled mail drop. On another occasion a mailing
went out with a wrong station’s name, and again no recourse was offered. The CEO of
Beta was part of Omega’s board and he tried to work with other stations’ representatives
on the board to resolve the issues. Beta’s CFO recalled that there was a lot of conflict
around the contract and shared his communication with Omega (Table 6.12):
“They caused our mailing to not go out on time. And we certainly rely on
the mail marketing. And so the mail drop didn’t occur when it was
supposed and consequently our whole cash flow was impacted negatively
because of that. And I know our CEO was fighting about that. He would
have to go to the board of directors and lodge complaints and that sort of
thing.”
Table 6.12 Sampling of Communication from Beta to Omega
Date
01/20/2000
02/16/2000
03/02/2000
03/08/2000
03/10/2000
03/16/2000
03/21/2000
08/17/2000
09/19/2000

Subject
December Membership Deposit Shortage.
January Membership Deposit Shortage.
Payment/Deposit Shortage.
Cash Revenue Reconciliation.
Revised January Pledge Receivables Summary Spreadsheet
dated 03/08/2000.
Auditors and Meeting with Omega.
February Membership Deposit Shortage.
Where is Beta’s July Pledge Receivables Spreadsheet? May
and June only received after phone calls.
Pledge Comparison and Reconciliation.

Format
Fax
Fax
Mail
Phone
Fax
Phone
Fax
Fax
Fax

When Beta decided to end the relationship and transfer the services back inhouse, it notified Omega of the upcoming changes. The outsourcing contract was
annually renewable, and Beta sent a letter to Omega informing of its intent not to renew.
Beta was one of the largest stations that outsourced the membership database to Omega
and was responsible for a large portion of Omega’s income. Omega was furious that Beta
was discontinuing service. Beta’s VP for Annual Giving and Special Events spearheaded
the transition, and she had to deal with a lot of hostility from Omega during the transition
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period. Omega’s management warned that Beta would not be able to handle the database
on its own and would lose all the data. The Network Administrator recalled that Omega
was visibly disappointed with the situation:
“I would say they were pretty frantic, they kind of freaked out. Because I
know we felt like we were one of the big fish and we were paying the
majority of the money because it was based on numbers of members. And
there were a lot of other stations that were paying considerably less and
we felt like we were footing their bill. So I think when we told them that,
they kind of freaked out because we were a big source of revenue for
them.”
The relationship between Beta and Omega deteriorated over time. Omega’s
service quality continued to decline over the years, and Beta’s employees did not have
any trust in the provider. Conflicts and major mistakes on the part of the provider only
worsened the situation. Beta suspected Omega was opportunistic in handling the
duplicates in the database. On multiple occasions Beta attempted to resolve the issues,
modify the situation, and promote the relationship. However, Omega did not have enough
personnel to address the concerns, and frequently ignored the requests. The CEO of Beta
had to personally make multiple complaints to the management of Omega. Beta clearly
signaled to Omega its dissatisfaction and eventually decided to exit the relationship when
its voice behavior became ineffective.

Emerging Themes
Power
The original decision to outsource the membership database and activities to
Omega, was imposed on Beta by Omicron. Not surprisingly, when Beta decided to
backsource this contract, Omicron continued to support its pet project Omega. Omicron
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was able to exercise pressure over Beta as it serves as an umbrella organization for nonprofit broadcasting stations. Beta was dependent on Omicron for some of its financial and
programming resources. The CFO recalled that Omicron even threatened Beta with
retaliation during backsourcing:
“There were people within Omicron, I’m not sure which, but there were
people that were supporters of this concept of this having this service
bureau do this for a bunch of stations, and when we were going to leave,
they would talk to [The Vice President for Annual Giving and Outreach]
and try to talk her out of it and tell her how we’re going to fail and how
it’s not going to work. They might’ve even threatened her with some kind
of retaliation. You’re going to lose some of your support from Omicron or
something like that. They weren’t very happy as I recall, and she was
intimidated by that.”
Internally, Beta’s President and CEO was an avid supporter of the Beta-Omega
contract. Despite troubled performance and growing disappointment, he continued to
promote the project and was not willing to end the relationship with Omega. Because the
CEO held the decision making authority at Beta, the company remained with Omega
although all other executives favored backsourcing. The Vice President for Development
was frustrated with the CEO’s actions:
“Our president decided that we would want to do this and then we had to
make it work. So that immediately puts you in kind of a precarious
position in the first place…And we stayed in until the very end because
our president was really the one who spearheaded the whole project and
wasn’t willing to give up on it…I think part of what got us into problems
was our president guilt because he was not willing to admit because he
spearheaded it that this isn’t working.”

Integration of Perspectives
Three main reasons for backsourcing Omega’s contract were common among all
informants (Table 6.13). First, Beta’s personnel were dissatisfied with the poor service
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that Omega was delivering to them. Secondly, Beta’s staff felt they did not have control
over the membership database. Thirdly, the contract was very expensive and Beta
estimated that it could reduce its costs by taking the membership activities back in-house.
The VP for Development also named the decreased fundraising revenues as the main
reason for backsourcing. It can be considered a cost factor, yet it does not directly address
the costs incurred by Beta for outsourcing the database. Decreased revenues are more of a
function of inadequate service offered by Omega, that resulted in unsuccessful
membership campaigns by the station.
Table 6.13 Company Beta: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant
Informant
Network Administrator
Data Entry & Batch Processing
VP Development
VP Annual Giving & Outreach
Database Administrator
Customer Service
Representative
CFO

Primary Reason
Cost
Poor service quality
Decreased fundraising
revenues
Regain control
Poor service quality
Regain control

Secondary Reason
Regain control
Cost
Poor service quality
Poor service quality
Regain control
Poor service quality

Regain control

Cost

Poor service quality and lack of control over the membership database,
experienced by Beta’s staff during the outsourcing contract, are interrelated. Because
Beta perceived the delivered services as inadequate, it constantly tried to improve
Omega’s performance to ensure that its membership recruitment activities were
successful. Whenever Omega failed to contact members on time, or somehow
mishandled the data in the database, Beta’s employees felt that they could do a better job
themselves if they had a chance. Yet they had no direct access to the database and
consequently, they felt helpless that they could not do more effective fundraising. Poor

235

service quality only intensified the feeling of helplessness and loss of control on the part
of Beta’s employees. Realizing the importance of the membership database to the
economic stability of the station, Beta felt it needed to regain control over the database
and bring it back in-house.
While service quality and lack of control undermined the success of the
outsourcing arrangement, excessive costs associated with the contract left Beta even more
dissatisfied and resentful. The station was paying a large sum of money for inferior
services, which on several occasions put Beta in financial distress. The economic
efficiency of the arrangement is always essential for the success of any sourcing decision.
Inevitably, the cost factor played a role in the decision to end the outsourcing contract
with Omega and backsource the management of the membership database.
Table 6.14 reconciles the opinions of the informants on various antecedents of
backsourcing; mostly the informants agree on the issues (Table 6.15). Overall, a
combination of economic, strategic and relationship reasons led Beta to the backsourcing
decision. Beta suffered through multiple conflicts and service mishaps during its
relationship with Omega. Many times during the three year period the station voiced its
concerns and dissatisfaction in an attempt to rectify the situation. Strategically, facing
the declining service quality and losing control over the membership contributions, Beta
realized the importance of the membership database to its bottom line. The expected
outsourcing benefit of cost savings never materialized and the CEO, who insisted on
outsourcing in the first place, was forced to leave the station. Taking into consideration
the escalating outsourcing costs, poor service quality and loss of control over the
membership database, Beta decided to pursue backsourcing.
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Network
Database
Administrator Administrator

Purchased
hardware,
licenses

Structural
Changes

Change in
the Role of
IS
Loss of
Control

Purchased
hardware,
licenses

CEO resigned, CEO departure
was moved
out by the
Board

Had no
control:
Omega kept
control

Realized the
power in data

Asset
All stations
Specificity are similar

Switching
Cost

Cost
Cost the main Backsourcing
Advantage reason
cost savings

Construct

Informant
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CEO
departure

Had no control: Had no
control: felt
helpless

All stations
are similar

Customer
Data Entry &
Service
Batch
Representative Processing
Increasing
cost, in-house
cheaper
Purchased
hardware,

VP
Developme
nt

Prepaid fees, saved
money
backsourcing
No extra costs,
paid Omega for
hardware, licenses
too
All stations are
Beta was
similar
larger than
other
stations
Membership is
integral part of the
station
Had no
Had no
control: could not control:
couldn’t
select lockbox
address
provider
issues
CEO
CEO replaced
because of Omega departure
fiasco

CFO

Table 6.14 Beta – Omega Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant

CEO departure

Had no control: couldn’t
get member data

Stations are different
how they use data

VP Annual Giving &
Outreach

Were
Satisfaction Cordial
relationship, getting
but
some attention
resentment
Voice
Daily
Behavior communication
to
resolve
problems.
Omega
was
unhappy with

Goal
Conflict

Reported
problems
to
supervisor who
then contacted
Omega

238

Omega has
too
much
control,
suspicious
duplicates in
DB
Good
relationship
in
the
beginning
Various
people
involved in
communicati
on

Omega was not Poor
timeliness
efficient
enough, long
response times,
many issues

Customer
Data Entry &
Service
Batch
Representative Processing

were
not People
the nice, but bad
service

Services were
not
individualized
for
Beta’s
needs. Behind
on
software
updates
Losses to Beta Restrictive with
because
of access to data
missed mail
drop, financial
conflicts

Service
Quality

Did OK job,
but were too
controlling,
fairly
receptive
to
change

Mostly trusted

Network
Database
Administrator Administrator

Trust

Construct

Informant

VP
Developme
nt
Could
never rely
on Omega
Poor
timeliness,
low
customer
service,
terrible

Interacted
with
controller
to
reconcile financial
discrepancies,
more frequently as
problems escalated

Daily
communica
tion
because of
problems

Omega did not
understand
accounts
receivables,
discrepancies
in
funds in the bank
Never
fully Unhappy
satisfied
with
contract

Had to watch over,
was not a trusting
relationship
Delays
in
responsiveness,
poor
quality,
deadlines are not
met, few people
doing work

CFO

In charge of the contract
relationship, interacted
with Omega’s account
manager, technical staff
at least once a week,
communicated concerns

Contentious
relationship, got worse
with time

Unsatisfactory
performance,
some
employees
not
knowledgeable,
only
few had knowledge.
Lengthy response times,
lack of procedures.
Duplicates in DB, extra
charges

VP Annual Giving &
Outreach

Power

Construct

Informant

termination
Omicron
funded ex Beta
employee who
started Omega

Network
Database
Administrator Administrator
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Customer
Data Entry &
Service
Batch
Representative Processing
Omicron
threatened
retaliation

CFO

VP Annual Giving &
Outreach

but it created tension.
CEO didn’t CEO made decision
want
to
backsource

VP
Developme
nt

Table 6.15 Beta – Omega Contract: Informant Agreement
Construct
Cost Advantage
Switching Cost
Asset Specificity
Change in the Role of IS
Loss of Control
Structural Changes
Service Quality
Trust
Goal Conflict
Satisfaction
Voice Behavior
Power

Total Number of
Coded Quotes
14
6
6
2
16
12
36
6
16
10
30
7

Number of Informants
who had Quotes
4
4
5
2
6
6
7
3
5
7
6
4

Agreement on
Construct
100% (4/4)
100% (4/4)
60% (3/5)
100% (2/2)
100% (6/6)
100% (6/6)
100% (7/7)
67% (2/3)
100% (5/5)
100% (7/7)
100% (6/6)
100% (4/4)

Company Three – Gamma
Gamma’s decision to outsource its membership activities was driven by the
factors very similar to the ones described in the case of Beta above. The non-profit
corporation, Omicron, licensed both Beta and Gamma. Like Beta, Gamma’s outsourcing
provider, Omega, was established with financial and leadership support from Omicron.
Gamma was one of the stations that joined in the project from the very beginning and its
CEO served on Omega’s Board. Outsourcing was expected to generate cost savings and
increase membership revenues, by concentrating the efforts of the membership personnel
on fundraising activities.
When Gamma finally ended the relationship with Omega, it brought the
previously outsourced membership activities back in-house. However, within a year
Gamma negotiated with Lambda, the membership database software developer, to take
over the hosting and technical support of the database software. Gamma maintained all
other membership activities internally and had full access to the data in the membership
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database. The station worked closely with Lambda for database support when it was
necessary.

Economic Considerations
The Cost Benefit of Backsourcing
The outsourcing contract fees were based on the number of the station’s
subscribers. The station had to prepay the monthly fees in advance based on the projected
subscriber numbers for each period. Several months later, once the actual membership
figures were posted, the amount was adjusted and future payments were recalculated. If a
credit was due, Omega did not issue the actual credit to its clients, as it heavily relied on
the clients’ prepayments for working capital. Instead, the future payments were modified
based on the credit. The Vice President for Membership at Gamma believed the station
was overpaying Omega for the services:
“I think the biggest driver was [Omega] were not meeting revenue goals
and they were exceeding expense. So that was the bottom line is they
created goals that they felt were reasonably attainable at the beginning of
each fiscal year. Finally they were not meeting those over several periods
of time, several quarters just were not getting it and they were exceeding
their expense budget.”
Unfortunately, during the contract Omega was unsuccessful in recruiting
members and Gamma even saw its membership decline. Gamma’s expenses for
membership continued to grow, yet the revenues fell. From the economic perspective,
the outsourcing relationship became inefficient. Gamma decided to backsource the
membership database and activities, to decrease the expenses and increase the revenues
generated by membership. Gamma’s Senior Vice President for Administration and
Technology complained about Omega’s negative impact on the station:
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“Instead of making several hundred thousand dollars in new annual
revenue, it was costing us several hundred thousand dollars in lost revenue
and increased expenses. Prior to going to Omega, we were growing
membership. During Omega, we lost members and dollars. After taking
the function back in-house our membership revenue began to rise again.”
Switching Costs of Backsourcing
When the decision to backsource was made, Gamma had to first purchase a server
to host the membership database in-house. Omega refused to lend any help during the
transition, and Gamma ended up working closely with the software manufacture of the
membership database software, Lambda. The database server was installed and the data
was transferred with the help from Lambda. The IS Manager housed the database server
at the station, after it was configured:
“Of course there were some [costs]. We had to buy a server. I'm sure
there were costs in having them set up the server and getting it all
configured, so yup, there was some additional cost that we had to entail
but I think the company thought it was worth for what we needed.”
Several new staff members were hired for the membership department, and an
internal person was transferred and assigned the role of database administrator. All new
personnel were trained to use the membership database, and the database itself was
cleaned up after the transfer. As part of the contract with Omega, printing and lockbox
services for receiving payments were subcontracted to third parties. After backsourcing,
Gamma found new providers to handle the printing, maintain a lockbox facility and
process bank deposits. New relationships took some time to negotiate and streamline. The
Vice President for Membership was in charge of the transition back in-house:
“Sure we had to purchase a new server which was about $10,000. We had
to hire new staff. We had to enter into agreements with different vendors
which were more expensive than what we had been paying through
Omega because there certainly was some cost savings with economy of
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scale, having several stations do it. The learning curve, you know, was
difficult, and it took us awhile to rev back up.”
There were large switching costs associated with the backsourcing at Gamma. In
addition to the above mentioned expenses, for several months, Gamma incurred double
costs for managing the database. To ensure a successful transition, Gamma hired Lambda
to assist them with the transfer of the database. During the testing period, Gamma ended
up paying both Omega and Lambda for their services. The Executive Vice President and
General Manager estimated the station spent almost a quarter of a million US dollars
during the transition:
“I think we spent in conversion and capital combined, the whole
transition, about what we would normally pay, I would say about 200,000,
a quarter of a million. Well in the whole concept, the conversion, the
capital, the new equipment, the printing costs, the day to day expenses of
the membership, because at one point we were paying twice, because we
were paying Omega for the data and we were paying Lambda for the
overlap, because we had overlap for about 2 months to make sure
everything was working, so we had that expense, it was about 200,000
total.”
Despite hefty switching costs, Gamma went through with the backsourcing.
Because of the large capital outlay during the transition, Gamma ended up losing money
in the first year of backsourcing. The revenues from membership were also slow to pick
up, after a significant slump during the relationship with Omega. However, once the
normal fundraising practices resumed, Gamma saw its membership increase by 16% the
next year. The Vice President for Membership believes the cost of membership
recruitment went down after backsourcing:
“I think we lost revenue that first year too. We saw that first year there
was increase in one time expenses. That second year though it was less
expensive for us to do it ourselves then it is to have Omega.”
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Asset Specificity of the Outsourcing Arrangement
During the outsourcing contract, Gamma modified its business practices to adjust
to the requirements imposed by Omega. To reduce differences and specifics of each
station and achieve economies of scale, Omega developed fundraising and membership
procedures that all of its client stations had to follow as part of the contract agreement.
Because Omega, as an outsourcing provider, was relying on economies of scale,
customization was not possible for each individual client. The Vice President for
Membership lamented the situation:
“They were forced to be similar. That was one thing that was agreed to
before everyone entered into their contract, that you would have to agree,
you had input into the business practices, but ultimately we would have to
agree to share business practices with the other stations.”
Before the backsourcing decision was made, Gamma evaluated its options. From
the economic standpoint the station felt it was paying Omega a large amount of money
for very ineffective fundraising and membership management. Sometimes, excessive
costs can be justified by the customized service that the client receives. Yet Omega was
not providing any unique services to its clients. Instead, all stations had to adjust their
procedures to fit into the new requirements, even though there were a lot of similarities in
the fundraising and membership support between the various stations. There were
significant switching costs associated with backsourcing. However, Gamma chose to end
the relationship with Omega, despite a large capital outlay during the transition. In the
long run, the switching costs were justified by the reduced expenses for membership
activities and increased revenues received from contributions.
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Strategic Considerations
Redefinition of the Role of IS
Gamma relied on IS for office support and communication, financial systems, TV
and radio programming storage, membership and various other activities. At Gamma, IS
played mostly a supportive role, yet as the use of computer driven applications increased,
Gamma recognized the importance of IS within the organization. The Executive Vice
President and General Manager referred to the increasing role of IS in the station’s
business:
“We are in a world of computers. Everything that we do today is going
through a network connection at some point. When you set up this
meeting, it was done by e-mail. When I call up members of the Courtship
Society, which is those members of $1000 or more, Don and Catherine
input that information on their computers, I bring that up on my screen
here so I know who to call. So many changes around done by computers.
That's the way it is now.”
As one of the IS components employed at the station, Gamma’s membership
database played an important role in its business. The membership database contained
records of all prior, current and potential members of the station. The membership
department staff relied on the database to devise new pledge campaigns and to track and
maintain the relationships with current members. Donations from members contributed a
major part of Gamma’s revenues, which are then used for TV and radio production and
broadcasting, as well as administration and development. The IS Manager emphasized
the critical importance of the database to the station:
“Well it is rather important because all the member information is on
there. All the information regarding the mailings for program guides
when they get their membership, when their membership is needed to be
renewed. All that information. So it is one of our major portions of
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income to the station is through the membership base. So if that becomes
lost or not good we can not support our members, we can not track
revenue, or utilize it. So, yes, it is very important.”
When the membership database was outsourced to Omega, together with most
membership activities, Gamma outsourced the core of its business. Membership was
critical to the station as it generated the majority of revenues and supported the station’s
operations. During the time of Omega’s outsourcing contract, Gamma realized that it lost
the key component of its success and decided to end the relationship with Omega. The
Senior Vice President for Administration and Technology referred to membership as the
core of Gamma’s business:
“But outsourcing a part of your core business is very risky - and Omega is
a good example of that risk.”
He was not alone in this realization. The Vice President for Membership
expressed similar opinion during her interview:
“Absolutely we were outsourcing our core with Omega.”
Loss of Control over IS
Having the membership database outsourced to Omega presented Gamma with
another problem. The membership personnel no longer had control over membership
activities. While they were still responsible for raising the funds, they were limited in the
execution of their fundraising campaigns by Omega’s policies and procedures.
Accessibility to the database was limited and Gamma’s staff had read-only access to the
system. All requests for changes or special actions with the data had to be submitted to
Omega. The Member Services Supervisor at Gamma did not have control over the
membership:
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“Because we were very restricted in terms of what we can do with the
system. We were only allowed to do certain things. We had no control
over what they were doing or when they were doing it.”
Omega had full control over the renewal notices and any kind of communication
with the existing members on behalf of Gamma. The outsourcing provider followed its
own procedures for renewal membership, which proved to be unsuccessful. The
membership department at Gamma could not contact the members on its own because it
did not have access to the membership data. Gamma was left to hope that next month’s
contribution numbers would improve. The Vice President for Membership felt helpless,
as if her hands were tied:
“But eventually we weren't getting anything. We didn't know what was
being mailed out, we really didn't know what was going on with our own
company and paying them an inordinate amount of money every month to
do that. Our hands were really tied. I really feel our hands were
handcuffed our entire time with them.”
The database software had the capability to generate reports, but the report
function was not available to Gamma. Omega blocked most database capabilities from its
clients, and required that clients submit all their requests with a 10 day turnaround. Often,
the waiting period was too long and did not allow Gamma to quickly react to changes in
the fundraising strategy. The Vice President for Membership used many different queries
to devise the station’s direct marketing campaigns:
“Some we could run on our own. We had very limited access to the
software. I would say a good three fourths of it we couldn't use. So there
a few things that they allowed us to do, but the rest they did for us. So we
would have to request it, go through a cue and wait.”
The main role of the database was to assist the membership department in raising
funds for the station’s broadcasting operations. Because membership contributions
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represent the largest source of revenues, the station depended heavily on successful
membership campaigns. Gamma needed to react quickly to drops in revenues and devise
new strategies for raising money. Yet Omega was in control of the membership database,
and as a result it was in control of the fundraising at Gamma. The Executive Vice
President and General Manager had no control over the station’s revenues during the
outsourcing contract:
“Well we lost control to creativity. There was never a real concern that
we would lose the integrity of the data, which we didn't, but we did lose
control of the creativeness of the direct mail and telemarketing campaigns.
And we lost control where we couldn't do anything to fix the revenue. If
they screwed up, we had to live with it. I couldn't go out and do another
mailing, because I don't have the database and we are on the contract that
they are doing all the mailings, so if they were late getting the renewal
pieces out, we were out of luck.”
After the database was brought back in-house, Gamma was able to control its own
fortune. Initially an internal person was performing the functions of a database
administrator. Gamma had to work hard to improve the revenues resulting from member
contributions. Eventually, the internal DBA did not prove to be knowledgeable, and
Gamma decided to seek services of the membership database developer, Lambda, that
earlier helped with the transition. After several months of negotiations with Lambda,
Gamma hired it to host the database and provide technical support. Yet Gamma retained
full control of the database and could use complete functionality of the database, and full
accessibility to the membership data. Lambda provided 24 hour support and assisted
Gamma as needed. The Executive Vice President and General Manager could quickly
adapt to the environment with the new arrangement:
“In the current environment that we have now, absolutely because we
control the message so we are quick to make changes, adapt to the
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environment, deal more quickly and effectively with direct mail pieces
that aren't working. We can pull them off faster and think of something
else. But in Omega world, no, slow as molasses.”
Internal Structural Changes
The original decision to outsource was avidly supported by the president of
Gamma who also served on Omega’s Board of Directors. The decision to bring the
membership database back in-house was spearheaded by the Chief Operations Officer of
Gamma. There were no major changes in the management of Gamma while outsourcing
to Omega. During the time of the contract, Gamma’s VP for Membership passed away,
and a new VP was hired. The new VP was tasked with transitioning out of Omega and
setting up the membership operations in-house, once the decision was made. However,
this change in management did not have an impact on the backsourcing decision. The
station was concerned about its revenues, and would have ended the relationship
regardless of the change of VP. The Executive Vice President and General Manager
evaluated Gamma’s outsourcing options and developed a plan to transition out of Omega:
“I was tasked to clean it up, so I took over membership and I developed
the plan to get out of Omega and then manage the transition out of Omega.
And then I set up the new transition into Lambda and then I hired [Vice
President for Membership] to take it from there. But I think now the
player's impact, had the old VP still been alive we still would have gotten
out of Omega.”
Strategic considerations were crucial in Gamma’s decision to backsource.
Gamma’s revenues from membership fell, yet the station could not control the
fundraising campaign as the membership data was not available to Gamma’s staff. The
station had no recourse and had to continue to rely on Omega for fundraising. The
membership personnel felt as if their hands were tied and they could not react to the
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decrease in the membership and revenue decline. Secondly, membership function proved
to be value adding to Gamma’s business. Membership is the single largest source of
revenues, and having it outsourced to Omega put Gamma at a disadvantage. The station
reassessed the role of the membership database in its business, and ended the relationship
with Omega to take control over the membership activities. No external or internal
structural changes at Gamma affected the decision to backsource.

Relationship Considerations
Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement
One of the original reasons for outsourcing was the idea of centralizing
membership activities for multiple stations under one roof at Omega. Gamma hoped that
it would free its time for strategizing fundraising while Omega would handle all the
communication and mailings. In reality, the quality of fundraising that Omega delivered
was very poor and the revenues of Gamma went down. One reason for the inadequate
service quality was inexperienced personnel. The Executive Vice President and General
Manager was disappointed with Omega’s staffing of the contract:
“And they weren't able to hire the best people in the system. So they were
hiring people who had little experience with public broadcasting, so we
had to educate them. That just created one bad mistake after bad
mistake.”
Omega experienced frequent turnover of personnel and failed to train them
properly. The staff did not have experience with fundraising and did not understand the
business of public broadcasting. To make the matters worse, there were frequent mishaps
in handling membership accounts and data entry. Gamma’s membership department had
to contact Omega frequently to resolve the membership discrepancies and update the
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member accounts in case of errors. The Senior Vice President for Administration and
Technology recalled several occasions when Omega delivered poor service:
“In reality, Omega was not able to hire the caliber of staff they promised.
In fact, their staff expertise was what we would consider entry level. They
made many mistakes, causing major fundraising blunders such as mail
merge errors and improperly timed direct mail drops. They also provided
very poor customer service to your members.”
While there were many problems with Omega’s service, some individuals
employed by the provider were quite knowledgeable. Omega had some experienced
technical personnel, but there were not enough of them to handle all the clients. As the
outsourcing company grew and recruited more clients, the database administrator’s work
load increased. The stations experienced delays with receiving reports and queries even
with a ten day waiting policy. Because the core of the membership activities was
fundraising, even good database administrators could not improve the revenues. The VP
for Membership praised the quality of equipment and technical staff at Omega but
complained about the fundraising personnel:
“Equipment: perfect, they had the best equipment. I really think their
database administrators were the best of the best. It was their fundraisers
were not the best. So from a database perspective, behind the scenes of
the server, it was great.”
One problem that came up during the contract was the mishandling of the
membership mailings. Each month, Gamma contacted members whose membership was
about to expire. One time, the letters went out, signed by a cartoon character name,
instead of the station’s president. On another occasion, the letters addressed the members
of Gamma, yet was signed by the president of another TV station. On yet another
occasion, the address merge was done incorrectly and the letters were shipped to the
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wrong location. The Executive Vice President and General Manager felt Omega was
never willing to step up and resolve the issues:
“They weren't being responsive to us as quickly as they should. They
weren't getting it, they were not understanding it. They were making
mistakes. For example they would send out our mail pieces to the wrong
city. They would send out letters to you as a member of Gamma, but the
letter would say Nu or some other station. Sometimes the letters wouldn't
go out at all. They could never give you resolution. I mean part of the
resolution is taking ownership of the problem and making it, fixing it, and
it was always, well it's not really our fault, it's someone else's fault. And
that wasn't a very fast resolution.”
Another mistake by the provider caused significant financial problems for
Gamma. The station relies on monetary contributions coming as monthly renewals from
members to fuel its operating budget. When Omega failed to send out the renewal mail, it
cost Gamma several thousand dollars in lost revenues. To make the matters even worse,
Gamma never informed Omega that the mail was not sent. In the end, they did not want
to take the responsibility for the missed mailing. The VP for Membership believes the
problems were due to poor senior management at the provider:
“They did not drop mailing, did not mail a whole month of renewal mail
which is about 9000 pieces. Never told us, so when we were trying to
figure out why we didn't have a certain amount of money coming in, we
never knew. I mean we asked if anything odd had happened, no, no
everything's fine. It was just difficulty in getting what we needed, them
looking at us as more of a group of stations than individual stations with
individual needs, a lack of management in my opinion at their station.
They had undergone station changes in their senior station, which I believe
had a negative effect as well. They weren't real competent. They wouldn't
mail things, they would sign it Teletubbies that kind of thing.”
Every time the membership mailings were mishandled, Gamma suffered financial
consequences. It tried to approach Omega to receive compensation for mismanaged
membership campaigns. Typically Omega was not very responsive and it was difficult to
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receive credit for un-mailed letters. When it was decided to end the relationship, the
Executive Vice President and General Manager negotiated with Omega to receive some
reimbursement for the overpayments and damages:
“Actually towards the end there was a significant overcharge on their part.
I don't remember the specifics but I remember I negotiated with them and
they had to pay us back something like 90 thousand dollars. A lot of it
was just bad bookkeeping on their part and not doing things that they said
they were going to do with that money. For example they would charge
us X number of dollars because they were going to do a mail out, but then
they wouldn't do the mail out, well I want my money back. Or they would
charge you X number of dollars to do the mail out, but the mail out would
go so late that it wasn't effective. And in the end we negotiated some of
those things to come back to us and in the end we got our money back.”
Goal Conflict
There was a lot of conflict in the relationship of Gamma with Omega. Many of
those issues developed because Gamma and Omega pursued different goals. Omega was
working on standardizing the fundraising and membership activities of all its client
stations. Consolidation, unified procedures and economies of scale were Omega’s
definition of success. However, Gamma wanted to follow its own steps when it came to
membership renewal and recruitment. Omega did not offer individualized attention to
Gamma even at the expense of decreased membership and revenues at the station, which
for Gamma, was a sign of Omega’s failure. The Vice President for Membership felt there
was a goal conflict between Gamma and Omega:
“I think their goal of outsourcing was to make sure that it all worked as a
whole, but they didn't look at the individual, so they may have thought
something was a success when we would have not thought it was a
success. We certainly have individual disagreements with people there
because we needed to accomplish certain things that they did not feel were
a priority when looking at the other stations, but it was still a priority for
us and we needed to get it done. So there would be some conflict there.”
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Satisfaction with the Outsourcing Relationship
Gamma grew increasingly frustrated with Omega’s recurrent mistakes and the
need for constant monitoring of the outsourced services. As problems exacerbated,
Gamma’s top management had to get involved more often, in an attempt to improve
services. But even the lower level membership personnel felt the strain of the
relationship. The Member Services Supervisor described the relationship with Omega as
fair in the beginning but as frustrating in the end:
“Fair. Again it depends on different people. On my level it was different
from my supervisors probably because they had to deal with different
issues. And in the beginning it was different too. In the end there was a lot
of frustration on my part.”
Inadequate service quality and various conflicts left Gamma dissatisfied with the
contract with Omega. The provider proved to be very inflexible and did not want to
modify their practices even when they were unsuccessful. There was an obvious
incongruity in goals of the two partners which only alienated them even more. The
Executive Vice President and General Manager described the relationship of Gamma and
Omega as adversarial:
“It was an adversarial relationship from the beginning and throughout the
relationship. It was adversarial because we didn't feel we were getting the
customer treatment that we thought we deserved. Most of our
disagreements with them was on the way they handled those mistakes and
how they handled providing us proper feedback and information. We
would, it would take a lot for us to convince them the way we think they
should be doing direct mail. Because we think we know our market better
and at times it was adversarial they thought that they knew how to do it
better than we did it, but they couldn't prove that they knew how to do it
better because the facts were they couldn't do it better.”
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Voice Behavior
To deal with the day-to-day operational issues, several individuals from Gamma
worked closely with Omega. The CEO of Gamma served on the board of Omega and was
involved in the operations of the outsourcing provider. When the issues did not get
addressed on the lower level, the CEO had to contact the executives at Omega to seek
resolution. Several executives at the station communicated with Omega staff almost
daily, including the VP for Membership:
“Our entire management team was very involved in it. In fact, our CEO
served on the board of Omega and at one point was chair of their board.
So it really was from the top down of our day to day contact with them.
And with anything they had certain people they would call for this and
certain people they would call for that.”
The station’s employees tried to address the problems with Omega directly with
the provider’s staff. However, when the issues were not resolved, it was passed up to the
more senior level. The Vice President of Membership oversaw the membership
department and was the main point of contact if the problem was escalated to the next
level. Sometimes she had to get the Executive Vice President and General Manager
involved in the dealings with Omega or even the CEO.

The Vice President for

Membership described the hierarchy for escalation of outsourcing problems:
“Well our CEO would have directly been serving on their board. Our
COO because I reported to him, so he had that level when a director can
only get so far and you just run into a wall so you just have to bring your
boss in to say look I've done everything I can. He would come in at that
point but didn't have a lot of contact with them. And then my staff, the
member services team to talk about hey Natasha called and said that she
gave $100 two months ago and it's not showing up anywhere, where in the
world could it be? So then our member services team which is my
people.”
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On the Omega side of business, several individuals were responsible for the
outsourcing contract with Gamma and kept contact with Gamma’s employees. One of
them was the data entry person who was in charge of entering and modifying
membership data when there was a mistake. The second person was the database
administrator who was responsible for querying the membership database and generating
reports for the station. When there were problems, the Member Services Supervisor had
two points of contact within Omega:
“I usually communicated with two people. I am not sure what the correct
titles for those people are. But one was the person that would do
adjustments for us. So I would communicate with him. And then if we had
requests for reports, there was another person.”
Most communication between the client and provider happened over the phone.
From time to time, Gamma and Omega had face-to-face meetings to discuss fundraising
projects. As the problems escalated, Omega resorted to written communication with
Gamma. Major financial or mailings disagreements were addressed by the station’s
executives in writing. The VP for Membership tried to document all the communication
with Omega, especially in the end of the contract:
“We would either meet mostly by phone or they would come here and we
would talk about it. Do a scope of work, what was required how many
hours was it going to take to complete it because it was doing changes not
necessarily to the software but to the business rules of the software and
gift type rules and that type of thing. So it was in writing and verbally
large changes were requested. And really towards the end most changes
all had to be requested in writing so that there was a paper trail.”
When the executives at the station decided to end the contract with Omega, they
first got approval from Gamma’s Board of Directors. The decision to terminate was
unanimous as the relationship was plagued with so many problems. To notify the
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provider of the decision not to renew, Gamma sent a written letter of termination to
Omega. At the same time the CEO of Gamma resigned from the Omega’s Board where
he served together with other stations’ CEOs. The VP for Memberships was part of the
transition team:
“Yes and we as soon as the board approved it we sent them written legal
notice that we were terminating our contract with them and our CEO
resigned from their board; so it was all done.”
Gamma informed Omega about the intent to discontinue service six months
before the end of the contract. Omega was not thrilled about the loss of one of its largest
customers and was not very cooperative during the transition. Gamma proceeded with a
backsourcing transition plan that was developed by the Executive Vice President and
General Manager:
“We gave notice that we would not renew. The renewal date was coming
up the same time that we were going to terminate anyway. So we sent a
letter saying our intention is not to renew. We gave I think 6 months
notice. Come December 31st, we are not going to renew. We want to be
out, and here's the transition plan for us to get out. The time came and we
got out.”
Once it was clear that Gamma wanted to end the relationship, Omega attempted to
negotiate with the station to prevent the termination of the contract. However, Gamma
had thoroughly evaluated the situation beforehand and was not interested in continuing
the contract. The VP for Membership felt the relationship with Omega aggravated to a
point when there was no possibility for reconciliation:
“I think that our concerns had been addressed so much that by the end we
said that there was nothing that they would be able to come back and say
to us that would make us want to stay.”
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Poor service quality plagued this outsourcing contract from the very beginning.
Gamma felt the majority of the Omega staff was unqualified to perform the membership
activities, and the few individuals who were knowledgeable, had their hands full with
requests from multiple stations. Frequent mistakes and a lack of resolution of those
problems by Omega, only created more aggravation. Goal incongruity led to
disagreements about fundraising and membership procedures and strategies. By the time
Gamma notified Omega of ending the contract, there was no recourse for Omega to
maintain the relationship. The damage was done during the course of three years and
multiple attempts by Gamma to improve the service quality were not addressed.

Emerging Themes
Power
Omicron exercised coercive power to pressure several stations to join the new
outsourcing project. Gamma, as a non-profit broadcasting station, depended on the
funding and leadership from Omicron and had to submit to the demands and outsource to
Omega. During the time of the contract, Omicron continued to support Omega despite
clients’ multiple complaints and dissatisfaction. The Senior Vice President for
Administration and Technology indicated that Gamma would have exited the GammaOmega contract earlier if it was not for pressure from the other stations and Omicron:
“We would have dropped out much sooner, but there was political
pressure from the group and Omicron (major venture funder) to stay the
course until Omega got their act together.”
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Integration of Perspectives
Most informants believed that dwindling service quality was the main reason for
getting out of the outsourcing relationship with Omega (Table 6.16). Complaints about
poor service quality included issues with incompetent employees, accounts of multiple
mistakes in performing services, lack of accountability on the part of provider, delays in
services and responses to requests, and poor senior management. Decreased fundraising
revenues were also mentioned by almost all of the informants during the interviews, and
the VP for Membership identified it as the main reason for backsourcing. Membership
contributions were the main output of membership campaigns, and low revenues signaled
a poor quality of fundraising. Lack of control was a concern of the Membership
Supervisor as she felt she could not deliver a good service to the members anymore,
because all the membership data was in hands of Omega and unavailable to Gamma.
While inadequate service quality was the main driver for backsourcing, the decision was
also economically sound. The station expected to achieve a cost advantage by returning
the membership services back in-house as the costs of managing it by Omega continued
to be exorbitant.
Table 6.16 Company Gamma: Reasons for Backsourcing by Informant
Informant
IS Manager
Member Services Supervisor
VP for Membership
Executive VP and General
Manager
Senior VP for Administration
and Technology

Primary Reason
Poor service quality
Regain Control
Decreased fundraising revenues
Poor service quality
Poor service quality
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Secondary Reason
Cost
Cost

Analysis of the comments made during the interviews revealed several other
factors that played a role in the decision to backsource. Table 6.17 reconciles the
comments of all the interviewees, which proved to be quite consistent (Table 6.18). From
the economic perspective, cost advantage was the leading factor in bringing back the
membership database. Gamma was able to achieve a lower production cost internally and
eliminate transaction and agency costs associated with the contract. Gamma considered
switching costs and realized that there was significant expense associated with the
transition, yet in the long run, this one time expense was justified by decreased overall
expenses for membership activities. So switching costs did not have an effect on the
decision. Omega was providing standardized services for all stations, but frequently
Gamma found itself seeking modifications to the membership practices. Omega was not
able to deliver customized or asset specific services to Gamma. Asset specificity may not
have much impact on the backsourcing directly, yet it influenced the perceptions of poor
service quality and a loss of control.
Gamma expected some customization to its membership campaigns from Omega,
particularly when the membership recruitment by the provider was unsuccessful. As the
service got worse and the revenues declined, Gamma increasingly felt that it had the
expertise in fundraising and wanted Omega to implement some innovative procedures.
Yet Omega wanted to keep the customization to a minimum, which in turn, delivered low
revenues and inadequate service to Gamma.
Poor service and decreasing revenues left Gamma feeling a lack of control over
the membership activities. Gamma could no longer react to the changes in its
membership environment as the data in the membership database was not available. Loss
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of control over membership recruitment, and in turn, the station’s revenues was amplified
by the importance of the membership function to the business of Gamma. Because the
membership contributions represented the largest portion of Gamma’s revenues,
membership activities were the core of Gamma’s business. Having the core outsourced
resulted in the feeling of helplessness and a loss of control.
Poor service quality exacerbated the feeling of loss of control even more. Gamma
realized that the goals of the provider were different from its own, particularly when it
tried to request station specific services from Omega. To improve the state of affairs,
Gamma’s staff and management frequently voiced their concerns to Omega. As the
issues escalated, most appeals were made to the provider’s executives as the highest
authority. Voice was not able to modify the situation, and Gamma proceeded to exit from
the relationship.
Considering all the aspects, Gamma’s outsourcing arrangement with Omega
suffered from several problems. The main factor, low service quality, resulted in the loss
of control over the station’s revenues and emphasized the importance of membership for
Gamma. At the same time low service quality necessitated requests for customized
services which accentuated the Gamma and Omega goal incongruence. Decreased
revenues from membership contributions led to financial difficulties at Gamma and
decreased economic benefits of the outsourcing arrangement.
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Table 6.17 Gamma – Omega Contract: Triangulation of Constructs by Informant
Informant

IS Manager

Construct

Member
Services
Supervisor

Cost
Advantage

VP for
Membership
Exceeding
expense of
outsourcing

Switching
Cost

Server
purchase

Asset
Specificity

All stations
are similar

All stations
are similar

Purchase server,
hire staff, new
vendors
Stations forced
to be similar,
was bad
Membership
DB is core

Change in Membership
the Role of DB is critical
IS
Loss
of
No control: No control:
Control
limited access limited access
Structural
Changes
Service
Quality

Fair service
quality

Felt
comfortable
that data was
safe
Goal
Could not
Was not
Conflict
name any
involved in
resolution
Satisfaction Did not have
many issues
personally

Senior VP for
Administration
& Technology
Outsourcing
increased
expenses and
lost revenue

Executive VP
& General
Manager
Outsourcing
was terribly
expensive
Very
expensive
transition
Cookie cutter
did not work
IT is critical
now

No control:
could not fix
revenues
VP died but no
VP died but
impact
no impact
Staff expertise Unresponsive
Good
low
equipment, bad low, many
service, many mistakes, poor experience,
mistakes
service
problems
Outsourcing
part of core
proved risky

Trust

Voice
Behavior

Power

Poor
feedback and
information
Adversarial
Fair
relationship
relationship,
deteriorated to from the start
frustration in
the end
Communicated Communicated CEO chaired
Informed of
network
escalated
termination
Omega’s Board.
problems
through
and transition
Top down
supervisor
communication
Pressure from Executive
Omicron
decision
Differences in
business
practices
Started off
positive, by the
end more than
terrible
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Table 6.18 Gamma – Omega Contract: Informant Agreement
Construct

Cost Advantage
Switching Cost
Asset Specificity
Change in the Role of IS
Loss of Control
Structural Changes
Service Quality
Trust
Goal Conflict
Satisfaction
Voice Behavior
Power

Total Number
of Coded
Quotes
7
4
5
4
12
4
18
1
7
6
14
2
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Number of Informants
who had Quotes

Agreement on
Construct

3
3
4
3
4
2
4
1
4
4
4
2

100% (3/3)
100% (3/3)
50% (2/4)
100% (3/3)
100% (4/4)
100% (2/2)
75% (3/4)
1 opinion
50% (2/4)
75% (3/4)
100% (4/4)
100% (2/2)

CHAPTER SEVEN. ANALYSIS OF BACKSOURCING
ANTECEDENTS

The previous chapter presented the results of individual case studies and
described the influence of each proposed backsourcing antecedent on the backsourcing
decision in every case. This chapter goes on to further analyze the backsourcing
antecedents by synthesizing the results of six case studies and identifying the factors most
salient in backsourcing. It starts out by triangulating the primary backsourcing factors
across the cases and identifies several factors that were critical in every case. Then it
examines each antecedent, in light of all cases, and discusses its impact on the
backsourcing decision. Finally, a qualitative comparative analysis is employed to identify
the necessary and sufficient factors for backsourcing. The chapter concludes with the
discussion of additional factors that emerged in the analysis and their role in the
backsourcing decision.

Triangulation of Backsourcing Antecedents Across Cases
The previous chapter focused on the interview results for individual cases and
presented interesting depictions of backsourcing considerations in every case. By itself, it
provided a unique perspective into the development of the outsourcing relationships,
backsourcing decision making process and transition back in-house. However, the main
research question of this dissertation is why outsourcing clients decide to backsource. To
answer this research question, results of all analyzed cases need to be synthesized and
certain main reasons for backsourcing isolated.
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During the collection of evidence, the researcher interviewed informants about
their backsourcing experience, and every informant had an opportunity to name the main
reason(s) that influenced their company’s decision to backsource. Table 7.1 summarizes
the results of individual cases presented in Tables 6.3, 6.6, 6.9, 6.15 and 6.18. The table
only includes cases that were backsourced. The most popular primary and secondary
reason for each case are presented in the respective columns. All other reasons that were
named by the informants, but did not make it in the primary or secondary category, are
grouped in the ‘Other reasons’ column. Interestingly enough, across all cases, only four
factors were identified as primary reasons for backsourcing decisions, and overall there
were only five reasons for backsourcing mentioned by all informants.
Table 7.1 Reasons for Backsourcing Across Cases
Contract
Alpha-Kappa
Alpha-Iota

Primary Reason
Change in the Role of IS
Change in the Role of IS
Poor service quality

Alpha-Sigma

Cost

Loss of control
Poor service quality
Gamma-Omega Poor service quality
Beta-Omega

Secondary Reason
Cost
Cost

Other reasons

Loss of Control
Structural
Changes/Power
Poor service quality Loss of Control
Structural
Changes/Power
Poor service quality Cost
Loss of control
Cost
Loss of control

Poor service quality was the most popular primary reason for backsourcing across
cases, followed by a change in the role of IS. In fact, service quality was named as either
the primary or secondary reason for backsourcing in every case except Alpha-Kappa.
Loss of control over the outsourced activities and cost benefit of backsourcing were also
identified as primary reasons for taking the activities back in-house. Besides, cost
surfaced as the most dominant secondary reason for backsourcing.
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The only additional factor that did not make it as a popular primary or secondary
reason, and emerged in the ‘Other’ category, was structural changes in the organization.
This made all three theoretically derived strategic factors (structural changes, loss of
control, and redefinition of the role of IS) to be identified as crucial by the informants in
analyzed backsourcing decisions.
Based on the informants opinions, five main factors had a direct impact on the
decision to backsource and can be considered as one answer to the research question
posed for this dissertation. To further investigate the role of other factors across cases, the
next section reviews all theoretically proposed constructs and discusses their influence on
backsourcing as well as other constructs.

Economic Considerations
According to the informants, cost reasons were critical in backsourcing decisions.
Yet other economic factors also played a role in backsourcing decisions of Alpha, Beta
and Gamma. Table 7.2 lists the status of asset specificity, production, transaction, agency
and switching costs for each case. Cost benefit of backsourcing is broken into internal
production cost and existing outsourcing contract transaction and agency cost, to evaluate
the role of those cost components in more detail.
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Table 7.2 Economic Considerations Across Cases
Contract
Alpha-Kappa

Alpha-Iota

Asset Specificity
No asset specificity

Cost Benefit
Small internal
production cost
advantage
Some asset specificity: Internal production cost
advantage
Need for specific
Some transaction costs
procedures

Some asset specificity: Internal production cost
advantage
business in many
Some transaction costs
countries
High agency costs
Some asset specificity: Internal production cost
Alpha-Tau
advantage
Need a global
Some transaction costs
provider, direct link
between continents
Some asset specificity: Internal production cost
Beta-Omega
Need for customized advantage
Some transaction costs
membership
High agency costs
procedures
Gamma-Omega Some asset specificity: Internal production cost
Need for customized advantage
Some transaction costs
membership
High agency costs
procedures
Alpha-Sigma

Switching Costs
Almost non-existent
switching costs
High switching costs
U.S.$80,000-transfer
U.S. $50,000 –
termination fee
High switching costs

Not backsourced: no
switching costs

Some switching
costs

High switching costs
U.S. $200,000

Asset Specificity of Outsourcing Arrangement
Transaction cost theory suggests that only when asset specificity of the
outsourced service is low, the provider can aggregate the demand of multiple clients and
achieve reduced production costs (Walker and Weber 1984). On the other hand, asset
specificity can raise transaction costs by increasing the need to coordinate the customized
activities and can raise agency costs by necessitating monitoring of the asset-specific
arrangement. Additionally, asset specificity by itself can motivate backsourcing when the
client company can no longer obtain the required customized services from the provider
or the provider does not have the ability to offer a particular service.
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Omega, an outsourcing provider for Beta and Gamma, built its business on
consolidating and standardizing the membership activities of non-profit TV stations.
Indeed, the stations had a lot of similarities in fundraising and membership recruitment
procedures. However, both Beta and Gamma used some unique approaches to
communication with its members and required some customization of the membership
activities carried out by Omega. In addition to general reports delivered to all stations,
both stations had to request, and pay extra, for customized reports to fit their situation and
needs. Such requests inflated the overall costs of the outsourcing contract by increasing
the monthly payments, or production costs, and incurring an expense to coordinate the
requests, or transaction costs. Similarly, some specific procedures had to be followed by
Alpha’s provider, Iota, for application upgrades and maintenance. It increased Alpha’s
outsourcing costs, as Iota always billed Alpha for requests above SLA (production costs),
and Alpha had to train Iota’s staff on special procedures (transaction costs).
In the Alpha-Tau contract, asset specificity coupled with provider’s inability to
deliver, required unique services and necessitated renegotiation of the contract to
terminate the existing telecommunication line between Australia and North America.
Instead, Alpha purchased the line from another telecommunications provider who offered
its services worldwide and was able to satisfy Alpha’s need for a global direct
connection.
Cost Benefit of Backsourcing
Cost benefit of backsourcing was named by the informants as one of the main
factors to backsource in every analyzed backsourcing case. As in any make-or-buy
decision, estimated internal production costs were compared with the cost of the existing
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outsourcing arrangement. When original expectations of economic efficiency did not
materialize in the outsourcing contracts, Alpha, Beta and Gamma turned to backsourcing
for cost savings.
Cost benefit was the primary reason for backsourcing of the Alpha-Sigma
contract. This arrangement was significantly overpriced, and Alpha was motivated to
backsource because of exorbitant costs associated with this contract. Sigma, on multiple
occasions, billed Alpha for discontinued network nodes and Alpha’s employees had to
continuously monitor the provider to curb its opportunism, which increased Alpha’s
agency costs.
Costs were the secondary most critical reason for backsourcing for the Alpha-Iota,
Alpha-Kappa and Gamma-Omega contracts, and one of the other reasons for the BetaOmega contract. Alpha considered the cost of Kappa’s contract reasonable, but was not
satisfied with the costs of the contract with Iota. Alpha was able to backsource both data
processing contracts and incur lower costs in-house by consolidating its IS operations and
utilizing economies of scale. In addition to the direct financial expense of outsourcing,
Alpha also incurred transaction costs when Alpha’s employees had to spend time
coordinating the activities of Iota. Likewise, Gamma and Beta estimated that they could
reduce their membership costs by backsourcing the Omega contracts. They were able to
achieve lower internal production costs, as well as cut the agency costs of monitoring the
poorly performing provider and the transaction costs associated with coordinating
customized membership activities.
Cost considerations are important for any business entity. Not surprisingly, as
predicted by the transaction cost theory, costs played a role in all analyzed backsourcing
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decisions. However, only in one case, costs were named as the primary reason for
backsourcing. In all other cases, cost played a secondary or even supporting role by
justifying the transfer of the outsourced services back in-house when backsourcing was
motivated by other factors. In the case of the Alpha-Tau contract, Alpha could have
reduced its IS cost by backsourcing, yet was precluded from doing so by other factors
that had a stronger influence on the final decision.
Switching Costs of Backsourcing
While expected cost savings can be a motive to backsource an existing
outsourcing contract, transitioning back in-house can often be an expensive undertaking.
Backsourcing of IS activities can involve large capital outlays for purchase of IS
hardware and software and the network’s set up, as well as difficulties in recruitment of
qualified IS personnel to take over formerly outsourced activities. If early termination of
an existing contract is involved, switching costs can also include termination fees. Even if
a company can achieve low in-house production costs, significant switching costs can
negate the cost benefit of backsourcing.
All examined cases had some switching costs associated with backsourcing, yet
the switching costs did not preclude the companies from pursuing backsourcing. Beta and
Gamma had to rebuild in-house expertise to be able to handle backsourced activities
internally. Additionally, Gamma had to hire another company to help with backsourcing
and had to pay both Omega and another provider for the same services during the
transition. Backsourcing Iota’s contract Alpha had to purchase equipment, and physically
transfer some equipment from the provider’s site to the internal data center. Sigma’s
contract backsourcing required extensive travel to set up the new network and significant
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equipment costs. In addition to all the transition costs, Alpha had to pay an early
termination fee to Iota for breaching the contract.
While switching costs can serve as a barrier to transitioning back in-house, in
most cases those costs are justified by expected long-term cost savings as a result of
backsourcing. Even the difficulties in reestablishing a non-existent IS department and the
learning curve associated with gaining expertise and IS skills, could not prevent the
company from backsourcing. It can especially be true in situations where cost savings are
not the primary factor motivating backsourcing.

Strategic Considerations
Redefinition of the role of IS, need to regain control and internal structural
changes were each identified as leading reasons for backsourcing by the informants.
Table 7.3 summarizes the role of strategic components across cases. The following
sections discuss the influence of these factors on backsourcing, as well as on other factors
involved in the evaluation of the backsourcing decision.
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Table 7.3 Strategic Considerations Across Cases
Contract
Alpha-Kappa

Change in the Role of IS
Loss of Control
Redefined the role of IS: No loss of control
IS became global function
and was centralized

Alpha-Iota

Redefined the role of IS: Some loss of control:
IS became global function slow responsiveness
and was centralized

Alpha-Sigma

Redefined the role of IS: Loss of control: no
IS became global function knowledge of the
network,
poor
and was centralized
flexibility

Alpha-Tau

Redefined the role of IS: Loss of control: no
IS became global function knowledge of the
network,
poor
and was centralized
flexibility

Realized the importance
of
IS:
Membership
database is critical to
generating revenues
Gamma-Omega Realized the importance
of
IS:
Membership
database is critical to
generating revenues
Beta-Omega

Structural Changes
Internal
structural
changes:
centralization
of
global
operations,
new CEO and CIO
Internal
structural
changes:
centralization
of
global
operations,
new CEO and CIO
Internal
structural
changes:
centralization
of
global
operations,
new CEO and CIO
Internal
structural
changes:
centralization
of
global
operations,
new CEO and CIO
Internal
structural
changes: CEO had to
resign

Loss of control:
could not react to
changes
in
membership
Loss of control: No internal structural
could not react to changes:
changes
in
membership

Internal Structural Changes
Structural changes in the organization can involve external changes such as
mergers or acquisitions, and internal changes, such as changes in the management.
Internal structural changes can lead to shifts in corporate power. Power and politics play
a role in decision making and can have an impact on decisions about sourcing
arrangements (Markus 1983; Lacity 1993). When new executives join the company, they
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arrive with their own ideas, which affect overall company strategy and IS strategy in
particular. Changes in management can lead to a redefinition of the role of IS or even
impact specific decisions on backsourcing.
While none of the examined cases had any external structural changes, like
mergers or acquisitions, Alpha and Beta did experience some changes in management.
Alpha’s parent company Delta, decided to establish the corporate headquarters of Alpha
to streamline its business. As a result, all regional executives were replaced with a team
of executives at the corporate headquarters. The new team embarked on globalization and
centralization of the company. Alpha’s new CEO and CIO did not support the idea of
outsourcing, and wanted to create an internal IS center that could handle Alpha’s global
IS needs. New executives spearheaded backsourcing of all existing outsourcing contracts.
However, one of the contracts with Tau was not backsourced but only renegotiated. This
particular contract supported Asia-Pacific operations of Alpha and was part of an
agreement arranged by Alpha’s parent company, Delta. Even though Alpha’s CIO
wanted to have full control over IS operations, he was not able to end the relationship
with Tau, as it would have left Delta with overhead capacity in the contract.
Beta’s contract with Omega was promoted by Beta’s CEO who also served on
Omega’s board. Even though the contract deteriorated over time, and there was an
increasing sense of resentment among Beta’s employee, the CEO continued to support
the arrangement. Because the outsourcing contract negatively affected the fundraising
revenues, Beta’s Board of Directors had to step in and advise to discontinue the
relationship. The station proceeded with backsourcing, while the CEO had to resign over
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the failed contract with Omega. As long as the CEO was in charge of the decision
making, he did not allow Beta to pursue backsourcing.
Loss of Control over IS
Some IS functions happen to be critical contributors to business operations and
empower companies to adapt quickly to changing opportunities. However, if an
outsourcing provider is in charge of critical functions, the client company may experience
a loss of control over those functions. When a company loses control over an outsourced
activity, it reduces its ability to take action when things are going wrong (Huxham and
Macdonald 1992). Poor service quality exacerbates loss of control by bringing an
emphasis to the company’s inability to act upon derailing activities. To prevent
significant loss of control, the companies should maintain critical activities in-house.
Omega standardized membership and fundraising procedures for all its clients and
limited the client’s access to the membership database. Beta and Gamma had no control
over the actions taken by Omega to recruit members and raise contributions. Faced with
falling revenues, both stations wished they could have access to the membership database
and rely on internal activities to increase fundraising contributions. Yet, they could not
modify Omega’s procedures, could not reach out to members on their own, and had to
wait 10 days to get any report from Omega. To gain control over the membership
database, Beta and Gamma needed to return the membership database back in-house.
Alpha’s contract with Iota suffered from the slow responsiveness of the provider.
Alpha’s requests for updates to its software took time to implement and slowed Alpha’s
ability to respond to its business needs. During system failures, Alpha’s staff had to travel
to Iota to address the issues and ensure the fastest response. Because Iota’s data center
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was several hundred miles away from the Alpha-U.K. office, it took long time to return
the systems to full functionality. While failures were not frequent, Alpha did experience
some loss of control and could not react quickly in cases of emergency.
Alpha experienced significant loss of control in both of its telecommunications
contract with Sigma and Tau. Alpha had poor visibility of the networks, and was not able
to assess the actual capacity of the network, or view its utilization at any given time.
Requests for any network modifications had to be submitted to the provider and Alpha
could not promptly react to the telecommunication needs of its business and environment.
When Alpha experienced network failures, it could not repair the network and had to rely
on Sigma or Tau to address the issues. To regain control over the network, and better
utilize the network, Alpha decided to pursue backsourcing. It was successful at
terminating the contract with Sigma and centralizing the global network administration at
the corporate headquarters. While Alpha was not able to completely terminate the
contract with Tau, it renegotiated the contract to have access to the tools that assess the
utilization of the network and give Alpha more control over its telecommunications
environment.
Redefinition of the Role of IS
Based on core competency perspective, to achieve operational efficiency,
companies should focus on activities that underpin their business success and deliver
unique value (Allen 2002; Quinn 1999). Activities that play a supporting role are
considered commodity type activities, and are good candidates for outsourcing. A
Business strategy undergoes modifications as businesses develop, which can lead to the
repositioning and restructuring of certain activities. If those activities are outsourced, the
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company may have to backsource them to address the changes in strategy. Redefinition
of the role of IS happens on the executive level of the organization and is driven by the
company’s decision makers. If there are changes in the company’s management, it can
inflict subsequent changes in the strategy and role of IS.
Beta and Gamma outsourced membership data processing and support to an
outside provider, Omega. Several years into the contract both stations were struggling to
maintain their membership and their fundraising revenues were falling. Membership
proved to be a critical component of Beta and Gamma’s operations as it was the largest
source of revenues and financially supported the stations. Because the stations could not
control their fundraising, it forced them to reassess the role of membership in their
business and backsource their membership data processing. There was no company wide
policy change, yet the poor outsourcing experience led to a loss of control over
membership, which in turn underscored the value of this activity.
On the other hand, Alpha experienced a huge strategic shift in positioning of its
business. The company decided to transition from disparate operations in different
countries to one global standardized operation, centrally managed by one group of top
managers. As part of the overall strategy redefinition, the role of IS underwent changes as
well. To match the new global business structure, IS activities had to become global too.
Part of the globalization was consolidation of those activities in one location, at the
corporate headquarters. The new IS operation involved a new corporate wide IS and
centralized network, which made the existing outsourcing contracts with Iota, Kappa,
Sigma and Tau obsolete. Redefinition of the role of IS at Alpha was driven by the new
executives at the company.
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Relationship Considerations
A major characteristic of the outsourcing contract and service quality, was
identified as the primary reason for backsourcing by the informants. Actually, poor
service quality was a concern in four out of five analyzed backsourcing scenarios. Table
7.4 summarized relationship constructs across cases and the following sections discuss
the role these constructs played in examined backsourcing decisions.
Table 7.4 Relationship Considerations Across Cases
Contract

Service
Quality

Goal Conflict

AlphaKappa

Good service None
quality: very
responsive

Alpha-Iota

Low service
quality:
deteriorated
over time

Goal conflict:
provider
unwilling to
do extra work

AlphaSigma

Low service
quality:
network
failures and
delays
Low service
quality: poor
responsiveness
and delays
Low service
quality: poor
responsiveness

Goal conflict:
billing issues

Alpha-Tau

BetaOmega

GammaOmega

Trust

Satisfaction
Voice
with
Behavior
Outsourcing
Good rapport:
Trusted the Satisfied:
provider
provider
positive
relationship responsive to
requests
Documented
Some trusted Somewhat
problem
the provider, satisfied:
some did not relationship reports helped
deteriorated end contract
over time
Did not trust Not satisfied: Poor rapport:
the provider: bad contract, lack
of
constant
response from
bad
monitoring
relationship the provider

Not satisfied: Negotiated
more control
strained
the
relationship over
network
Goal conflict: Did not trust Not satisfied: Poor rapport:
the provider: relationship communicated
provider
deteriorated concerns
unwilling to constant
daily, lack of
over time
monitoring
customize
response from
the provider
Low service Goal conflict: Some trusted Not satisfied: Poor rapport:
the provider relationship escalated
quality: poor provider
deteriorated concerns
responsiveness unwilling to
over time
customize
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Service Quality of the Outsourcing Arrangement
Clients evaluate service quality of the outsourcing arrangement by benchmarking
the received service level against the expected service level. The quality and promptness
of the provided outsourcing services affects the client’s business and effectiveness of the
outsourcing arrangement. Not surprisingly, service quality is a big component of client’s
overall satisfaction with outsourcing. Continuous service performance below the
expectations puts a negative strain on the relationship between the client and the provider
and undermines the client’s trust. As the service quality declines, one of the options for
the client is to exit the relationship (Hirschman 1970) and backsource.
Five examined outsourcing contracts suffered from inadequate service quality and
four of them were backsourced. Alpha was unhappy with poor responsiveness, lack of
professionalism, and service delays in its contracts with Iota, Sigma and Tau. Similarly,
Beta and Gamma complained about unknowledgeable staff at Omega, delays with
membership mailings and mishandling of billing. All poor service quality contracts were
backsourced except Alpha’s contract with Tau. Alpha renegotiated that contract, but had
to continue with the provider despite low levels of service quality.
In contrast, Alpha was very happy with the level of service provided by Kappa.
The staff of Kappa was described as very responsive and Alpha’s requests were always
addressed promptly. Yet, the contract between Kappa and Alpha was terminated and
Alpha brought data processing from Kappa back in-house. High service quality by itself
was not able to justify continuation of outsourcing relationship with Kappa.
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Trust in the Provider
Trust between partners in a relationship develops over time. In an outsourcing
arrangement troubled by inadequate service quality and poor rapport between the
partners, the trust is likely to deteriorate. Client’s lack of trust in the provider necessitates
frequent monitoring of provider’s activities to curb opportunistic behavior and ensure
adequate performance. Such monitoring increases agency cost associated with the
outsourcing contract, and makes the arrangement less attractive economically. When the
client can not trust the provider, it affects the overall satisfaction with the relationship and
backsourcing becomes a viable alternative.
The Alpha-Sigma and Beta-Omega arrangements were troubled by low service
quality. As a result, the trust in the provider did not develop in those relationships. Alpha
and Beta had to scrutinize the provider’s activities to maintain acceptable levels of
service. Lack of trust undermined the relationship and led to a more frequent voicing of
concerns by the clients. Beta suspected Omega was opportunistic in inflating membership
database numbers and overbilling Beta for services. Alpha was also concerned about
Sigma’s billing for services that were deemed by Sigma above SLA. As the relationships
deteriorated, both companies pursued backsourcing.
Goal Conflict
In an agency relationship, conflicts are inevitable as partners pursue different
goals. Providers rely on economies of scale to reduce its costs and deliver standardized
services to multiple clients. On the other hand, clients not only seek to lower their costs,
but also to streamline their operations. Goal conflict can sometimes be a result of high
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asset specificity of the outsourcing arrangement when a client requests asset specific
services from the provider. Goal conflict often causes the relationship between two
partner companies to disintegrate and backsourcing comes into consideration.
Beta and Gamma had to alter its membership procedures to comply with the new
requirements imposed by the provider, Omega. Throughout the contract, however, Beta
and Gamma saw their fundraising revenues decline and wanted to implement some
station specific procedures to improve membership activities. Omega insisted on
restricting stations’ access to the database and continued to follow its own procedures.
Tensions ran high in the relationship and companies were not able to find common
ground. Eventually, Beta and Gamma sought to backsource membership activities.
There was some goal conflict in the relationship of Alpha and Iota. Alpha had
many legacy applications running at Iota’s facilities. When updates and service were
required, Iota had to contact individual software developers. Iota wanted to charge extra
because there were so many different developers to contact, and Alpha was not willing to
pay more as it felt updates were part of the contract. Similarly, Alpha ran into billing
issues with Sigma over the number of the nodes on the network and payments for those
nodes. Goal conflict in these relationships contributed to overall dissatisfaction as well as
increased transaction costs of the outsourcing arrangement and resulted in subsequent
backsourcing.
Satisfaction with Outsourcing Relationship
Timeliness and quality of the delivered services, provider behavior and
performance on the contract, rapport between the client and the provider, costs of
services, and overall competitive advantage gained by contracting the provider contribute
280

to the overall satisfaction with the outsourcing arrangement. A dissatisfied client is likely
to seek other alternatives to an existing outsourcing contract and can backsource.
Beta and Gamma were not satisfied with their contracts with Omega. The
relationship deteriorated over time due to a low quality of the provided services, frequent
mishaps by the provider, goal conflict in the relationship and monetary disagreements.
Likewise, Alpha was not satisfied with its contracts with Sigma, Tau and Iota. Sigma and
Iota contracts were perceived as expensive and delivered unsatisfactory service quality.
All three contracts also limited Alpha’s ability to control their IS activities and promptly
respond to business changes. Alpha, Beta and Gamma decided to backsource the
unsatisfactory relationships with Iota, Sigma and Omega to improve the situation. On the
other hand, Alpha was very happy with its relationship with Kappa, it was a “perfect
contract”, yet it was backsourced like all other ones. Even though Alpha was satisfied
with the relationship, other factors necessitated backsourcing.
Voice Behavior
In a relationship, partners can resort to voice behavior in an attempt to change an
objectionable state of affairs. Clients and providers in outsourcing contracts have to
communicate about service levels, billing, service requests, monthly reports, and resolve
issues when those arise. When there is unhappiness with any part of the contract, a client
can bring it up with the provider in an attempt to improve the situation. If those requests
do not result in improved service, the client can grow increasingly unhappy. On the other
hand, in healthy relationships parties keep lines of communication open, try to listen to
the concerns of other party and find common ground. In a successful relationship the
provider would try to respond to the client’s concerns if such concerns are justifiable.
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In the Alpha-Sigma, Alpha-Tau, Beta-Omega and Gamma-Omega relationships,
clients used voice to communicate their concerns to the providers. Escalation procedures
were established for situations when the problems were not addressed to the client’s
satisfaction. As problems progressed, the companies found themselves contacting the
provider more frequently. Alpha-Sigma, Beta-Omega and Gamma-Omega contracts were
backsourced when the clients continuously voiced their concerns but did not experience
any improvement in the situation.
The Alpha-Iota contract was an interesting example of using voice behavior to
negotiate early termination of the agreement. Alpha resorted to voicing its concerns every
time there was a problem with Iota’s service. Iota was not very responsive to Alpha’s
requests, and Alpha sometimes had to repeat the requests several times. When it was
decided to backsource, Alpha used the records of communication to demonstrate Iota’s
poor service quality and multiple requests to modify the service. Alpha was able to end
the contract early without termination fees.
An example of successful voicing behavior and cooperation between client and
provider is the Alpha-Kappa contract. One of Alpha’s providers, Kappa, was very
responsive to the clients concerns. Alpha’s use of voice behavior was mostly to maintain
a healthy relationship with Kappa and modify the situation when necessary. Voice
behavior increases only when there are problems with the relationship. In a satisfactory
arrangement, voice behavior is used to maintain rapport between the partners.
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Emerging Themes
To make sure that selected theoretical perspectives did not bias and limit the
findings, the interview transcripts were also reviewed for emerging themes. Those themes
were added to coding categories and applied to transcripts, together with predefined
coding categories. One significant theme that emerged across the cases was the role of
power and its impact on backsourcing decision making.
Power
Power can be achieved through control of power bases and power sources. Power
bases refer to what power holders control that permits them to manipulate the behavior of
others, while power sources refer to the manner in which parties come to control power
bases (Hall 1999). Two different notions of power were revealed during the analysis of
backsourcing decisions. First, power of the organizational decision makers had influence
on the backsourcing decisions. According to the rationalist perspective on power, top
management in an organization holds power based on its legitimate and formal
organization authority and its expertise (Bradshaw-Camball 1991).
Second, interorganizational power of other entities that were affiliated with the
client organization also impacted the backsourcing decisions. The power of those other
entities was based on the control over resources and information (Bradshaw-Camball
1991). The organizations faced conflicting goals and had to resort to negotiation and
politics to favor their interests. Power in interorganizational relations can be explained by
a pluralist perspective which suggests that other companies can have power based on
their access to resources, expertise, or their position can legitimize their authority. During
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a power struggle, parties engage in political games and stakeholders utilize various
political strategies (Bradshaw-Camball 1991).
Power of Decision Makers
Power of decision makers played a significant role in backsourcing decisions at
Alpha. First of all, the new executives hired to head the corporate headquarters did not
approve of outsourcing. The CIO had prior experience working for an outsourcing
provider and was confident he could create the same successful IS operation in-house,
especially that Alpha was large enough to enjoy economies of scale. He had full support
of the CEO who was working on the centralization of Alpha’s worldwide business in the
corporate headquarters. The CEO was centralizing control over the business, and control
over IS activities and was part of the overall consolidation. Since the CEO and the CIO
held the decision making rights they were able to spearhead the backsourcing of various
IS outsourcing contracts at Alpha.
Corporate decision to backsource created some resentment on behalf of the local
employees who felt they were losing control over their own jobs. While the executives
justified backsourcing by cost savings, poor service quality or need to regain control,
some employees on location had different opinions. In fact, one of Alpha’s employees in
France during his interview suggested that the service quality of the Alpha-Iota contract
was not necessarily bad (contrary to all other accounts), but it was “the Americans” (i.e.
executives from corporate headquarters) who decided to backsource. As a result of
business centralization the local offices lost their power and control over the business
strategy, including IS strategy. New executives at Alpha wanted to backsource all
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regional IS outsourcing contracts upon their expiration to enjoy full control over the
operations.
Similarly, the CEO of Beta was an avid supporter of the idea to outsource to
Omega. He used his position and decision making authority to continue to support BetaOmega contract throughout the term of the arrangement, even when it became apparent
that Omega was not successful in managing the membership database and the fundraising
revenues started to slide. There was some resentment on the part of Beta’s membership
personnel as they grew dissatisfied with the relationship, yet could not modify the
situation. The CEO, being the decision maker, continued to support the project and
defend it in front of Beta’s Board. Finally, the Board exercised its power and made the
decision to end the relationship with Omega and backsource the membership database. At
the same time the CEO had to resign under the pressure from the Board. Some of the
interviewees suggested that he could have stayed with Beta had he accepted the
responsibility for the falling revenues and admitted that outsourcing had been a mistake.
Power in Interorganizational Relationships
Power of other entities was evident in backsourcing situations of all three
examined companies. An interesting situation occurred in the Alpha-Tau contract. This
particular contract was not negotiated by Alpha, but by Alpha’s parent, Delta. Delta was
the sole owner of Alpha and was based in Asia-Pacific, where the Alpha-Tau contract
originated. It was Delta’s decision to establish global headquarters for Alpha and have
one team of executives managing the worldwide business. Yet when the new strategy
meant backsourcing part of the contract with Tau, it was not accepted well in AsiaPacific.
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Alpha was able to terminate and backsource all of its worldwide IS outsourcing
contracts except the contract with Tau in Asia-Pacific. Because Delta was the sole owner
of Alpha, Delta was able to exercise its power and keep Alpha in the contract with Tau.
The problem stemmed from conflicting goals of Alpha and Delta. While Alpha estimated
that it could save money, improve service quality and gain control over those outsourced
activities by backsourcing, it had to stay with the provider to support its parent company.
Alpha is the largest company of the Delta consortium and thus was responsible for the
largest part of the outsourcing contract with Tau. Alpha’s backsourcing would have left
Delta with significant overhead capacity in the contract that had to be paid for regardless
of Alpha’s participation.
Interestingly enough, Alpha – Asia-Pacific was also the last one on schedule to
transition to the global corporate financial systems and logistics application. The
transitioning kept being postponed while all other regions have already been using the
new system hosted and managed at the corporate headquarters. The Asia-Pacific office is
closely connected with Delta and was able to resist the transitioning the longest, thus
keeping the control over its local business in its hands. Clearly, there is some political
maneuvering involved in the relationship between Alpha and Delta. Alpha – Asia-Pacific
enjoys the support of Delta which derives its power from its ownership of Alpha.
Role of power was also evident in the Beta-Omega and Gamma-Omega contracts.
First of all, the initial decision to outsource the membership database to Omega was
strongly supported by a non-profit broadcasting corporation Omicron. Beta and Gamma
were dependent on Omicron for some of its funding and Omicron served as an umbrella
corporation for non-profit broadcasting stations. Omega was started under the auspices of
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Omicron and CEOs of several TV stations were invited to serve on its board. To show
support for the idea of centralizing membership those stations were also recruited to
participate in the outsourcing project and had to comply. CEOs of both stations served on
the Omega’s Board and Gamma’s CEO even presided over the Board.
When the things at Omega started to deteriorate, Omicron exercised it power over
the stations once again by insisting the stations continue with outsourcing. Beta’s
attempts to backsource the Beta-Omega contract were met with threats by Omicron that
persisted in its support of the project. The CEO of Gamma had to resign from Omega’s
Board to support his stations’ backsourcing. Both stations received no help from either
Omega or Omicron during backsourcing transition.
Role of Power in Backsourcing Decisions
The role of decision makers or powerful other entities is evident in all examined
backsourcing cases. Power plays a significant role in organizations that had to conform to
pressures from the environment as well as pressures exercised within the company. The
role of power in implementation and use of information systems is widely acknowledged
(Markus 1983; Jasperson 2002). Within organizations power provides authority and
decision making rights. In the case of Alpha, structural changes in the organization
altered the balance of power by shifting it from the local offices to the central
headquarters. High position in the formal structure of the organization provided access to
specific power resources (Markus 1983) and allowed executives to make backsourcing
decisions. Similarly, Beta’s CEO was able to use his authority and continue with the
outsourcing arrangement with Omega.
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Backsourcing decisions can be impacted by low service quality of the outsourcing
arrangement, cost benefit of backsourcing, structural changes, loss of control or
redefinition of the role of IS. However, it is also evident that the backsourcing decision
can be imposed by the opinions of corporate executives who have decision making
authority. To justify their decision, executives are likely to rely on the traditional
economic factors, yet the evaluation of the existing outsourcing and backsourcing options
could be first and foremost driven by their personal opinions and beliefs.
On the other hand, the companies under investigation also experienced pressures
from other organizations. Delta was able to pressure Alpha into continuation of its
contract with Tau, and Alpha – Asia-Pacific was successful in resisting corporate IS
changes with the support from Delta. Omicron was successful at recruiting Beta, Gamma
and other TV stations to participate in outsourcing to Omega by exercising its power over
the stations. Therefore, in interorganizational relationships, other organizations could
have influence over the client organization and exercise its power to impose its opinions
on backsourcing decision.

Integration of Factors
In all examined backsourcing cases, cost benefit was named as one of the reasons
for backsourcing. Interestingly enough, in the Alpha-Tau case, the informants suggested
that it would have been cost beneficial to backsource that contract. Nevertheless, the
contract was not backsourced even though cost analysis called for it. Other factors,
namely pressure from the parent company to continue the relationship, had a stronger

288

impact on the decision to continue with the relationship. In this case, cost benefit by itself
was not able to justify the backsourcing.
It should be noted that cost factors were closely interrelated with other factors.
Various economic, strategic and relationship considerations impacted cost components of
the outsourcing arrangement, thus increasing the overall benefit of backsourcing. For
example, loss of control over the outsourced IS services increased the agency cost of the
outsourcing relationship. Any deterioration of the outsourcing contract contributed to the
decreased cost benefit of the outsourcing arrangement. While cost is important, a
company could not sacrifice its crucial competencies and capabilities to save money and
that’s why strategic components are all included in the primary factors that affect the
backsourcing decision.

While service quality and cost benefit are strong precursors to

backsourcing, they can be overpowered by strategic factors such as a change in the role
of IS (Alpha-Kappa) or power pressure (Alpha-Tau).
Surprisingly, power of the decision makers or other entities involved in the
interorganizational relationship with the client had a significant impact on the
backsourcing decision. The role of power was so important that it even overpowered
other rational economic, strategic or relationship considerations. Politics played an
important role in backsourcing decisions, and in some cases was able to postpone (BetaOmega) or prevent backsourcing (Alpha-Tau).

Qualitative Comparative Analysis
To augment the above analysis of backsourcing antecedents, another technique,
namely qualitative comparative analysis, was used to identify factors necessary and
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sufficient to result in the backsourcing outcome. To perform qualitative comparative
analysis, first, the outcome of interest and its theoretical scope were defined. In this
dissertation the outcome of interest was backsourcing of information systems and a
number of theoretical antecedents have been defined as possible factors that affect
backsourcing. All six examined cases were used during the analysis. While the number of
cases is not exhaustive, backsourcing is a large scale and infrequent phenomenon, which
makes it easier to employ an enumeration rather than sampling strategy for case selection
(Fichman 2004). The case evidence was analyzed for presence of absence of the
theoretically derived backsourcing antecedents and emerging antecedent, power, in each
case. Table 7.5 summarizes the factors across cases. Dichotomized values were assigned
to the factors for each case (0 for absence of a condition, and 1 for presence of a
condition).
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Table 7.5 Presence of Backsourcing Conditions Across Cases
Contract
Construct

AlphaKappa
Present

Cost
Advantage
Switching
Not Present
Cost
Asset
Not Present
Specificity
Change in the
Present
Role of IS
Loss of
Not Present
Control
Structural
Present
Changes
Poor Service Not Present
Quality
Low Trust
Not Present
Goal Conflict Not Present
Dissatisfaction Not Present
Power
Present
Backsourcing
Present

Alpha-Iota
Present

AlphaSigma
Present

Alpha-Tau

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Not Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Present
Present
Not Present

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Not Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Present

BetaOmega
Present

GammaOmega
Present

Present

Present

QCA 3.0 software was used to construct a truth table that enumerated all possible
combinations of the independent variables and what outcome was observed. In total,
there were 11 independent variables considered, which brought the total number of
possible factor combinations to 2048. The algorithm compared all configurations to one
another, looking for opportunities to eliminate irrelevant variables and combine
configurations into simpler forms (Drass 1992). The most parsimonious set of conditions,
that explained backsourcing in the analyzed cases, was a combination of backsourcing
cost advantage, redefinition of the role of IS, structural changes in the organization and
power influence.
The QCA method may not be a perfect solution to the research question, yet it
provides an additional insight into the factors that lead to backsourcing. The sample of
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cases did not include a full enumeration of all backsourcing cases, and there is a
possibility that different results could be observed with a different sample. However,
combined with the analysis presented in the earlier section, this method allowed the
researcher to single out the backsourcing antecedents that are necessary and sufficient to
lead to backsourcing. These primary factors interact with other factors and together lead
to backsourcing, yet the other factors only serve as compounding reasons, but are not
sufficient to produce the outcome. The factors that were not included in the three factor
solution are considered irrelevant to the outcome, because they do not change the
outcome whether they are present or not.
It is essential to point out that all four components that were identified by the
QCA, as necessary and sufficient reasons to lead to backsourcing, were also included in
the primary reasons for backsourcing named by the interviewees. Power was named in
two cases, where it referred to the power of executives and the structural changes that
caused power shifts. This provides some credibility to the analysis performed by QCA
and confirms that these four factors are indeed critical in decision to backsource.
However, loss of control over the outsourced activities and service quality of the
outsourcing arrangement were not deemed necessary by the QCA to imply backsourcing.
Why was service quality not included in the final solution? It is surprising that
service quality was identified as the primary reason for backsourcing by informants
across cases. The result may be due to the fact that in one of the cases, service quality
was high (Alpha-Kappa), yet the contract was backsourced. In another case (Alpha-Tau)
service quality was inadequate, yet the relationship still continued. Other reasons,
specifically, like the change in the role of IS and cost, were critical in the decision to
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backsource. Qualitative comparative analysis eliminated variables that are irrelevant to
the outcome because those variable were either present or absent, yet the outcome was
unchanged. It demonstrates that while service quality is an important deliverable in the
outsourcing contract, it can be superseded by other factors. For the informants it is easy
to point out to the problems with the service and blame the service quality for the
outsourcing failure. Yet in decision making, there are more powerful factors in play that
lead to backsourcing.
Loss of control was probably also deemed irrelevant by the QCA algorithm. Loss
of control increases agency costs and also can underscore the importance of the
outsourced services, thus necessitating the redefinition of the role of IS. While it’s been
argued that loss of control directly impacts backsourcing, it may be that loss of control
affects backsourcing indirectly by increasing the cost of existing arrangement and
demonstrating the importance of outsourced services.
One of the notions of power, authority of decision makers, and internal structural
changes in the organization are very similar. Both components were included into the
QCA solution, but it should be acknowledged that structural power is related to the
theoretically derived antecedent of internal structural changes. These changes in the
organizations lead to redistribution of corporate power and thus, imply structural power.
Construct of power can replace the construct of structural changes as the one that
addresses both existing and incoming power structures.
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CHAPTER EIGHT. LESSONS LEARNED AND REFLECTIONS ON
RESEARCH

This is a final chapter of this dissertation. It starts out by evaluating the
methodology of this research and discussing the steps taken to ensure the validity and the
reliability of results. It then presents the findings of this dissertation, followed by the
acknowledgement of limitations. The chapter concludes with a list of future research
directions stemming from this study.

Evaluation of Conducted Research
The value of any research project is its contribution to knowledge. The goal of
this dissertation was to identify factors that serve as antecedents of information systems
backsourcing. The knowledge contribution of this dissertation is the framework of factors
that contribute to the backsourcing decision. Specifically, through case study research,
several main reasons for backsourcing were identified that include cost benefit of
backsourcing, poor service quality and loss of control over existing outsourcing
arrangement, redefinition of the role of IS, structural changes in the organization, and the
power of decision makers and other entities involved in interorganizational relationships
with the client company.
Guidelines for conducting case study research can help to evaluate the quality of
this research project (Benbasat 1987). Table 8.1 summarized the guidelines and specifics
for this dissertation. This research pursued exploratory strategy by examining the context
of backsourcing and determining the factors that impact the outsourcing client’s decision
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to backsource. The unit of analysis for the case studies was an outsourcing contract
between client and provider, and six different contracts were examined. Literal
replication was the goal of case site selection, with research focusing on the phenomenon
of backsourcing.
To increase the validity of this study, multiple sources of evidence were utilized.
While most of the data was collected through semi-structured interviews, archival
documents and corporate documents were also perused. Interviews were conducted on
different levels of the organization, and provided detailed accounts of informants’
experience with outsourcing and subsequent backsourcing. Using multiple informants
and different sources of evidence, allowed validating the findings and reducing
subjectivity. Through triangulation, the researcher was able to depict a multifaceted
picture of backsourcing considerations and transition in each of the case studies. Across
the case comparisons it helped isolate the factors salient in backsourcing decisions.
Specifically, two different methods were used to triangulate and arrive at the list of
primary backsourcing antecedents. The case study approach also allowed the researcher
to remain open to emerging themes, and in the analysis an important backsourcing
antecedent, namely power, was discovered.
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Table 8.1 Evaluation of Dissertation
Guidelines
Research Theme
Research Objective

Specifics of This Dissertation
Information Systems Backsourcing
Exploration: Why do IS outsourcing clients decide to
backsource?
Unit of Analysis
Outsourcing contract between client and provider
Site Selection
Multiple cases, literal replication, criterion based
sampling strategy
Data Collection
Semi-structured interviews, archival records, company
documents
Methods to ensure reliability Case study protocol and case study database. Multiple
and validity
informants for each case. Two coders. Triangulation by
using different sources, informants, and methods.
Methodologically, the use of triangulation presented an advantage to this
dissertation by providing an opportunity to validate the findings through different
methods. Through triangulation, we learned the value of various methods and the strength
of combining those methods to arrive at more compelling conclusions. Triangulation was
involved in both data collection and data analysis, and it helped increase the rigor of
research and create a comprehensive account of backsourcing.
Specific findings of this dissertation, study limitation and future research
directions are discussed in the following sections.

Implications for Practice and Research
The cost benefit of backsourcing, service quality of the existing outsourcing
arrangement, redefinition of the role of IS in the organization, loss of control over
the outsourced services, structural changes and internal and external power in the
organization are the main factors impacting the backsourcing decision. These factors
were isolated as the salient antecedents of backsourcing in the analyzed cases. Cost
considerations were expected to play a role in the backsourcing decision, as costs have
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already been demonstrated to impact other types of sourcing decisions. Service quality
proved to be the most popular factor claimed by the informants. Service quality is easy to
measure and is a major expectation in the outsourcing arrangement, so not surprisingly,
many informants were able to point to low service quality as the problem in the
relationship.
It turned out that loss of control over IS is closely connected with service quality.
Specifically, loss of control is only present in the relationship when service quality of the
arrangement is low. Inadequate performance of the provider impacts the business of the
client, thus necessitating better service and need to regain control of underperforming
activities. Redefinition of the role of IS was interestingly enough a result of either
structural changes in the organization or loss of control over outsourced IS activities, so
again the primary reasons for backsourcing were interrelated. Corporate executives
joining the organization were able to embark on strategic changes in the organization,
thus modifying the role IS played in the organization. Alternatively, loss of control stirred
up reevaluations of the role of outsourced services, thus bringing attention to true
importance of the IS activities.
All of the discussed motives were salient in the examined cases, and loss of
control and redefinition of the role of IS were also influenced by other primary factors.
As a result, some of these factors, had a stronger impact on the decision to backsource,
and the next finding is dedicated to that.
When strategic considerations are involved in the backsourcing decision,
they supersede economic and relationship concerns. While all of the primary motives
seem to be important, strategic reasons can dominate the backsourcing decision,
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especially when service quality and economic considerations dictate otherwise. For
example, the backsourcing of all Alpha’s contracts was first and foremost driven by a
change in the role of IS and the desire to consolidate IS operations by the top executives.
Regardless of the quality of the relationship or economic efficiency of the contract, Alpha
was terminating all outsourcing contracts in reaction to the redefinition of the role of IS.
Even though Alpha enjoyed years of a successful relationship with Kappa, it pursued
backsourcing of this relationship. Despite satisfactory service and acceptable costs Alpha
pursued backsourcing for strategic reasons. There could be several explanations to the
dominant role of strategic factors.
One reason could be that strategic reasons are part of strategy making in the
organization and represent decision making at the top level of the organization. As such,
strategic decisions are far reaching and impact resource allocation, personnel, financials
and overall company performance. Therefore, backsourcing of IS services can have a
significant effect on the business of the organization and should be justified, not only by
immediate concerns about service quality and cost, but also by long term considerations
of the importance of the outsourced activities to the organization.
Another reason could be that the redefinition of the role of IS and loss of control
over the outsourced IS activities do not happen in a vacuum but are caused by other
factors. As a result, redefinition of the role of IS and the loss of control, exert stronger
influence on the final decision by combining the underlying reasons. These two motives
are a result of significant concerns about the existing outsourcing arrangement and
changes in the organization. Therefore, redefinition of the role of IS and the need to
regain control over the outsourced activities are more powerful than other factors.
298

Yet another explanation of the dominant role of strategic reasons can focus on the
role of structural changes in the organization. Structural changes result in the reshaping of
the business and influx of new ideas brought by the new executives. Interestingly enough,
in those situations where the cost or service quality were neglected, the power of
individuals making the decision played a significant role. The next finding addresses this
point.
Backsourcing decisions can be impacted by the experience, beliefs, and
attitudes of the decision maker, because it is the decision maker in the organization
who has ultimate power over backsourcing decisions and sourcing decisions in
general. The backsourcing decision is a strategic decision in an organization and
involves significant changes in the facilities, personnel and resources of the company.
This kind of decision is made at the highest level of organization as formal structure in
organizations typically assigns decision making authority to the top executives. Those
individuals, by their position, are legitimized into power in the organization and power in
important in decision making (Hall 1999).
While rational economic considerations are important in decision making, it has
also been acknowledged that decisions are constricted by “bounded rationality” (Simon
1957). As such, there are multiple factors that contribute to the decision making. Decision
makers are expected to thoroughly analyze the situation and information that is available
in making the decision. In reality, the decision makers may be faced with imperfect
information, uncertainty, and time and resource constraints. Some decision makers also
can rely on their ideologies, values, morals, feelings and even habits to arrive at the
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solution (Hall 1999). Consequently, the final decision may have little to do with
economic or strategic motives.
Because decision makers have the final authority when it comes to the
backsourcing decision, their view and experience with sourcing in general has a major
impact on backsourcing considerations. When new executives join the organization, they
arrive with preexisting expertise and experience. As a result, they base the decisions in
the new organization not only on the rationale, but also on their prior experience and
beliefs. The former CIO at Alpha was eager to centralize all of the IS operations in the
headquarters, even before any economic assessment of the existing outsourcing contracts.
As one of the informants pointed out the backsourcing “process began the day he walked
through the door.” In another case, Beta’s CEO stuck to his conviction in the benefits of
outsourcing and refused to acknowledge the failure of the outsourcing contract with
Omega despite falling revenues and escalating complains. The backsourcing of the BetaOmega contract was only able to begin upon the intervention of Beta’s Board.
Pressure from others entities involved in the interorganizational relationship
with the client organization, and that have some sort of power or authority over the
client organization, can impact the decision to backsource. It is inevitable that in
interorganizational relationships, some entities have more power because of better
resources, expertise, structural position or opportunity. As organizations participate in
various types of interorganizational relationships, they may face some power dependency
and may have to alter their decision making and act in accordance with powerful others.
Organizations can pursue conflicting goals which can lead to political maneuvering to
pursue specific interests.
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As with any other kind of decision, backsourcing can be motivated by the
opinions, advice or pressures from other organizations. Delta exercised its power over its
subsidiary, Alpha, by opposing the backsourcing of the Alpha-Tau contract. While the
backsourcing was justified by the economic benefits and need to regain control over the
network in Asia-Pacific, Alpha had to comply with Delta’s request. Delta had power
over Alpha as it was the sole owner of Alpha and Alpha had to ensure that it did not
cause financial problems for its parent. Beta and Gamma were pressured into initial
outsourcing by a non-profit broadcasting corporation Omicron. Omicron’s power bases
included its ability to reward the stations, in the form of grants, and it also served as a
referent for the stations by guiding their programming and issuing their licenses.
Omicron’s position and expertise in the non-profit broadcasting community allowed it to
sponsor the outsourcing provider, Omega, and recruit stations for participation.
When service quality is sliding, detailed records of communication with the
provider and contract problems, can assist in negotiation of the contract
termination by demonstrating problems with service quality. Early termination of the
outsourcing to bring the services back in-house is often accompanied by termination fees,
which sometimes can negate the cost benefit of backsourcing. Early termination may be
motivated by various reasons such as economic efficiency, loss of control over IS,
redefinition of the role of IS, and low service quality. Some of these reasons, especially
loss of control over IS, are likely to be a result of unsatisfactory performance by the
provider. As such, inadequate service quality is a popular reason for backsourcing and it
also can cause other problems in the contract. If properly documented, poor service
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quality can help client avoid costly termination fees by bringing claims against provider
for failure to perform according to SLA.
It is a good practice to keep thorough documentation of all problems encountered
in the relationship and attempts taken to resolve them. Detailed records can demonstrate
unsatisfactory performance below levels specified in the service level agreement if
necessary. Documented inadequate performance can help justify early termination and
help the client company to reduce termination fees by requesting reimbursement for poor
service or damage to the company. Alpha used this strategy to negotiate an early exit
from the relationship with Iota. Alpha was centralizing its operations in its corporate data
center and wanted to backsource the Alpha-Iota contract before its expiration. It so
happened that Alpha also experienced some problems with the levels of service delivered
by Iota. So when it became apparent that early termination fees are unavoidable, Alpha
was able to resort to the documented conflicts, demonstrate unsatisfactory performance,
and demand reimbursement for low service quality, thus, offsetting the termination fees.
Detailed planning of transition activities and testing of equipment and
services is important for successful backsourcing. Backsourcing is not an easy
proposition. Companies lose valuable expertise during outsourcing and recovering lost
skills and resources can be costly and time consuming experience. It is beneficial for an
outsourcing client to complete a comprehensive analysis of backsourcing and establish
procedures for bringing the previously outsourced activities back in-house. Alpha, for
example, spent almost nine months planning the backsourcing of the Alpha-Iota contract
and then was able to transfer all the equipment and services into the new facilities within
two weeks. Extended planning, testing and negotiations with the provider ensured
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successful transition and minimal interruptions to business. The equipment and software
involved in the transition should be significantly tested before actual deployment from
the internal location. Failure to thoroughly test the equipment can result in failed
transition and lengthy system outages that can hurt the business. Beta followed a detailed
plan for the backsourcing transition out of the Beta-Omega contract. To deliver
satisfactory performance upon backsourcing, Beta worked closely with the software
manufacturer and ran multiple tests with sample and partial data. It allowed resolving
problems with the conversion prior to transition.
Backsourcing offshore outsourcing arrangements can prove to be especially
complicated and costly. Backsourcing requires significant expense and expertise on the
part of the client. Backsourcing an offshore contract can be even more costly and time
consuming as it involves a transfer of equipment and software to a location overseas. The
software licenses are typically country specific and may not be possible to transfer.
Similarly, equipment may be difficult to disassemble and relocate or it may not be
compatible with the local electronics. During the transition, the client company may have
disruptions to its business. Alpha faced some of these challenges when transitioning out
of the Alpha-Iota and Alpha-Sigma contracts. Software licenses purchased in Europe had
to be replaced with software licenses for the United States. The engineers had to spend
several months in Europe installing networking equipment, to replace discontinued
Sigma circuits. Alpha had to physically unplug the servers and bring them down for a
weekend in order to relocate them from the U.K to the United States.
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In summary, the following were knowledge contributions of this research:
1.

Service quality, cost, loss of control over outsourced services,
redefinition of the role of IS, structural changes and internal and
external power in an organization were identified as key antecedents of
backsourcing.

2.

When strategic considerations are involved in the backsourcing
decision, they supersede economic and relationship concerns.

3.

Backsourcing decisions can be impacted by the experience, beliefs and
attitudes of the decision maker.

4.

Pressure from others entities that have some sort of power or authority
over the client organization can impact the decision to backsource.

5.

Good records of communication and escalation procedures can help in
negotiation of the contract termination.

6.

Detailed planning of transition activities and testing of equipment and
services can help ensure successful backsourcing.

7.

Backsourcing offshore outsourcing arrangements can be especially
complicated and costly.

Limitations
While every attempt was made to ensure validity and reliability of this research,
some limitations, which may have impacted the findings, have to be acknowledged.
Some findings of this dissertation may be attributed to particular cases that
were selected for analysis. Selection bias can be a problem if research only samples
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from within a larger set of potential cases. For that reason, conclusions of the research
can be partially due to the type of cases that happened to be selected for analysis. To
overcome selection bias, this research followed a purposeful sampling strategy and
selected outsourcing contracts that experienced backsourcing. Building on one of the
theoretically derived factors, the selected companies were also different in terms of the
role of IS in the organization. Yet, recruiting companies for participation in the case
studies presented some difficulty. One of the possible explanations can be the fact that
backsourcing follows prior outsourcing arrangement, and companies may view their
withdrawal from outsourcing as a failure, and thus, are unwilling to share information
about their unsuccessful outsourcing. Consequently, the value of backsourcing
antecedents revealed in this dissertation may be limited because it is based on the small
number of cases. Future research can include more cases and evaluate the proposed
framework and its limitations.
A semi-structured interview used to collect data was developed based on the
theoretically derived constructs and may have limited dissertation findings to the
predetermined themes. To help conduct data collection and ensure consistency of data
collection across cases, a semi-structured interview guide was used. The guide consisted
of questions based on theoretically derived constructs as well as overall questions about
the outsourcing relationship and subsequent backsourcing. Using the guide could have
skewed the results towards the preset constructs and limited the finding of the
dissertation. However, the informants had a chance to provide their own accounts of the
situation and name their own reasons backsourcing. The interview guide simply helped to
ensure that all informants addressed the main points of interest. Subsequently, during the
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coding of interviews, the researcher considered emergent themes and coded not only
predetermined themes but also the new themes across the cases. Specifically, an
important additional backsourcing antecedent, power of decision makers and other
entities, surfaced during the analysis.
Some subjectivity may have been introduced into analysis during the
interpretation of data. It is possible that the researcher may have introduced personal
biases into the interpretation of the results. To circumvent subjectivity, two independent
coders coded the interview transcripts and together refined the coding schema. They then
recoded the transcripts of one case and the coefficient of interrater agreement for that
case was .527, which indicated moderate agreement. All other cases were coded by the
primary researcher. To provide complete account of backsourcing events Chapter 6
presented detailed results of all cases together with coding summaries. The subjectivity
bias was overcome by triangulating the results of multiple informants and using several
methods of analysis to arrive at the list of antecedents that impact backsourcing.
The findings of the qualitative comparative analysis are limited by the small
number of cases under consideration. Qualitative comparative analysis isolated four
factors necessary and sufficient to result in backsourcing. QCA is best performed on an
exhaustive number of cases, and this dissertation only examined 6 contracts, 5 of which
were backsourced. While the same four factors were also among the factors identified as
the primary reasons for backsourcing by the informants, the results of the QCA can not
be fully reliable. Future studies using QCA should attempt to include more backsourcing
cases in order to improve predictive capability of the identified factors.
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Future Research Directions
IS backsourcing is an acknowledged phenomenon in practitioner literature, yet it
is still unexplored academically. There are a lot of opportunities for future research
directions. This study of backsourcing followed an exploratory approach trying to
determine factors that impact backsourcing decisions in organizations. Now, that several
primary reasons for backsourcing are established, further research is necessary to explore
the backsourcing success factors, role of executives in backsourcing, provider’s role in
backsourcing, and evaluate the backsourcing scenarios.
As backsourcing is gaining popularity, it is important to focus on
transitioning success factors, and strategies to rebuild expertise in-house.
Backsourcing is not an easy proposition. Organizations face difficulties in rebuilding inhouse expertise to handle the previously outsourced services internally. This research
suggested that a detailed plan for transition is necessary for successful backsourcing.
Transitioning back in-house involves negotiations with the provider to either exit the
relationship upon expiration or premature termination. Providers are typically unhappy to
lose clients, and backsourcing organization should be well prepared to handle the
negotiations and proceed with the transition regardless of the support from the provider.
Studying successful backsourcing transitions can identify critical steps in preparing for
backsourcing and help organizations that are getting ready to embark on backsourcing to
formulate a successful transitioning plan.
For more powerful conclusions, it can be useful to perform a more
exhaustive study that can identify necessary and sufficient conditions for
backsourcing, using qualitative comparative analysis. Qualitative comparative
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analysis is most powerful when performed on an exhaustive sample of cases. This kind of
study can collect data about multiple backsourcing cases using publicly available sources
and other studies that reported on backsourcing. It should attempt to identify as many
backsourcing cases as possible to fully represent the universe under consideration. It will
be beneficial then to apply qualitative comparative analysis to the sample and compare
the finding with the results of this dissertation. The factors identified through analysis
would represent the primary conditions that result in backsourcing outcome, and can be
useful for practitioners evaluating backsourcing opportunities.
From the provider’s perspective, it is helpful to examine the role of the
provider, in termination of outsourcing agreements. While it is the client’s decision to
end the relationship with the provider and backsource, the provider is significantly
involved in the relationship with the client and the providers behavior affects the client’s
overall perspective on outsourcing. Future research can explore ways for the provider to
maintain outsourcing relationships and prevent termination. This research suggested that
several primary reasons for backsourcing (service quality of the outsourcing arrangement
and loss of control) were closely related to the provider’s performance in the outsourcing
contract. An interesting research question would be to investigate if improvements in
service quality can prevent backsourcing. Another appealing topic can be the role of the
provider in the backsourcing transition. While the provider may be unwilling to help the
departing client with the transition, the provider may be able to learn from the experience
and prevent other clients from leaving the relationship.
Further studies are needed that consider the power of executives and their
role in backsourcing, and sourcing decisions in general. One of the findings in this
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dissertation was the fact that beliefs and the disposition of executives play a significant
role in the backsourcing decisions and sometimes can overrule the rational factors that
typically are used in the assessment of backsourcing. While earlier research has
demonstrated that executives’ values, beliefs and morals affect overall decision making,
outsourcing research has not examined the role of executives in great detail. It is a
revealing discovery that executives base backsourcing decisions on their prior experience
and beliefs instead of the needs of the organization. Review of other outsourcing and
backsourcing cases can provide an informative analysis of true reasons behind sourcing
decisions. It would be interesting to further examine the role of executive power in
sourcing decision making. Another attractive research question could be the role of
external structural changes, such as mergers and acquisitions in backsourcing.
In summary, IS backsourcing is a new phenomenon, and there are several future
research directions to be explored:
1. Transitioning success factors and strategies to rebuild expertise in-house.
2. Qualitative comparative analysis of a more exhaustive sample of cases.
3. Exploration of the provider’s perspective in backsourcing.
4. Role of executive power in backsourcing and sourcing decisions.
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Semi-Structured Interview with a Company that has Undergone Backsourcing
I am working on a dissertation research project examining reversal of the
outsourcing relationship and return of previously outsourced functions back in-house. In
the last decade many companies turned to information systems (IS) outsourcing suppliers
for assistance with the growing technology needs. However, recent years also witnessed
the reversal of IS outsourcing arrangement. This research aims to examine the change in
the sourcing of corporate IS functions and the grounds for this decision.
Your identity will remain anonymous, and any and all information obtained in the
course of the interview will not be associated with you or your company. I would like to
ask your permission to tape-record this interview. This would allow me to focus more on
what you are saying rather than note-taking. It will also enable me to be more efficient
and accurate in reviewing the information that you provide. You can choose to
discontinue the tape-recording at any time during this interview. At the end of this
research study, all the tapes will be destroyed.
1. What is your position within this organization?
2. How long have you been in the present position?
3. How were you involved in day to day operations of the outsourcing arrangement?
4. How long did you work with the Outsourcing Provider?
5. If you think about your company’s IS processes, how do they differ, compared to
other companies in the same industry?
6. Can you think of any unique technical skills, extensive business knowledge or
substantial investments in equipment on the part of the outsourcing provider that your
company requires?
7. Who from the Outsourcing Provider did you personally directly interact with?
8. How often did you communicate with Outsourcing Provider’s representatives?
9. What were the reasons for those communications?
10. How would you characterize the relationship between your company and the
Outsourcing Provider?
11. What did you think of the quality of service provided by the Outsourcing Provider?
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(After the respondent answers, specifically prompt for the following if it was not
mentioned in the response)
a. Physical facilities, equipment, and appearance of personnel
b. Willingness to help customers and provide prompt service
c. Ability to perform the promised service dependably and accurately
d. Knowledge and courtesy of employees
e. Caring, individualized attention
12. Can you tell me of any significant disagreements (if any) between your company and
the Outsourcing Provider during the time of the contract?
(After the respondent answers, specifically prompt for the following if it was not
mentioned in the response)
a. About specific way work is done or services are provided
b. About goals and priorities of outsourcing
c. About specific terms of the relationship between your organization and
Outsourcing Provider
13. What kind of concerns did you company have about the service that it was receiving?
a. How did you communicate those concerns to Outsourcing Provider’s
representatives?
b. How did the provider react to those communications?
14. What kind of changes if any did your company suggest to Outsourcing Provider if
there was a problem?
a. How did your company work with Outsourcing Provider to help improve the
situation?
15. What did you think about the
a. IS services performed by Outsourcing Provider?
b. Customer support by Outsourcing Provider?
c. Relationship with Outsourcing Provider?
d. Honesty and accuracy of deadlines set by Outsourcing Provider?
e. Reliability of the computer systems of Outsourcing Provider?
f. Willingness of Outsourcing Provider to share information?
g. Outsourcing Provider’s adherence to agreements?
16. Can you think of any changes in the way IS was utilized in your company during the
outsourcing contract?
(After the respondent answers, specifically prompt for the following if it was not
mentioned in the response)
a. Change in the role of information systems in the success of your company?
b. Change in your company’s expertise in information technology and
understanding how it can be used in your organization?
c. Change in the competitive advantage that information systems offer your
company?
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17. Can you tell me if your company had control over the IS processes that were handled by
the Outsourcing Provider and why?
18. Can you tell me if you felt your company was able to respond to competitive and
environmental challenges in a timely manner during the outsourcing contract?
19. Can you tell me of any significant changes in the management that your company has
undergone during the outsourcing arrangement and during backsourcing?
20. Were there any specific reasons why your company terminated the relationship with
Outsourcing Provider?
21. Which one of those reasons was the biggest driver for backsourcing?
22. Who now manages the services that were previously performed by Outsourcing
Provider?
23. How long did the transition from outsourcing to backsourcing take?
24. What were the difficulties during the transition from outsourcing to backsourcing?
25. Were there any extra costs involved in the transition?
26. What do you think were the benefits of backsourcing?
(After the respondent answers, specifically prompt for the following if it was not
mentioned in the response)
a. What kind of cost savings did your company achieve by returning the previously
outsourced services back in-house?
a. Direct cost savings
b. Indirect cost savings
b. Do you think your company gained advantage through the improved management
of IS?
c. Can you tell me of any changes in the service quality of IS services after
backsourcing?
27. What do you think about the way that IS services are managed in your company now?
28. Are there any additional comments that you would like to make about your
experience with backsourcing?
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29. What was the length of the contract with Outsourcing Provider and what was the
amount of the contract with Outsourcing Provider?
30. What is your company’s total IT budget?

317

APPENDIX C: CASE STUDY PROTOCOL

318

Case Study Protocol
Purpose of the Protocol
To ensure the reliability of research case study the researcher should follow the
same procedures for data collection across multiple cases. To assist the researcher in this
task this case study protocol should be used. It helps guide the researcher in the collection
of the data for all case studies on backsourcing. Follow these procedures to establish
contact, collect and analyze data, and write the case study report for each case.
Description of Case Study
This research aims to investigate the reasons for backsourcing after the initial
outsourcing arrangement, considerations involved in the formation of backsourcing
intentions on the part of the IS outsourcing client, as well as the transition to
backsourcing and issues associated with it. It targets to answer the following research
question: Why do IS outsourcing clients decide to backsource? The framework of
backsourcing antecedent guides the collection of data this research. The factors that can
have an impact on backsourcing decision include various economic, strategic and
relationship considerations.
Data Collection Procedures
To initiate entry into the organization contact the individual identified as the main
contact person and discuss the research interest and the possibility of data collection.
Once the agreement to participate in research is obtained, set up the initial interview in
person at the company’s location. Use this interview as an opportunity to learn more
about the organization, its information systems, and the IS outsourcing contract that was
backsourced. Compile a list of individuals that were involved in the outsourcing
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arrangement, in the decision to backsource, and in the transition process back in-house.
Request assistance in contacting the potential interviewees. Set up a subsequent interview
with the main contact to include them as one of the informants.
Set up the interviews with the identified informants. To each informant explain
the purpose of research, your specific interest in their experience with IS outsourcing and
backsourcing and promise confidentiality. At the time of the interview ask the informant
to complete a written consent form which is to be kept by the researcher. Once again
promise confidentiality of the responses. During the meeting use the semi-structured
interview guide to conduct the interview. Use a recorder to tape the interviews for later
transcription. Request to review documents (e-mails, letters, SLAs etc.) pertaining to the
outsourcing agreement. Ask about additional candidates for interviews, seek introduction
if possible. Explore the interviewee’s connections with the provider, seek contacts within
the provider’s organization.
Transcribe the recorded interviews as soon as possible after the interview. Make
every effort to reflect the interview as fully as possible by being verbatim. Forward the
transcribed interview to the informant for review. If additional questions arise during the
transcription address them by e-mail. Seek clarification of dates and terms of the contract
that seem to contradict the information from other sources.
If follow-up interviews are necessary with some of the informants, use this
opportunity to once again request corporate documents and communication pertaining to
the outsourcing contract, backsourcing decision and transition back in-house. Read all the
interviews before this follow-up interview and seek to explore issues that surfaced during
the original interviews.
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Case Study Questions
Use the structured interview guide to direct the discussion. Keep in mind that the
questions of specific interest include:
•

Details, dates, amounts of the contractual agreement with the outsourcing
provider
• Details about the IS operations in the company
• Role of the IS in the company
• Changes in the management of the company
• Uniqueness of the way IS used in the company
• Costs of outsourcing and backsourcing
• Service quality delivered by the outsourcing provider
• Satisfaction with the IS outsourcing provider
• Trust in the IS outsourcing provider
• Loss of control over the IS activities when they were outsourced to the
outsourcing provider
• Conflict with the outsourcing provider
• Communication with the outsourcing provider
• Details of the transition back in-house
Prompt to get additional information on these items when necessary.
Initial Data Analysis
Compile all of the collected data by case. No analysis of the interview data should
be done until all of the interviews are completed for each case. Read the transcripts of all
the interviews, if something is not clear in the transcript use the tapes to go back to the
source and check for accuracy. Combine all of the interviews for each case together in a
document.
As a first step in reducing the text of the interviews read the interview and mark
the passages that related to the overall information about the company and descriptions of
the information system operations. Set aside for further analysis all contract details of the
initial IS outsourcing agreement (dates, costs, outsourced activities) and discussion of the
outsourcing contract experience and subsequent backsourcing. Group the individual
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passages into two categories: overall information about the company and outsourcing
contract. Use the company, IS operations and contract details information for case
descriptions.
Combine on a single transcript all of the passages from all the interviews that
relate to the outsourcing contract and backsourcing experience for each case. Seek
another person to code all of the interviews together to increase coding reliability.
Review the developed coding schema with the second coder to ensure full understanding
of the categories. Start out by practice coding several pages of one of the interviews and
review the results. Discuss and modify the descriptions of the coding categories to
address experienced misunderstandings and difficulties.
Both individuals should use the revised coding schema to assign naturally
occurring chunks of text to one of the coding categories. Naturally occurring chunks of
text can be represented by complete paragraphs, blocks of sentences or paragraphs,
individual sentences, or even part of sentences if it can be logically related to one of the
categories. If some passage does not fit into any category assign it to “Other” category.
All of the text must be assigned to an existing category or to “Other” category. Once
coding of the whole transcript is done, read all of the “Other” quotes to see if any
additional categories may surface.
Use the interview text from one of the cases to refine the coding schema. Meet
with the second coder to reconcile the coding. If new categories surfaced for any of the
coders, develop a new coding category when necessary and add it to the schema. Refine
the existing coding schema definitions and recode the interview text based on the refined
schema. Calculate the inter-rater agreement after the final coding. Apply the refined
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coding schema to all other cases and calculate inter-rater reliability for each of them. If
new categories surface in other cases, discuss with the second coder and add new
categories as necessary.
Once the interview coding is complete, construct a matrix for each case by
combining the chunks of text assigned to each coding category and arrange it by each
interviewee (list coding categories in rows, and informants in columns). Use the quotes in
each cell to create another review matrix that summarizes each interviewee’s perspective
on each of the coding categories.
Case Study Description
Research information about each company using publicly available sources
(corporate website, news media, Hoover’s on-line database). Compile a description of the
company based on the collected archival data and interviews. Detail IS operations of the
company using the data gathered through interviews and other sources. Describe the
provider and the IS outsourcing contract that was subsequently backsourced. Describe the
backsourcing decision and facts of transition without discussing the reasons for
backsourcing. Use quotes from the interviews when necessary to highlight the
descriptions.
Identifying Backsourcing Antecedents
Use the details of the passages coded ‘Service Level Agreement’ for each case to
determine the reasons for initial outsourcing if possible. Briefly describe those reasons.
Structure the analysis of backsourcing antecedents around three perspectives: economic,
strategic and relationship. Start out with economic perspective and review the quotes in
the matrix for economic categories: asset specificity, cost benefit/disadvantage and
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switching costs. Select quotes from every informant that relate to the construct and
represent their opinion of the situation. More than one quote or none can be selected
depending on the availability. Describe the situation with respect to every construct, use
quotes to support the story. In the end of the economic category briefly review the
constructs and their impact on backsourcing. Perform the same procedure for strategic
and relationship categories.
To integrate the perspectives compile the primary and secondary reasons as
identified by the informants in a table for every case. If possible determine the most
dominant motive. Compare it to the discussion of backsourcing antecedents in the case.
Analyze the interrelations between the constructs in the case and the impact on
backsourcing.
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Coding Schema for Data Analysis
Coding is applied to naturally occurring chunks of sentences. All of the transcript text
should be assigned to one of the categories based on the description provided for each
category in the table below. If no category applies, then “Other” (O) should be assigned.
All of the text coded “Other” then should be analyzed for possible themes.
Coding Categories

Description

Outsourcing Relationship

Service Quality
Code: SQ

Satisfaction with
Outsourcing
Code: SAT
Trust in the Provider
Code: TRU

Conflict
Code: CON
Voice Behavior
Code: VB

Strategic
Changes in the
Management
Code: MAN
Loss of Control over IS
Code: LOSS

Conformance of the service delivered by the provider to the
requirements of the client. It can refer to the appearance of
physical facilities, equipment, personnel , and
communication materials; the ability to perform a promised
service dependably and accurately; the willingness to help
customers and to provide prompt service; the knowledge
and courtesy of employees and their ability to convey trust
and confidence; and the caring attitude which provides
individualized attention to customers.
Satisfaction with overall outsourcing relationship with the
provider and satisfaction with outsourcing contract and
service level agreement. Overall satisfaction, not
satisfaction with the details of day to day operations.
Willingness of the client to be vulnerable to the actions of
the provider. Expectation that the provider will perform a
particular action important to the client, irrespective of the
client’s ability to monitor or control the provider.
Information sharing and openness between the partners.
Can refer to the conflict with the outsourcing provider over
the services to be performed or the way services are done.
Any attempts to communicate with the provider in order to
change the way the services are performed or resolve issues
arising in the outsourcing contract and relationship. The way
issues are escalated and how they are handled by the
provider.
Any changes in the personnel in the client organization or
any other mention of new people being appointed for
positions or people leaving the organization. Influential
individuals in decision making.
Inability of the provider to meet the individual requests of
clients in flexible and timely manner, especially if they
involve major changes. Loss of ability to respond to
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Change in the Role of IS
Code: ROLE

Economic
Cost Benefit or
Disadvantage

Code: COST
Asset Specificity
Code: AST
Switching Costs
Code: SWI
Other Categories
Transitioning from
Outsourcing
Code: TRA
Details of Outsourcing
contract
Code: SLA
Benefits of Backsourcing
Code: BEN
Multivendor Situation
Code: MV
Provider Perspective
Code: PRO
Power
Code: Power

competitive and environmental challenges in a timely
manner. Lack of control over activities. Damage to business.
Change in the mission of the IS function and its actual
contribution to the company’s business operations. Refers to
strategic importance and value of IS to the organization or
how IS is utilized. Mention of globalization, centralization,
implementation of new IS (SAP), retiring legacy systems.
Cost benefit of backsourcing. Cost can include production
costs, i.e. cost of operations; transaction costs, i.e. effort,
time, and costs incurred in coordination of external market
activities; agency costs, i.e. the costs of structuring,
monitoring, and bonding a contract with the provider. Cost
savings or losses as a result of backsourcing.
Refers to the uniqueness of the service or product being
outsourced. Any need for customization of their services on
the part of the provider or extra effort to accommodate the
client.
Effort, time, and investments incurred in undergoing
transition to backsourcing. Termination fees.
Description of steps undertaken to transition back in-house,
negotiation of contract termination, set up of the in-house
operations, issues arising during transition, etc. Not why
transition happened.
Description of SLA, contract terms, dates of contract,
history of the contract, past contract details and costs. Why
outsourcing originated. The role of informant in the
company and in the scontract.
Description of the current in-house arrangement after
backsourcing. Mention of any benefits other than cost.
Working with multiple providers. Description of the
situations where two or more providers are present.
Description of the experiences on the provider side (what
they did and details of the contract): applicable only to
WEDU- DC interviewee who worked for the provider
Pressures internally or externally on decision making. Role
of powerful individuals/companies/society in backsourcing.
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Former CIO

through, because we were taking all of our
legacy systems and converting them to
singular global systems, centralized in
Orlando, Florida, at the location where you
visited, what we did was as countries were
being converted we then took work away
from whoever their processing center was.
NF: When the backsourcing happened of this
particular contract do you think there were
any changes in the way IT was utilized at
Alpha that might have led to the change over?
JS: I think in terms of service it was
transparent to the users. They didn’t know we
made the move. But the thing that was the
difference is that we went off an old legacy
application to a brand new application in
Orlando. That was what was different. It
wasn’t the service or the availability, or the
response time, or the kinds of things that
customers or users tend to see. It was really
they had a brand new application. So that was
a big business reengineering process change
for the company. Nothing to do with a fact
that it was going from an outsource to an
insource type of arrangement.
NF: When all of this centralization occurred,
do you think the perception of IT strategy
within Alpha has changed?
JS: It was favorable. My opinion is that it is
the business, the people who depended upon
IT for services and support on daily basis,

Change in the Role Anyway, and I will tell you about the other
places, but I will go with this one all the way
of IS

Construct
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NF: Also was this
agreement terminated
because they were
trying to centralize or
was it because it was
old?
HL: No, it was part of
centralization, the
SAP implementation.

Global Telecom
Program
Manager
NF: When was the Kappa
then contract terminated?
MK: After about one or two
years and the reason for
termination was that we had
central IT organization in
Orlando. And the old
mainframe systems which
were running at Kappa were
replaced by SAP. SAP system
running on a different
hardware site and this
hardware site is in Orlando.
NF: Do you think there were
any changes in the way
technology was utilized …
MK: Because we used
different systems, different
hardware platforms, and
different applications. So the
application running at Kappa
was dead afterwards, it was
no longer used. So it was a
complete change for us.
NF: What were the reasons
for terminating the contract?
MK: Because I said we had, it
was a company decision to
centralize IT, it was no longer
a European function, but a
worldwide function and we
had a data center in Orlando.
We did no longer had this

European Relationship
Manager

The reason the contract with
Kappa was terminated was
because they had basically
the regional system for
Germany. It was housed on
IBM mainframe
environment, they ran an
application that was about
25 year old. When we
integrated the German
business into our global
architecture being SAP and
CMS etc. at that point on
we no longer needed their
services because we weren’t
on legacy systems any
more. And that’s why we
terminated the contract.
NF: The main driver for the
termination of this contract
and backsourcing was…
that is was old legacy
application first of all, and
did centralization have any
impact?
RC: Yes. Because we
brought everything,
centralized all the new
processes here in Orlando.
So there wasn’t any need to
have anything running in
the environment.

Director of IT
Operations

Construct

when they pick up the phone and they want
help, and service levels in general. Two things
happened. I think that they saw
NF: Speaking about that specific contract
with Kappa, specifically why would you say
the relationship was terminated?
JS: The reason to terminate?
NF: Yes.
JS: Because we were centralizing. We were
strategically centralizing all of our
applications into one global location. It just
happened to be in Orlando. It could have been
London, it could have been Madrid, it could
have been anywhere. But it was because we
were centralizing our applications. And the
timing of it was because we were converting
to SAP. So we built, we didn’t move legacy,
well… I will say this, here is may be another
example. Kappa had say 4 or 5 separate
systems they were running for us. About three
of them were replaced with SAP, but a couple
of them like the warehouse management
system wasn’t replaced with SAP. That
system physically was moved to Orlando
from Germany. Unplugged, put in a crate,
shipped on an airplane and installed here in
Director of IT Operations’s data center. So, it
was more of the consolidation deal, as
opposed to just a SAP thing.
NF: So what I am hearing is that the
centralization was the biggest driver.
JS: Yes, that was the driver, centralization.
NF: What would you say were the benefits of

Former CIO
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Global Telecom
Program
Manager
split between Europe and
America.
NF: How long did the
transition take from
outsourcing to backsourcing?
MK: The question does not
really fit in this case. Because
I said systems were no longer
used in Orlando. The systems
were legacy systems. They
stayed at Kappa until they
were closed and we started
with new systems that were
never at Kappa in Orlando.
Kappa would like, would
want to take over the new
technology but as we had no
data center in Europe
anymore it was not a decision
to give them the new
technology because we had
our own data center already in
Orlando.
NF: Ok. But do you see any
benefits of centralizing it in
one location for Alpha?
MK: Of course. Because we
are using one system and not
a system per country or per
continent.
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backsourcing?
JS: An ability to have everything in one
centralized location that had to do with our IT.
In other words, all of our IT things weren’t at
different places. There was one physical
location and one single manager, like VP or in
this case former CIO, and Director of IT
Operations and others. One person, one
hierarchy to deal with issues concerns or even
with forecasts, planning, capacity, future
business needs, link up with a business
strategy. It was all in one spot and one
structure. That was real positive and it would
be in any case.
If I was trying to manage them from Orlando
and never physically went there, which some
companies try to do, if it was in India or
something, there could have been some
problems.
NF: Do you think Alpha had control over the
IT services when they were outsourced to
Kappa?
JS: Yes. We felt comfortable that we could
make adjustments, for example, to service
levels, or we could get them to do things or
not do things based on our request, if that’s
what you mean. In other words, they behaved
as if they worked for us, not as if they were
and we may be wouldn’t It wasn’t that way at
all.
So there was control and management but we
didn’t filter the people who were really trying
to solve issues.
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NF: Do you think you had
control over information
systems processes when they
were handled by Kappa?
MK: Control and so far that I
got reports, regular reports to
follow up service level
agreements. And if we had
our DBA who checked in
addition, so it was a kind of
control of what was done.
And we could check batch
schedule and so on, so it was
kind of control of the work
that was done. We checked
whether all back-ups were
done as requested and so on.
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NF: Do you think you had
control over IS services
when they were outsourced
to Kappa?
RC: We had control of the
process aspects, from
actually performing day to
day processing in through
Alpha. We didn’t have
control over the internal
operating system. It was
kind of unique in fact that
the server and operating
systems licenses that ran on
that environment Kappa had
contracted through IBM
directly and we just paid a
subset of the amount every
month for using it. So, we
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there were also very stringent service levels,
and it was also a contract in which there was a
base cost, or revenue for them, that always
had to be hit at the minimum, but then it was
incremental based on how many gigabytes of
DASD or how much memory or other things
that passed through.
And we were paying them and I am guessing
on this, whatever I probably told you in my
old notes, I believe we were paying them
somewhere around, I want to say, 20-30
thousand dollars a month, something like that,
American dollars. I am pretty sure it was
accounted in Euros so it could be a little bit
more.
I negotiated with Kappa an agreement that
was favorable to us both, to where they
wouldn’t lose any money but we didn’t have
to pay any penalties, that’s the bottom line.
and we basically paid them a little bit less
money per month than if we discontinued the
contract in say another 3-4-5 years. So it was
financially good for us. That’s the best way I
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didn’t own the environment,
therefore, there probably
was some liability of some
shape with the fact if we got
onto changing things versus
them maintaining it. In
application yes, we had
some control over it, from
the other side of the house
no.
There was no deteriorating
factors to pull it out, cost
wasn’t even necessarily
bad.
the pricing structure was
reasonable. It was more
than it would have cost us
to insource but it wasn’t so
outrageous that we wanted
to get rid of it
NF: What about the other
one, the Kappa?
RC: The Kappa. I don’t
know what the costs were, I
didn’t see the bills.

Director of IT
Operations

Construct

can put it.
1) they saw their costs go down gradually,
because it was a big evolution, but they saw
their costs go down.
Because it wasn’t cost effective for us to just
have two little servers sitting on a corner at
this huge data center at Kappa in Cologne
And we were centralizing because it was
saving us money. I was able to invest several
million dollars into this central site, where I
would have been replicating the
infrastructure, you know, the generators, all of
the stuff you do to put a huge data center with
a help desk. They are much more efficient if
you have high volume as opposed to just a
little bit of volume by time zone. So that’s
how that worked.
Now, the other thing was because we had
everything in that location for a long enough
period of time, the assets that were ours were
fully depreciated. But lots of times companies
would capitalize equipment for three years or
may be even five years. And if you do all this
moving around quicker than three years or
quicker than five years you quite often have to
have a write-off to cover the wasted facilities,
expense or infrastructure. We didn’t have to
have that with this Kappa situation.
In our case financially it was less expensive.
Now it wouldn’t have been less expensive if it
wasn’t a growth situation. Just because you
put two computers in one room, you are still
paying for two computers. But if you can take
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two computers and put them on one computer
then you are saving money. And we were able
to consolidate the physical the and the
software hierarchies that just saved money,
bottom line dollars.
But net we saved money.
Also there were penalties if we got out sooner,
NF: Were there any extra costs involved in
backsourcing?
JS: Well, as I mentioned, in terms of the
contracts, we were able to negotiate into
where we never lost any money. But I know
of a lot of situations where that’s not the case.
Because if you want out early, there is almost
always a penalty for someone.
I didn’t have to in any case increase staff.
Some places as you can imagine if some one
else is doing all the work and if you move it
back in house, you may have to have a
hierarchy. But I was able to, again because we
were consolidating, I didn’t need to hire
people in Orlando because Kappa wasn’t
working. I did have to make sure that I had
people on for second, third, fourth shift here
in Orlando who spoke languages, but before I
didn’t have to worry about it.
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NF: Do you think there were
any extra costs involved in
centralizing this particular
function and moving it down
to Orlando for European
locations in particular?
MK: If you switch from one
application in one data center
to another application in
another data center of course
there are differences in costs
behind because we have
another network behind. It is
in the States it is no longer in
Europe and things like that. I
can’t give you estimation on
costs and values.
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NF: Were there any
difficulties during the
transition process?
RC: No.
NF: Did you have any extra
costs involved in the
transition from that
contract.
RC: Well, the extra costs
was the fact that Kappa had
done the same thing we did.
They were leasing the
equipment and the operating
system from IBM, so they
had an expectation when
they were going to turn it
off as well. And they had to
renegotiate their support
from IBM so they can
continue to offer us that
support so they had to pay a
little higher degree of cost
which they passed on us.
And we actually had to pay.
It wasn’t significant though.
I mean less than 10,000
dollars. At the end of the
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All of the equipment except for the few pieces
of the equipment were owned by Kappa. So
Kappa also owned the capital assets when we
did that.
From a business stand point and from a
technical stand point, good rapport,
we were managing based on written
documented service levels. And they always
did whatever we asked them to do, may be
that is the best way to put it.
The only things that came up that I would say
were negative if there were any, is every ones
in a while again at the technical level, you
know a systems programmer, a technician,
would say “He did this”, the other guy would
say “No, he did that”, or “Hey, they can’t fix
that”, or “We can’t fix that”. But that was
really-really minimal, it was not a big issue at
all.
NF: What about the quality of the service?
Were you satisfied with them?
JS: Very. They were always on time and I
think we got good value. In other words we
got what we paid for kind of thing.
NF: If you ever suggested any changes to
Kappa how would they react?
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NF: I see. If you think about
the physical facilities, their
equipment and their
personnel, were you satisfied
with that?
MK: Yes.
NF: How about their ability to
perform the promised services
dependably and accurately?
MK: Most of the time the
agreed service level was
fulfilled. If not we had regular
meetings to discuss what
caused it and to solve
problems.
But it is a problem to
announce in advance if you
have a problem on a Friday
evening. And there was an
emergency number or a
number you could call but it
did not always work as we
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And all indications that I
had was that Kappa was
very professional and the
service they were providing
was very good. I mean they
had strict guidelines that
had to be followed if
changes were to be made.
The German community
followed this.
They weren’t opposed to
respond to things quickly as
an unusual occurrence and
we respected that.
the quality of service was
very good
So, the relationship and the
service that Kappa provided
was very good,

contract there was no
relocation to be done
because it wasn’t our
equipment, so there wasn’t
relocation cost, hiring
personnel, move or
anything like that.
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We didn’t have to follow up and manage
them. They did what they said they would do.
So if we said we want some new equipment
installed in three weeks, they would make

JS: No. Again, the best way to describe this, I
don’t know if it translates well for you
though, but it was just like Germans. They are
so business like and structured, and there is
nothing gray, everything is black and white.
Everybody knew what everybody was doing.
It was a very structured business-like
relationship.
because we didn’t have to go up the ladder
across and down in order to get two people to
do something.
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expected.
NF: So would you say the
service has changed when
Kappa took over Epsilon?
MK: Yes, a bit. In sense that it
was a bit more bureaucracy, it
was not that the people were
not willing to deliver the job,
it was the same people. But
we had no direct access to the
people if I might say so. Not
during the week but on
weekends for additional work.
NF: Did you ever have any
concerns about the quality
that they would deliver to
you?
MK: Of course, because
quality sometimes depends on
people. And if you have a
person in the team that
doesn’t perform as the person
should, yes. But related to
people.
So they fulfilled their task.
It’s not that they suddenly
stopped working for Alpha
because they knew that the
contract was canceled.
If you think about the
relationship between Kappa
and Alpha how would you
describe it?
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sure that equipment got installed in three
weeks, kind of thing.
In fact, it was just an example were Kappa
was doing their best to make sure we didn’t
get charged for things we didn’t need to get
charged for.
NF: Would you say you trusted Kappa with
their activities?
JS: Very much so. And both in terms of trust
in a sense of integrity and also trust in the
sense would they do what they said they were
going to do. I knew that they would do an
honest and an efficient job.
And the biggest thing that I would say, part of
the thing that made the marriage work was a
lot of communication, and a lot of openness
between the businesses, it wasn’t at a distance
kind of relationship, it was a close
relationship.
But because we had a very good working
relationship
Kappa was extremely cooperative, we didn’t
have any transitional problems whatsoever,
we didn’t lose any data, there weren’t any
outages, or anything,
NF: Starting with Kappa in Germany that
was managing data processing in Continental
Europe, what did you think about the
relationship?
JS: Very positive, very good.
And if we were to do it all over again, I
wouldn’t have changed that particular
relationship, or that contract or anything. It
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So, I think they did their best
to fulfill our wishes. And one
thing I would like to mention
that change when we switched
from the Epsilon data center
to Kappa in a bit negative way
we had a contract to work
with a data center from
Monday to Friday, then we
had to pay for extra work on
weekends. And as long as the
data center was a part of
Epsilon, these weekends
could be handled very, very

MK: I think it was a very
open relationship.
NF: Would you say you
trusted Kappa to perform the
services dependably?
MK: Yes.
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So the relationship between
vendor and customer went
very well. There was a lot
of cooperation there,
anything outside of the
norm that came up that
wasn’t expected was
handled appropriately.
So the relationship was very
good,
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And we parted friends and there was no
issues.
NF: Can you tell me about any significant
disagreements that you might have had with
them?
JS: There were none. There were none at all.
The only problems we had, and it had nothing
to do with either Kappa or Alpha, but because
they had to use IBM, for example, as a
subcontractor. For example, IBM provided
software to them so they can do their job. And
there were issues at times between them and

was very good.
it made for a perfect relationship.
That’s again why I am saying that we felt real
comfortable that it was almost as if they
worked for us
They worked pretty well.
So we were ok with that. That was ok.
NF: Any other comments about this particular
Kappa Alpha relationship?
JS: No. I would just say it was real positive.
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flexible. If you had any
problems people were
available on a Saturday and
worked for us. So there were
no problem. When Kappa
took over there were much
more formal things in place so
we couldn’t just call anymore
and ask on Friday evening if
we had a problem, can we get
support on a Saturday. So that
was much more bureaucracy
and it was more difficult.
NF: But would you say you
were still satisfied with what
they were doing?
MK: Oh yes.
NF: Did you ever try to
replace the people who were
working for your contract?
MK: It was not that bad.
NF: Can you tell me of any
significant disagreements
between Alpha and Kappa
during the time of the
contract?
MK: Not really. It was if at all
day to day issues. Where we
think the job should have
started and they think they
started it and we said you did
not something. Only day to
day issues, if at all. No real
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IBM, because we had some older versions of
operating systems, MDS operating systems.
And IBM said, hey we are going to
discontinue support of those systems, the next
layer, or the new version of the system would
be expensive and Kappa would have had to
charge us more money.
Kappa was very responsive. And some of the
key reasons were, I met with them at least
quarterly face to face,
We said we don’t want to pay more money.
So Kappa had to go back to IBM and said we
are not going to upgrade even though you are
refusing to support us. So, but again, it did not
affect the relationship.
NF: So whenever you made any kind of
requests to them would they usually follow
through and help you out?
JS: Yes. Now, one of the things I was
required to do, they were in Germany, these
are all Germans, and I don’t speak good
German. Now they spoke fairly good English,
but I had a manager, a senior level IT
manager in Cologne, Germany, who could
drive there in 20 minutes. And so she,
European Relationships Manager was her
name, European Relationships Manager
would go and meet and talk to them in their
language at least once a month. So that also
kept a lot of good rapport.
A little bit more of misunderstanding and lack
of rapport. But I did go out of my way to go
out there at least once a quarter, European
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The people had an open style
to communicate and things
were discussed in a friendly
environment.
NF: If you ever had any
concerns about the service
that you were receiving, how
did you communicate those
concerns to Kappa.
MK: Very directly and
openly. I called to manager of
data center and told him about
the concerns or problems and
he tried to help.
NF: So how would you say
they reacted to your
communications and to your
concerns?
MK: They really tried to help.
NF: How many different
people did you usually
interact with? You mentioned
the manager and did you have
any other contacts?
MK: Yes. As we worked with
this company for a long time I

issues.
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Relationships Manager physically went there
and spoke their language every month. She
was a Alpha employee and she reported
directly to me. She would be an equivalent of
a director level kind of person. She managed
about 30 IT people in Cologne, Germany, and
she was sort of Director of IT Operations of
Kappa.
There were hierarchies of who talked to who,
and who did what, and the follow up and
escalation stuff.
It got escalated and she would talk to their
manager, but if it was, the reason it was 5 or
6, the network guys would talk to the network
guys, computer operations would talk to
computer operations, applications would talk
to applications. That’s why there were several
people but it really had to do with their
technical discipline, not because it was out of
control. In fact, and even the way we had it
set up, anytime that there was a problem or an
issue or anything it had to be logged, had to
be escalated and had to be communicated. So
if a network technician in Alpha needed to
talk to a technician at Kappa, he can do it, but
he also had to write a problem ticket through a
system we called Remedy. And that report
immediately was online and went to someone
like European Relationships Manager and she
saw that this happened and here is what went
on.
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knew all the people that
worked for Alpha. So the
operators, I knew them
personally, and I knew
another, the team leader that
cared about the operators. So I
could contract every person. I
even knew their private
numbers for weekends. So it
was… and that was the point
that changed when Kappa
took over. So we were not
allowed anymore to call an
operator or people to get this
direct help if necessary.
NF: So how did you have to
go about it after that?
MK: Announce in advance.
NF: But if you ever had those
concerns how would you
address them?
MK: I would talk to the
manager and tell him.
But in any case people were
told how to react or how to
behave by the manager.
NF: Oh, ok. So things were
adjusted. Were there any
significant changes in the
management of Alpha that
happened when the Kappa
contract was terminated or
before the termination of the
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Cologne, Germany. And now, so there isn’t
too much confusion, Kappa purchased a
company called CSC which was an internal to
Epsilon Corporation. Epsilon owned part of
Alpha, Epsilon had an internal service bureau
that did processing for several Epsilon
businesses, of which Alpha was one. But then
they sort of dissolved and Kappa came and
just bought them out. So, Alpha when I was
there I had a contract initially with Epsilon
and then we renegotiated the contract with
Kappa. But it was really the same contract to
do basically a 100% of all of the transaction
management, computer processing, data
storage, everything but printing the output. It

Ok, during that time probably the largest of
Service Level
Agreement Details the contracts was with Kappa, and that was in
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contract that might have led
to termination.
MK: I think we were always
very open from the very
beginning and when the
contract was to be terminated
and they did their job until the
last day of the contract.
NF: Would you say there were
any difficulties in terminating
the contract?
MK: No. Like I said it was
always a very fair and open
discussion from the
beginning. They knew our
position.
NF: I’ve heard there NF: Can you tell me how you
were involved with the
was an agreement
contract with Kappa?
with Kappa as well?
MK: Yes. In the beginning in
HL: That was in
Europe each country used a
Germany.
local IT function and in
NF: Ok.
HL: We had, I forgot Germany we used a local data
to mention, that it was center. The data center of the
Epsilon group and Alpha was
another small
part of the Epsilon group. And
outsourced data
this data center was
facility in Germany,
outsourced at a later stage and
but it was hosted on
the mainframe. I don’t Kappa took over this data
center.
have many details.
NF: How long did you work
The only … we just
with Kappa?
terminated that
agreement because the MK: For about a year I think.
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RC: The Kappa contract
evolved. Like I said it
started out as a sister
company of Alpha within
the same ownership
structure which initiated the
beginning of it. The was
really no cost factors
involved, because it would
have been cost between
associated industries within
the same company. It
evolved to a point that I am
not sure how long it was
there before the transition
occurred, but at one point
Epsilon decided that they
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application running
there, it just supported
one application for
our automotive
business which is a
separate arm in Alpha,
that application was
not needed anymore.
So the entire
agreement was just a
data center the main
frame was terminated,
and the people that
supported the
application are also
not with Alpha
anymore. It was taken
over by SAP.

was all IBM large mainframe systems, a lot of
DASD. For all of Alpha Europe except Alpha
UK. So it would be Spain, France, Germany,
all Benelux countries, what we call Iberia, so
it would be Greece, Italy, Portugal, and
France. All of that was done of this place and
the company is still there, I am pretty sure it is
in Rudischeim, but it’s just like 5 miles south
of Cologne. So anyway, that was Kappa. The
contract was one in which it was basically can
go in theory forever, but it was one where we
needed to give them at least a year’s notice by
contract in order to get out of it.
Anyway, that was Kappa. Now, what we were
doing, and they were running on the legacy
systems.
Yes, all the data processing. And I would say
in their particular case they had what we
would call a help desk of may be one or two
people, but they would really be taking notes,
or they didn’t really solve a lot of problems,
or if it had to do with something like the
system is down and it needs to be restored,
they would get involved. They were
physically at the data center and their facility
right there by the ??. However, we had our
own service desk, we had our own
programmers, we had own
telecommunications people, or there was like
a group of telecommunications there actually
in Germany for us that went to AT&T cloud,
the network in order to transmit data. But they
were basically the raised floor data center and
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A year or two years, I don’t
remember exactly.
NF: Ok. And what were your
responsibilities with that
contract?
MK: I was a… I represented
Alpha as one of the main
users in the data center. At
that time when we started
with Kappa all European
countries had their
production, their main
production system on the
mainframe computer at
Kappa. I was responsible for
running these programs, these
productions programs. So I
was the main contact for
them.
NF: What were approximately
the dates of that particular
contract, can you remember?
MK: It’s difficult to say
because we had the contract
with Epsilon, the data center
of the group and we didn’t
make, we just changed the
name in the contract when
Kappa took over in principle.
So it was based on an existing
contract, which we had used
for several years.
NF: Ok. What did you think
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were going to sell that
portion of their company off
to Kappa. From that point
on it began an outsourced
relationship external to the
company.
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all that kind of stuff, I guess what you call
computer operations. So they did 100%, we
didn’t have any employees there or anything.
They just ran based on instructions the
software that we wrote. But they didn’t do any
programming or even the application
maintenance, they just ran the stuff. And it
was 7x24, they were there all the time.
they signed short term contracts with IBM, so
they were never in a situation where the
contract with IBM or the main suppliers
Siemens and others were longer than when we
were going to terminate.
She is still with Alpha, but she is not in IT.
She is working on the business side now in
Cologne. I believe it would be
MK@Alpha.com. If it does not work, just get
a hold of Director of IT Operations and he
will tell you if it has changed. And she is in
Cologne, and just mention my name and she
will know. A very nice person. But she can
talk in a lot of detail because she also
managed the contract with, remember I said
they were previously owned by this Epsilon
company. She managed that for five years
before I even started working at Alpha. So she
can give you what happened in the very-very
beginning.
So it was a typical German kind of thing. I
would say that Kappa in general is sort of a
military kind of run thing. Of you know,
hierarchies, orders, do what you are told to do,
very-very procedural. But having this kind of
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about the quality of the
service that Kappa was
providing to Alpha at the
time?
MK: We should consider that
Kappa took over the data
center not only the hardware
but also the people. There was
no change in contacts. It was
the same people I worked
with for years. Only in the
management level I had a new
contact. But the people that
worked for Alpha on the day
to day basis that was no
change.
NF: Can you describe to me
exactly what Kappa was
handling for you in terms of
the data center?
MK: They were responsible
for having mainframe
computers available for us.
There were main application
programs that they were
running. They were making
sure that the jobs were started,
job scheduling, and back up.
They did not care about, they
did not take over the function
of data base administrators.
That was done within Alpha.
It was more the operational
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company in Germany where a general
behavior and attitude of the people is very
structured,
NF: When you were working with Kappa, how
many people from Alpha would you say were
dealing with Kappa?
JS: I would say may be 5 or 6 people at the
most. What it was, if it was a big problem
European Relationships Manager would
handle it.
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work, the machines running
the jobs, doing the back-ups.
NF: What do you think were
the benefits of backsourcing
in this case?
MK: It’s not really
backsourcing because in
Germany we always used an
external data center. We never
had our own machines. So for
us it was just another data
center going, instead of the
data center of Kappa in
Germany we use the data
center in Orlando.
NF: Do you have any
additional comments or
stories about this particular
relationship with Kappa?
MK: No, only what I
mentioned in the beginning, it
was a data center of Epsilon
in the beginning and it was
just changing in principle,
changing in names from a
data center to Kappa data
center. And I only had
different contacts on
management level.
NF: Do you remember the
dates of the whole contract
with Epsilon? When did it
start approximately and when
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processing in November but we stopped the
contract with them in December of 2002, that
was when we didn’t have any work at all.
What I did, and I am the one who did it,
And they agreed to add even a little additional
DASD because we knew we needed to get
some.
And the way I negotiated it was that it would
be terminated in May of 2002 with month to
month incremental continuances as long as I
gave notice of 30 days, which was very
favorable to us because we didn’t know
exactly when we could convert. So to move
away from them and all of their services in
this particular case because there are lot of
horror stories of when they are not working
well,
But the other thing that they saw was once
we, I would say there was about six months
learning curve, but the biggest issue was the
help desk. Because it took a while for the

Transition back in- And so I got to think now, I believe it was
December, I think we actually did our last
house
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did it end?
MK: Started at least before 11
years, so before 1993.
Because when I joined Alpha
they had the contract already.
NF: And when did you end the
contract with Kappa?
MK: I said I don’t remember
exactly it was three or four
years ago
NF: Ok. Then when did you
inform Kappa that you were
going to terminate the
contract and how long did it
take from the point when you
informed them to the point
when you actually ended the
relationship?
MK: About two years.
Because the contract was
fixed up to a special date and
we enhanced for some time
and it was always very clear
and open.

European Relationship
Manager

We actually ended up
extending the contract
beyond the termination date
about four months before
we terminated the
relationship.
NF: How long did this
process take?
RC: From start to finish if
you want to think from the
concept when we first
thought about doing it to the
point when we actually
executed it was a lot of
development effort to be
done to build the SAP
environment to get it
introduced to where they
can support it. And then
executing through all the
tests and everything in
comparisons, I want to say
it was probably 18 to 24

Director of IT
Operations

Benefits of
Backsourcing

Construct

Orlando help desk to figure out how to answer
a phone in German. But that’s all behind them
now.
NF: Were there any difficulties in the
transition from outsourcing to backsourcing?
JS: Probably, the only challenge that we had
to manage with, it wasn’t a problem, but we
had to be really-really good at it was the time
zones. Because Alpha Europe is six hours
ahead of Orlando. And so any time you had
an issue we either had to wait another six
hours or they had to wait another six hours. If
you had big issue that managers had to deal
with. That was a challenge. But it was
something I would say that needs to be dealt
with and certainly planned for in sourcing or
resourcing, particularly if you are pulling
from another side of the world, like India or
something. The time zones can be an issue
just like I mentioned language.
And they actually feel better about it because
now, where before because the agreement we
had with Kappa, for example, is their help
desk would just go to a voice mail unless it
was real-real urgent at 3 in the morning. So if
a warehouse had a problem in France they
would just leave a voice mail and it wouldn’t
be touched until 8 o’clock the next morning
European time. Now, that it is insourced, if
there is a problem in France at 3 am in the
morning, someone would answer the phone
on the second ring and be in Orlando, but
would answer the phone on two rings “How
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NF: But other than costs are
there any other indirect
benefits may be in terms of the
increased service quality or
improved management of
information technology?
MK: Difficult to say, because
we use just the hardware
function of all the operating,
hardware and operating
function, I don’t see a real big
difference because the end
user is not much involved.

European Relationship
Manager

months process that actual
went beyond its original
deliverable date by four
months because we had set
it to write when the contract
terminated. And we had to
extend it for four months.
NF: So this particular
contact ran out its course
and then four more months
and then it was over. So it
wasn’t an early termination.
RC: Yes.

Director of IT
Operations

Multivendor

Construct

can I help you”. So service levels actually
went up in the sense of 24-7. But there was a
anywhere between 3 and 6 month gap of I
would say dissatisfaction and then satisfaction
again when it came to the people to people
communication. Not hardware and system’s
availability, but when you call and want to
talk to somebody in your native language.
Particularly French, because the French they
don’t speak English. They just don’t. And
they don’t like English. But they don’t speak
English.
Another benefit I would say was the response
time. If the business wanted to make a change
and they wanted to do it right away dealing
with an outsourcer particularly with a major
piece of equipment or something like that can
or the vendor has to go through. Because quite
often even they are subcontracting. Where if it
is all in house you add you know a day or a
week or a month because of the planning and
extra layers of communication either we are
only dealing with a smaller group of vendors
and could be more responsive if you are
moving a new equipment or new software. So
response time, reaction time to new business,
new growth or change would be a benefit.
The only problems we had, and it had nothing
to do with either Kappa or Alpha, but because
they had to use IBM, for example, as a
subcontractor. For example, IBM provided
software to them so they can do their job. And
there were issues at times between them and

Former CIO

347

Global Telecom
Program
Manager
The systems are stable and
fine and this is the same as
before.

European Relationship
Manager
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IBM, because we had some older versions of
operating systems, MDS operating systems.
And IBM said, hey we are going to
discontinue support of those systems, the next
layer, or the new version of the system would
be expensive and Kappa would have had to
charge us more money. We said we don’t
want to pay more money. So Kappa had to go
back to IBM and said we are not going to
upgrade even though you are refusing to
support us. So, but again, it did not affect the
relationship. In fact, it was just an example
were Kappa was doing their best to make sure
we didn’t get charged for things we didn’t
need to get charged for.
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